Analysis and design of competing double auction marketplaces by Shi, Bing
University of Southampton Research Repository
ePrints Soton
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders.
  
 When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g.
AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name 
of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination
http://eprints.soton.ac.ukUNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
Analysis and Design of Competing Double
Auction Marketplaces
by
Bing Shi
A thesis submitted in partial fulﬁllment for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Faculty of Physical and Applied Sciences
School of Electronics and Computer Science
Intelligence, Agents, Multimedia Group
January 2011iii
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF PHYSICAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES
SCHOOL OF ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
Doctor of Philosophy
by Bing Shi
The double auction, a highly efﬁcient market mechanism, has been widely used by both tra-
ditional and online exchanges. However, with the globalisation of the economy, these market-
places increasingly need to compete with each other to attract traders and charge suitable fees to
make proﬁts. In this situation, a double auction marketplace needs effective market rules (also
called market policies) to govern the trading activity of its buyers and sellers and the ability to set
fees appropriately in order to make proﬁts and, at the same time, keep existing traders and attract
new ones. To this end, in this thesis, we analyse competing double auction marketplaces, and
use insights from this analysis to design an effective competing marketplace for an international
market design competition, which is called CAT.
In more detail, the design of a competing double auction marketplace consists of determining
market policies, which govern traders’ interactions in the marketplace, and a charging strategy,
which determines the fees charged to traders. In this thesis, we mainly focus on the latter since
this is a signiﬁcant determinant of the traders’ choices of marketplaces and the marketplaces’
proﬁts. Now, the effectiveness of a certain charging strategy depends on the traders’ behaviour,
both in terms of how the fees affect their market selection, as well as their bidding behaviour.
Thus, in order to set an appropriate charging strategy, we need to obtain a fundamental un-
derstanding of the traders’ market selection and bidding strategies. In the context of multiple
competing marketplaces, the optimal choice for a trader in terms of selecting a marketplace and
submitting bids not only depends on its own preferences (i.e. type, which is usually privately
known), but also on the behaviour of other traders and marketplaces, and the optimal choice of a
marketplace in terms of setting fees also depends on the behaviour of traders and other market-
places. Therefore we need to analyse the equilibrium strategies for traders and marketplaces. In
so doing, we consider several settings. In particular, we consider the settings where traders can
only enter one marketplace at a time (single-home trading) and can enter multiple marketplaces
at a time (multi-home trading). Furthermore, we consider the setting where the traded goods are
independent, substitutes or complements. In the analysis, we show how these different trading
environments and different good properties affect the strategies of traders.
In more detail still, we ﬁrst analyse a single-home trading environment with a small number of
discrete trader types, where traders are assumed to use a truth-telling bidding strategy, i.e. sub-
mit their types as their shouts. For this setting, we ﬁrst analyse the equilibrium market selectioniv
strategies of traders for given market fees. We derive the equilibrium strategies analytically and
furthermore use evolutionary game theory to investigate the dynamics of the traders’ strategies.
Our results show that when the same type of fees are charged by two marketplaces, all the traders
will converge to one marketplace. However, when different types of fees are allowed (registra-
tion fees and proﬁt fees), competing marketplaces are more likely to co-exist in equilibrium.
Moreover, we ﬁnd an interesting phenomena that sometimes all the traders eventually migrate
to the marketplace that charges higher fees. We then go on to analyse the equilibrium charging
strategies of the marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, we present two approaches: a static and a dynamic
analysis. The former is based on the assumption that marketplaces set their fees once at the
beginning and so the charging strategies are not affected by the changes in the traders’ market
selection strategies. In the latter analysis, we tackle this limitation by using a co-evolutionary
approach where we analyse how competing marketplaces dynamically set fees while taking into
account the dynamics of the traders’ market selection strategies. From this analysis, we ﬁnd that
two initially identical marketplaces eventually charge the minimal fee that guarantees positive
market proﬁts for them. We also ﬁnd an initially disadvantaged marketplace with an adaptive
charging strategy can beat an initially advantaged one with a ﬁxed charging strategy.
Building on this, we use ﬁctitious play (a computational learning approach) to extend the above
analysis by considering continuous trader types, different trading environments and different
good properties. Moreover, we consider two more types of fees (transaction and transaction
price percentage fees), and instead of assuming that traders adopt a truth-telling bidding strat-
egy, we analyse both the equilibrium market selection and bidding strategies. In more detail,
we ﬁrst analyse traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies in a single marketplace and investigate
how these strategies are affected by the different fees. In so doing, we ﬁnd that registration fees
cause a bigger range of traders not to choose the marketplace; proﬁt fees cause traders to shade
a lot; transaction price percentage fees cause sellers to shade relatively less than buyers. Then
we analyse how different trading environments and different good properties can affect traders’
equilibrium market selection and bidding strategies. We then analyse the effects of different
types of fees on obtaining market proﬁts and keeping traders in a single marketplace environ-
ment. We ﬁnd that the transaction price percentage fee is the most effective in making proﬁts
and keeping traders. Finally, we analyse how competing marketplaces set fees in equilibrium
and show that the marketplace will charge high proﬁt fees since traders can shade.
Finally, in addition to analysing the charging strategies, we also experimentally analyse how
different market policies affect the performance of competing marketplaces in different environ-
ments where traders adopt different bidding strategies. Then, using the insights from analysing
the equilibrium charging strategies and the market policies, we design a competing marketplace,
which we entered into the 2010 CAT competition. This agent performed well and was ranked
ﬁrst in the second day’s competition and second in the third day’s competition.Contents
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Introduction
Exchanges, which are organised marketplaces where securities, futures, stocks and commodities
can be traded, are becoming ever more prevalent. Well known traditional exchanges include the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ, a stock ex-
change), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME, a commodity exchange) and Minneapolis Grain
Exchange (MGEX, a futures exchange). Now, with the development of information technology,
there also exist exchanges to trade goods online. For example, Google offers DoubleClick Ad
Exchange (http://www.doubleclick.com), which is a real-time exchange enabling
large online ad publishers and ad networks and agencies to trade advertising space. Another ex-
ample is FastParts (http://www.fastparts.com), which provides an online exchange
to trade excess electronic components and used manufacturing equipment.
In the past, there was comparatively little interaction among these exchanges because of techni-
cal restrictions (such as slow information transmission and weak data processing ability). How-
ever, because of the globalised economy, now these exchanges do not exist in isolation. For
example, in China, companies can be listed on both the Shanghai and the Shenzhen Stock Ex-
changes; in the USA, companies may be listed on both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and the NASDAQ, and even in non-US marketplaces like the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
Furthermore, the same commodities (such as agricultural products and precious metals) can
be listed on both the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the CME. Now, because
the same stocks and commodities can be listed on multiple exchanges, these exchanges are
in competition with one another to attract companies. For example, when the National Stock
Exchange (NSE) opened in India, it proceeded to claim much of the trade volume from the
more established India’s Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) (Shah and Thomas, 2000). Another
example is that, during the global stock market crash in 1987, unfulﬁlled orders on the CME
overﬂowed onto the NYSE (Miller et al., 1988). This competition also happens between on-
line exchanges. For example, Google’s DoubleClick Ad Exchange competes against other ad
exchanges, such as Microsoft’s AdECN (http://www.adecn.com) and Yahoo!’s Right
Media (http://www.rightmedia.com) in order to attract ad publishers and ad networks
and agencies. In addition, a number of alternative trading systems, often called “dark pools”, or
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“darkliquidity”, or“darkpoolsofliquidity”, arepropagatingrapidly(Carrie,2008). Wellknown
dark pools include Barclays Capital’s Liquidity Cross, Goldman Sachs’s SIGMA X, Citi’s Citi
Match. In contrast to the bulk of trades executed in traditional exchanges, trades in dark pools
are made anonymously and are executed outside of the marketplace. Thus nobody knows who
has just made a transaction and so minimum information about traders is leaked. That’s why it
is called a dark pool. There is evidence that these new trading systems have taken much trade
volume from the traditional exchanges because of this minimum information leakage (Carrie,
2008), and now they are also competing with one another to attract traders by varying their terms
of trades (e.g. Liquidity Cross operates on a continuous matching basis during market hours,
while SIGMA X also offers continuous matching, and in addition, it offers X-Cross in which
the matching takes place at a scheduled time).
Many of these exchanges adopt the double auction market mechanism which is a particular type
of two-sided marketplace with multiple buyers (one side) and multiple sellers (the other side)
(Friedman and Rust, 1993). Speciﬁcally, in such a mechanism, traders can submit offers at any
time in a speciﬁed trading round and they will be matched by the marketplace at a speciﬁed time.
The advantages of this mechanism are that traders can enter the marketplace at any time and they
can trade multiple homogeneous or heterogeneous items in one place without travelling around
several marketplaces. In addition, this mechanism is highly efﬁcient in terms of trading goods
between buyers and sellers (Smith, 1962). Since such a market mechanism has been widely
used by traditional and online exchanges, in this thesis, we focus on the competition between
multiple double auction marketplaces.
Speciﬁcally, in the competition between double auction marketplaces, traders that want to trade
goods (stocks, commodities or advertising spaces) have a choice of marketplaces in which to
participate. Thus marketplaces need to design effective and efﬁcient market rules to govern the
trading process in order to attract traders. Moreover, competing marketplaces usually charge
some form of fee to the traders so they can make proﬁts, and this choice will also affect traders’
choices of marketplaces. Intuitively, we can see that there exists a conﬂict between making
proﬁts by charging fees and attracting traders. A marketplace can make a high short-term proﬁt
by charging high fees, but will lose traders in the long term. Thus they need to set their fees
appropriately to make proﬁts, while still maintaining the number of traders at a good level.
Furthermore, a trader’s choice of competing marketplaces not only depends on market rules and
market fees set by the competing marketplaces, but also depends on other traders’ behaviour (in
terms of selecting marketplaces and making offers). In more detail, buyers(sellers) will prefer
the double auction marketplace with more sellers(buyers) but less buyers(sellers) since this will
increase the probability of making transactions for them. Against this background, in this thesis,
we will analyse how traders behave strategically in the context of competing marketplaces, and
how marketplaces compete with each other effectively in terms of establishing market rules and
setting fees. We will also use insights from this formal analysis to guide the design of a practical
competing marketplace agent.
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double auction marketplace design. Then, in Section 1.2, we discuss the research challenges
of this work and outline our contributions in Section 1.3. Finally, we detail the structure of the
thesis (Section 1.4).
1.1 Competing Marketplace Design
In this section we outline the key components of competing double auction marketplace de-
sign. In more detail, a marketplace can be deﬁned as an actual or metaphorical space, where
a set of rules is established, by which buyers and sellers are in contact to exchange goods or
services (Begg et al., 1994). Given this, research on marketplace design is mainly concerned
with how to design these rules (also called the market policies) to govern traders’ interactions
to achieve some desirable properties, like high allocative efﬁciency (meaning the ratio of total
proﬁts earned by all traders to the maximum possible total proﬁts in the marketplace) or reduced
ﬂuctuation of transaction prices.
Currently, many of the world’s marketplaces are auction based, where an auction is deﬁned as
a mechanism or set of rules for trading goods (Jones, 1988). Therefore, market design is often
also referred to as auction design1. To this end, Wurman et al. (2002) investigate the design
space of auctions, which are commonly used in marketplaces in general, and identify three core
activities which structure the space:
• Receive offers: an offer is the price at which a buyer is willing to buy a good or the price
at which a seller is willing to sell a good. When receiving an offer, the auction needs to
verify whether it satisﬁes the offer accepting rules, and if so, it will admit this offer into
the active set of offers.
• Clear: the central purpose of an auction is to clear the market, i.e. execute all possible
transactions (determining the allocation of goods and the corresponding payments be-
tween buyers and sellers). This activity aims to leave no possible transactions among the
remaining offers. It contains three sub-activities:
– Timing: indicates when to execute possible transactions.
– Matching: indicates how to execute possible transactions.
– Pricing: indicates the corresponding transaction prices between matched buyers and
sellers.
• Revealintermediateinformation: auctionsusuallysupplytraderswithinformationabout
the state of bidding during the process, in order to guide traders toward a ﬁnal outcome.
These status report are called quotes.
1Note that not all marketplaces are auction based, such as traditional shopping centres, eBay’s half.com and
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Thus in the design of auction mechanisms, offer accepting, timing, matching, pricing and quote
policies need to be determined to govern the above core activities. These policies are referred
to as market polices. Now, for ease of exposition, we ﬁrst use an English auction as an example
to introduce these policies. In the English auction, only the bid that is higher than the current
standing bid (which is the highest bid at any given moment) is accepted (offer accepting policy).
If no competing buyer challenges the standing bid in a given time, then the buyer with the
standing bid becomes the winner (timing policy). The item is sold to the buyer with the highest
bid at a price equal to the standing bid (matching and pricing policies). During the auction, all
bids at any time are public to all buyers (quote policy).
In the typical double auction marketplace, market policies are also needed to govern the above
three activities. In more detail, in the double auction, any seller can submit an offer (called an
ask) at any time in a speciﬁed trading period. This ask is observed simultaneously by all buyers
and sellers. Similarly, any buyer can submit an offer (called a bid) at any time, which is also
observed by all buyers and sellers. In the following, we use shout as a generic term for a bid or
an ask, and call the offer accepting policy the shout accepting policy. How traders submit their
shouts is determined by their bidding strategies. When traders attempt to place their shouts,
the marketplace needs to use a shout accepting policy to determine whether to admit a trader’s
shout or not. Then when some shouts have been admitted, the marketplace needs to use a timing
policy to determine when to match bids with asks to make transactions. For a successful match,
the marketplace uses a pricing policy to determine the transaction price between the matched
buyer and seller. Furthermore, the marketplace also needs to generate quote information to help
traders submit shouts based on the quote policy. In order to give further understanding of these
market policies as they are used in double auctions, we now introduce some examples of each of
these different policies: the quote-beating accepting policy which only accepts bids higher than
the bid quote and asks lower than the ask quote (see section 2.3.2.2 for more details); the round
clearing and equilibrium matching policy which clears the marketplace by matching the highest
bids with the lowest asks, and does so when all traders have submitted their shouts (sections
2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.2); the k-pricing policy which sets the transaction price of a matched buyer
and seller at some point in the interval between the buyer’s bid and the seller’s ask (section
2.3.2.2). Speciﬁcally, considering that different bidding strategies will be used by traders in the
double auction marketplace, and these strategies rely on different information provided by the
marketplace, researchers often assume that the quote policy publishes all information about the
state of traders’ shouts to all traders in double auctions. In our research, we also adopt this
assumption, and thus do not need to consider the design of a speciﬁc quote policy.
Moreover, in addition to establishing such policies, marketplaces also need to set charging poli-
cies (also referred to as charging strategies, in this thesis we use the two terms inter-changeably),
which determine fees charged to traders by marketplaces which participate in them. Such fees
enable the marketplaces to earn proﬁts and are common in real life2. In this thesis, we consider
two categories of fees which are common in the real-world marketplaces: ex ante fees, which
2As an example, eBay charges listing fees to sellers when items are listed, and both eBay and Amazon charge
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are charged to traders before they make transactions (like the listing fees adopted by eBay), and
ex post fees, which are charged to traders after they successfully make transactions (like the ﬁ-
nal fees adopted by both eBay and Amazon). In the isolated marketplace environment, a simple
charging strategy is usually sufﬁcient since traders have no other marketplaces to select. How-
ever, in the context of competing marketplaces, traders can move freely among marketplaces
to ﬁnd the best deal. Therefore how marketplaces set fees becomes important since this will
signiﬁcantly affect the traders’ choices of marketplaces and the marketplaces’ proﬁts. Thus in
addition to effective market policies, a smart charging strategy is also needed in the competing
double auction marketplace design.
1.2 Research Challenges
As discussed above, the design of a competing double auction marketplace consists of the design
ofmarketpoliciesandachargingstrategy. Intuitively, we canseethattheeffectivenessofmarket
policies and charging strategy is affected by the traders’ behaviour, which is determined by their
strategies. In more detail, in the context of multiple competing marketplaces, traders need to
decide which marketplaces to participate in (determined by their market selection strategies) and
how to submit their shouts in the selected marketplaces (determined by their bidding strategies).
Thus ﬁrstly, we need to obtain a fundamental understanding of traders’ strategies in terms of
market selection and bidding. Based on this, we can analyse how marketplaces should set their
market policies and charging strategies to make proﬁts while still maintaining traders.
In more detail, in the context of multiple competing double auction marketplaces, traders’ mar-
ket selection and bidding strategies not only depend on market policies and the charging strate-
gies, but also depend on other traders’ strategies. Speciﬁcally, there exists a positive size effect
(Ellison et al., 2004), whereby, buyers(sellers) prefer marketplaces which have a larger number
of sellers(buyers) since this gives the buyers(sellers) access to more choices. Such an effect will
always push all traders towards concentrating into a single marketplace. However, in addition
to the positive size effect, in double auctions, buyers(sellers) also compete with each other in
order to be matched with sellers(buyers). This is referred to as a negative size effect (Ellison
et al., 2004), whereby, traders prefer marketplaces with fewer other traders on the same side.
Thus this negative size effect will push traders to distribute across different marketplaces. The
positive and negative size effects have contrary impacts on the traders’ distribution across multi-
ple marketplaces, and so enhances the complexity of analysing traders’ strategies (especially for
market selection). Furthermore, we are interested in analysing which effect has a larger impact,
and whether competing marketplaces can co-exist, and the competition can be maintained, or
whether the marketplaces collapse to a monopoly setting where all traders move to one market-
place. This is important since competition drives efﬁciency and offers more and better choices to
traders. Moreover, in contrast to much existing work that makes simplifying assumptions that all
traders are homogeneous with the same preferences (i.e. types), or that marketplaces have com-
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traders whose types are only privately known. Speciﬁcally, in such settings, trader types can be
drawn from a discrete distribution (i.e. discrete trader types), or can be drawn from a continuous
distribution (i.e. continuous trader types). These assumptions also increase the complexity of
the analysis.
Furthermore, in the real world, there usually exist three types of trading environments. The
ﬁrst is single-home trading where both buyers and sellers can only select one double auction
marketplace at a time. The second is multi-home trading where both buyers and sellers can
participate in multiple marketplaces at a time. The last is hybrid trading where one side of
traders can only enter one marketplace at a time (i.e. single-home trading), while the other
side of traders can enter multiple marketplaces at a time (i.e. multi-home trading). Different
trading environments will affect traders’ strategies, and, in turn, affect the effectiveness of the
market policies and the charging strategy. For example, in a single-home trading environment,
traders will only participate in the most proﬁtable marketplace, and thus marketplaces have
to compete ﬁercely with each other to attract traders, and have to charge low fees. However,
with multi-home trading, traders will participate in any marketplace that provides non-negative
(or positive) proﬁts for them, and thus marketplaces can charge higher fees to maximise their
proﬁts. In addition to the impact of the trading environments on the marketplace competition,
the properties of the goods traded between buyers and sellers can also affect the competition.
Speciﬁcally, when multiple goods are traded across multiple marketplaces, these goods can be
either independent, substitutes or complementary. When they are independent, the trader’s value
for the multiple goods is additive, i.e. equal to the sum of its value on each individual good.
When they are substitutes, the trader’s value is subadditive, i.e. less than the sum of its value on
each individual good. When the goods are complementary, the trader’s value is superadditive,
i.e. greater than the sum of its value on each individual good. These different properties also
affect traders’ strategies. As an example, when trading complementary goods, buyers may prefer
to buy as many goods as they can, and thus will try to bid high in several marketplaces to make
more transactions. Therefore, when analysing competing double auction marketplaces, we need
to consider these different situations.
In this thesis, we consider all the above factors when analysing competing double auction mar-
ketplaces. More speciﬁcally, the research challenges of this thesis that deal with a number of
issues in the competing marketplace design are as follows:
1. Analyse the traders’ market selection strategies: In the competing marketplace context,
traders can move freely between marketplaces to search for the most proﬁtable one. In-
tuitively, we can see that how traders select marketplaces is important since this will sig-
niﬁcantly affect the competition result of marketplaces. For example, this will affect the
traders’ distribution across marketplaces, and, in turn, affect the market proﬁts. Further-
more, this will also affect the marketplaces’ decisions of establishing market policies and
charging strategies. Thus ﬁrstly, we should obtain a fundamental understanding about
traders’ market selection strategies. In the double auction with multiple buyers and mul-
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depends on market policies and fees charged to it, but also depends on the behaviour of
other traders. Thus we need to analyse the equilibrium market selection strategies for
traders. Furthermore, as discussed above, traders’ market selection strategies are affected
by different trading environments and different properties of trading goods, and thus we
need to consider these factors in the analysis.
2. Analyse the traders’ bidding strategies: After selecting marketplaces, traders need to de-
termine the shouts which they should submit in the chosen marketplaces. How traders
submit shouts is also important since it will also affect the marketplaces’ decisions of
setting market policies and fees. Thus in addition to the market selection strategies, we
also need to analyse the bidding strategies for traders. Similar to the market selection
strategies, in double auctions, the optimal choice for a trader in terms of placing a certain
shout not only depends on market policies and fees charged to it, but also depends on the
shouts placed by other traders. Thus we need to analyse the equilibrium bidding strategies
for traders. Currently, most work on bidding strategies is restricted to single marketplaces
without considering inter-marketplace competition. Actually, even for the single market-
place, the equilibrium bidding strategy for traders is a challenging problem. In addition, in
the competing marketplace context, we also need to analyse traders’ equilibrium bidding
strategies across multiple marketplaces. Furthermore, traders’ bidding strategies are af-
fected by the different trading environments and the different properties of trading goods
as well, and thus we have to incorporate these factors in the analysis.
3. Analyse the market policies: The ﬁrst part of competing market design is the choice of
the market policies. A considerable body of work exists on the market policy design of
an isolated double auction marketplace without inter-marketplace competition (in section
2.3.2.2, we introduce this work in detail). However, we do not know which market policy
will perform well when competing with other policies. Currently, there is no systematic
work on analysing the performance of market policies in the competing environment.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of a market policy also depends on the traders’ behaviour.
Therefore, we need to analyse how different market policies affect the performance of
competing marketplaces by considering different behaviours for traders.
4. Analyse the charging strategy: The second part of competing market design is the choice
of a charging strategy. By charging fees to traders, the marketplaces can make proﬁts.
However, as mentioned previously, there exists a conﬂict between attracting traders and
making proﬁts. Thus the competing marketplace has to be able to set appropriate fees to
maximise its proﬁt, while at the same time maintain the number of traders at a good level.
Furthermore, during the competition, the marketplace’s opponents may change their fees
and traders’ bidding and market selection behaviour may change as well, and thus the
marketplaces should be able to adapt their fees to these changes. Moreover, in the real
world, marketplaces charge different types of fees, which usually have different effects
on the traders’ strategies and on obtaining proﬁts for marketplaces. For example, when
an entry fee is charged to traders for joining a marketplace, some traders may not choose8 Chapter 1 Introduction
the marketplace because of the potential of negative trader proﬁts that may be caused by
this fee. Thus charging an entry fee may result in good market proﬁt for the marketplace,
but cause a decrease in the number of traders entering the marketplace. Similarly, when
a percentage fee is charged on transaction proﬁt made by traders, traders will choose
this marketplace since such a fee guarantees non-negative proﬁts for them. However,
the marketplace may not be able to obtain a good market proﬁt even by charging a high
percentage fee since traders can shade their shouts to hide their actual transaction proﬁts
(as we will show in Section 4.4.1). Therefore, we need to analyse what types of fees are
appropriate and effective for marketplaces to obtain market proﬁts and maintain traders.
5. Design and evaluate a competing marketplace: Once we have analysed market policies
and charging strategies and obtained insights from the analysis, we will use these insights
to design a practical competing marketplace agent. Furthermore, in order to test the ef-
fectiveness of our design, we will evaluate it in the CAT competition, an international
benchmarking exercise in this area.
1.3 Research Contributions
In order to reach the ultimate aim of designing an effective competing double auction market-
place, ﬁrstly, we theoretically analyse the market selection and bidding strategies for traders
and charging strategies for marketplaces. In our system, intuitively, we can see that how a
trader selects a marketplace and submits a shout depends on other traders’ decisions, as well
as the market policies and market fees. Similarly, how a competing marketplace sets its fees
depends on the traders’ strategies and other marketplaces’ fees. Thus game theory (Binmore,
1991; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), which mathematically studies such strategic interactions
between self-interested agents where an individual’s success in making choices depends on the
choices of others, is the appropriate tool for theoretically analysing our system. In particular,
we will analyse the Nash equilibrium bidding and market selection strategies for traders and
the Nash equilibrium charging strategies for marketplaces. By so doing, this is the ﬁrst work
to comprehensively analyse competing double auction marketplaces from a theoretical perspec-
tive. Furthermore, we empirically analyse the effectiveness of different market policies in the
context of an international market design competition (CAT), which is part of the Trading Agent
Competition (TAC) (Cai et al., 2009). Finally, we use the insights obtained from the theoretical
and empirical analysis to guide the design of a practical competing double auction marketplace.
More speciﬁcally, the research contributions of this thesis are:
1. We use game theory to analyse the market selection strategies for traders in the setting
with discrete trader types. This addresses research challenge 1. This is the ﬁrst work on
analysing the equilibrium market selection strategies for traders in the context of multiple
double auction marketplaces, where traders have privately know types. Here we assumeChapter 1 Introduction 9
that traders use a simple, truth-telling bidding strategy, and can only select one market-
place at a time (i.e. single-home trading). Given these assumptions, we ﬁrst analyse the
Nash equilibrium strategies for traders’ market selection for given market fees. Further-
more we analyse how traders dynamically change their market selection strategies and
which of the equilibria can be reached using evolutionary game theory (EGT). We show
that, when the same type of fees are charged, it is unlikely that multiple competing mar-
ketplaces will co-exist at long term despite the negative size effect; all traders will simply
converge to one of the marketplaces in equilibrium. However, when different types of fees
are allowed, competing marketplaces can co-exist over the long term. Counter-intuitively,
we ﬁnd that in certain situations all traders may converge to the marketplace that charges
higher fees when the marketplace initially has a larger market share. This means that the
marketplace can maintain both high number of traders and high proﬁts. We then analyse
this interesting phenomenon in more detail. Speciﬁcally, we analyse and characterise in
what situations traders select the marketplace that charges higher fees and what factors
affect this selection.
2. We game-theoretically analyse the charging strategies for marketplaces in the setting
with discrete trader types. This addresses research challenge 4. After having established
the traders’ equilibrium market selection strategies (i.e. contribution 1), we proceed to
analyse how competing double auction marketplaces should set their fees to make proﬁts
in equilibrium in the same setting as that in contribution 1. This is also the ﬁrst work
on analysing how two competing double auction marketplaces set fees in equilibrium. In
particular, we analyse the Nash equilibrium charging strategies for marketplaces using
two different approaches. In the ﬁrst, we calculate marketplaces’ proﬁts for each possible
type of fees, and then generate the payoff table, from which we ﬁnd the equilibrium fees.
However, this method does not consider the fact that marketplaces’ charging strategies are
affected by the dynamic changes of the traders’ market selection strategies. In the sec-
ond approach, we address this limitation by modelling the interplay as a two-stage game,
where, in the ﬁrst stage, competing marketplaces set their fees, and, in the second stage,
traders select a marketplace conditional on these fees. We then use a co-evolutionary ap-
proach to analyse this game. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that two initially identical competing
marketplaces will eventually charge the minimal fee that guarantees positive market prof-
its for them when traders initially have an equal probability of choosing each of them. We
also ﬁnd that by dynamically evolving the charging strategy, it is possible for the market-
place that is initially at a disadvantage to outperform its opponent, which is also able to
evolve its charging strategy. Furthermore, we show that an initially disadvantaged mar-
ketplace with an adaptive charging strategy can beat the initially advantaged one with a
ﬁxed charging strategy.
3. We use ﬁctitious play to analyse the market selection and bidding strategies for traders
and charging strategies for marketplaces in the setting with continuous trader types.
This addresses research challenges 1, 2 and 4. We use ﬁctitious play, a computational
learning approach, to extend the above analysis by considering continuous trader types,10 Chapter 1 Introduction
different trading environments and different properties of trading goods. Here we assume
that traders adopt discrete shouts. Given this setting, we ﬁrst analyse the equilibrium
bidding strategies for traders in single double auction marketplaces without considering
inter-marketplace competition. We show empirically that the ﬁctitious play algorithm
converges to a unique pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We then analyse how market fees
affect these strategies. By so doing, this is the ﬁrst work that analyses what traders will
bid in equilibrium in double auctions and analyses the effect of market fees on the equilib-
rium bidding strategies. Building on this analysis, we go on to study competing market-
place environments where we consider both the traders’ bidding and the market selection
strategies. Firstly, we analyse the traders’ equilibrium strategies in the single-home trad-
ing environment with independent trading goods. We ﬁnd that all traders that choose
a marketplace eventually converge to the same one. We then extended the analysis by
considering multi-home and hybrid trading environments and different good properties,
which is also the ﬁrst work on considering these factors in the analysis of competing
double auction marketplaces. Finally, we analyse what types of fees are effective for
marketplaces to obtain market proﬁts and maintain traders, and what are the equilibrium
charging strategies.
4. We empirically analyse market policies and design an effective charging strategy for the
CAT competition. This addresses research challenges 3 and 5. Through extensive exper-
iments, which are based on the CAT competition platform, we obtain empirical insights
about how each market policy inﬂuences the performance of competing marketplaces
when different bidding strategies are adopted (GD, ZIP, RE and ZI-C bidding strategies,
see Section 2.3.2.1). Examples of such insights include the fact that the allocative ef-
ﬁciency of a marketplace is low when it adopts a continuous clearing policy with most
traders using a ZI-C or RE bidding strategy, or when the marketplace adopts an equilib-
rium accepting policy with most traders using a GD or ZIP bidding strategy. From these
insights, we design market policies used for the CAT competition. Furthermore, based on
our theoretical analysis of charging strategies, we design a novel and adaptive charging
strategy in which the marketplace adjusts its fees based on the relative number of transac-
tions. Finally, we entered our competing marketplace into the 2010 CAT competition and
showed that it performed very well in this open benchmarking competition.
The following peer reviewed papers have been published or submitted to support these contri-
butions:
• Shi, B., Gerding, E. H., Vytelingum, P. and Jennings, N. R. (2010) An Equilibrium Analy-
sis of Market Selection Strategies and Fee Strategies in Competing Double Auction Mar-
ketplaces. Submitted to the Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems.
In this paper, we analyse the equilibrium market selection strategies for traders in the
setting with discrete trader types and use a co-evolutionary approach to analyse the equi-
librium charging strategies for marketplaces. This deals with contributions 1 and 2 (seeChapter 1 Introduction 11
Chapter 3).
• Shi, B., Gerding, E. H., Vytelingum, P. and Jennings, N. R. (2010) An Equilibrium Analy-
sis of Competing Double Auction Marketplaces using Fictitious Play. In: 19th European
Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence (ECAI), Lisbon, Portugal. pp. 575-580.
In this paper, we use ﬁctitious play to analyse the equilibrium bidding and market selec-
tion strategies for traders in the setting with continuous trader types. This partly deals
with contribution 3 (see Chapter 4).
• Shi, B., Gerding, E. H., Vytelingum, P. and Jennings, N. R. (2010) A Game-Theoretic
Analysis of Market Selection Strategies for Competing Double Auction Marketplaces.
In: 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AA-
MAS2010), Toronto, Canada. pp. 857-864.
In this paper, we game theoretically analyse Nash equilibrium market selection strategies
for traders in the setting with discrete trader types, and use EGT to analyse the dynamics
of traders’ strategies. This deals with contribution 1 (see Chapter 3).
• Shi, B., Gerding, E. H., Vytelingum, P. and Jennings, N. R. (2010) Setting Fees in Com-
peting Double Auction Marketplaces: An Equilibrium Analysis. In: 12th International
Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC 2010), Toronto, Canada. pp.
85-98.
In this paper, we game theoretically analyse Nash equilibrium charging strategies for
traders given traders’ equilibrium market selection strategies. This deals with contribution
2 (see Chapter 3).
• Vytelingum, P., Vetsikas, I., Shi, B.andJennings, N.R.(2008)IAMwildCAT:TheWinning
Strategy for the TAC Market Design Competition. In: 18th European Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (ECAI), Patras, Greece. pp. 428-432.
In this paper, we empirically analyse the market policies used in the CAT competition
context. This partly deals with contribution 4 (see Chapter 5).
1.4 Thesis Structure
The outline of the thesis is as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we provide the necessary background on game theory and markets, and anal-
yse the literature about both isolated and competing marketplaces. Finally, we describe
the CAT competition and review relevant work in this competition.
• In Chapter 3, we game theoretically analyse the equilibrium market selection strategies
for traders and the equilibrium charging strategies for marketplaces in the setting with
discrete trader types.12 Chapter 1 Introduction
• In Chapter 4, we use ﬁctitious play to analyse the equilibrium market selection and bid-
ding strategies for traders in the setting with continuous trader types, different trading
environments and different good properties. We also analyse the effects of different types
offeesonobtainingmarketproﬁts. Furthermore, weanalysehowcompetingmarketplaces
set fees in equilibrium.
• In Chapter 5, we empirically analyse the performance of different market policies when
different bidding strategies are adopted, and use insights from this analysis to design mar-
ket policies for the CAT competition. We also use insights from the theoretical analysis
of the charging strategy to guide the practical design of a novel and adaptive charging
strategy. We show that our design of market policies and the charging strategy performed
well in the 2010 CAT competition.
• In Chapter 6, we conclude this thesis and outline future work.Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we begin by introducing the basic background on game theory (Section 2.1) and
general market theory from microeconomics (Section 2.2). These topics are relevant because
they form the foundations for analysing marketplace competition. Then, we go on to describe
related literature about isolated marketplaces, including bidding strategies and market policies
(Section 2.3). Following this, we review work on competing marketplaces (Section 2.4). We
then introduce the Market Design Competition (Section 2.5). Finally, we summarise this chapter
(Section 2.6).
2.1 Background on Game Theory
Game theory, which studies the strategic interactions of self-interested agents mathematically, is
an important part of microeconomics. Thus it has been widely used to analyse the interactions
between traders and between competing marketplaces. In this section, we provide the basic
notions from game theory which are related to our work. For a comprehensive overview of this
area, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
In more detail, a game consists of a set of players which we will denote by I = {1,2,...,I}.
Each player has a strategy, which is a complete contingent plan, or decision rule, to specify
how this player will act in each possible distinguishable circumstance. Speciﬁcally, we use si
to represent a strategy for player i, and si ∈ S i, where S i is the set of all possible strategies
for player i. In the game, the strategies of all players constitute a strategy proﬁle, which is an
I-tuple, ¯ s = hs1,..., sIi ∈ S, where S = S 1 × ... × S I is the set of all possible strategy proﬁles.
In addition, we use s−i = hs1,..., si−1, si+1,..., sIi to represent the strategy proﬁle for all players
except i, and s−i ∈ S 1 × ... × S i−1 × S i+1 × ... × S I. Now ¯ s can be rewritten as ¯ s = hsi, s−ii. Each
strategy proﬁle will induce an outcome for the game. Players have different preferences over
different outcomes. We use utility functions to describe players’ preferences over outcomes.
Formally, the player i’s utility function is deﬁned as Ui : S → R, which is a mapping from the
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set of players’ strategy proﬁles to the utilities over the outcomes induced by the strategy proﬁles.
Now, given the set of players, the players’ strategy proﬁles and the utility functions, a game can
be formally represented in the following way:
Deﬁnition 2.1. For a game with player set I, Γ speciﬁes for each player i a set of strategies
S i (with si ∈ S i) and a utility function Ui(hs1,..., sIi). Formally, the game can be written as
Γ = [I,{S i},{Ui(·)}], i ∈ I.
The strategy we presented above is termed a pure strategy, where players choose strategies in
a deterministic way. However, stable outcomes (e.g. Nash equilibria, as we will introduce
below) where all players play pure strategies, do not always exist. Therefore, in addition to
pure strategy, we also introduce the mixed strategy, whereby a probability is assigned to each
pure strategy. The mixed strategy allows a player to randomly select a pure strategy. Formally,
a mixed strategy of player i can be deﬁned as ωi : S i → [0,1], which assigns to each pure
strategy si ∈ S i a probability ωi(si) ≥ 0 that it will be played, where
P
si∈Si ωi(si) = 1. Here, it is
important to note that a pure strategy can be regarded as a degenerate case of a mixed strategy,
where the particular pure strategy is selected with probability 1 and every other strategy with
probability 0. Because probabilities are continuous, there are inﬁnitely many mixed strategies
availabletoaplayer, evenwhenthepurestrategysetisﬁnite. Thesetofpossiblemixedstrategies
for player i which has M pure strategies in set S i = {si 1,..., si M} can be represented by
∆i =
n 
ωi(si 1),...,ωi(si M)

∈ RM : ωi(si m) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ {1,..., M} and
M X
m=1
ωi(si m) = 1
o
Similarly, a mixed strategy proﬁle can be denoted by ¯ ω = hω1,...ωIi ∈ ∆, where ∆ = ∆1×...×∆I
is the set of all possible mixed strategy proﬁles. Furthermore, the mixed strategy proﬁle can be
rewritten as ¯ ω = hωi,ω−ii, where ω−i ∈ ∆1 × ... × ∆i−1 × ∆i+1 × ... × ∆I is the mixed strategy
proﬁle for all players except i. Now, the players’ utility functions need to be redeﬁned since their
utilities are in expectation over probability distributions of pure strategies. Speciﬁcally, player
i’s expected utility function is deﬁned as ˜ Ui : ∆ → R. In more detail, it is the expectation over
the probability distribution of pure strategy proﬁle ¯ s = hs1,..., sIi:
˜ Ui(¯ ω) =
X
¯ s∈S
Y
i∈I
ωi(si) ∗ Ui(¯ s)
Therefore, the game where players adopt mixed strategies can be written as Γ = [I,{∆i},{ ˜ Ui(·)}],
i ∈ I.
Afterpresentingthegamewithmixedstrategies, wenowintroducethenotionofsolution concept.
In this context, a solution concept is a formal rule used to predict how the game will be played.
These predictions describe which strategies will be adopted by the players, therefore predicting
the outcome of the game. In the following, we describe the two most commonly used solution
concepts: dominant strategy and Nash equilibrium. For the solution concept of dominant strat-
egy, it means that the player can maximise its utility by adopting a certain strategy no matter
what strategies other players use. Formally, a dominant strategy is deﬁned as:Chapter 2 Literature Review 15
Deﬁnition 2.2. A pure strategy si ∈ S i is a dominant strategy for player i in game Γ =
[I,{S i},{Ui(·)}], i ∈ I, if
∀s0
i ∈ S i and s0
i , si,∀s−i ∈ S −i,Ui(hsi, s−ii) ≥ Ui(hs0
i, s−ii)
Generally speaking, a dominant strategy is a very robust solution concept since it is not based on
any assumptions about the information available to players about each other, and also does not
require each player to believe that other players will adopt its own optimal strategy. However,
the shortcoming is that dominant strategies often do not exist.
The other main solution concept, the Nash equilibrium, requires that in equilibrium, each player
will select the strategy which maximises its (expected) utility given the strategies of all other
players. Formally, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 2.3. A pure strategy proﬁle ¯ s∗ = hs∗
1,..., s∗
Ii constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium of game Γ = [I,{S i},{Ui(·)}], i ∈ I, if
∀i ∈ I,∀si ∈ S i,Ui(hs∗
i, s∗
−ii) ≥ Ui(hsi, s∗
−ii)
This deﬁnition can be extended to the game including mixed strategies:
Deﬁnition 2.4. A mixed strategy proﬁle ¯ ω∗ = hω∗
1,...,ω∗
Ii constitutes a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium of game Γ = [I,{∆i},{ ˜ Ui(·)}], i ∈ I, if
∀i ∈ I,∀ωi ∈ ∆i, ˜ Ui(hω∗
i,ω∗
−ii) ≥ ˜ Ui(hωi,ω∗
−ii)
Furthermore, in some games, it may be too complicated to derive the Nash equilibrium. There-
fore researchers have to approximate the Nash equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, -Nash equilibrium is
proposed as a solution concept which approximately satisﬁes the condition of Nash equilibrium
(Leyton-Brown and Shoh, 2008). It is formally deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 2.5. A pure strategy proﬁle ¯ s∗ = hs∗
1,..., s∗
Ii constitutes a pure strategy -Nash equi-
librium of game Γ = [I,{S i},{Ui(·)}], i ∈ I, if
∀i ∈ I,∀si ∈ S i,Ui(hs∗
i, s∗
−ii) ≥ Ui(hsi, s∗
−ii) − 
It means that in the -Nash equilibrium, it is not possible for any player to gain more than
 in expected utility by unilaterally deviating from its strategy. This deﬁnition for the game
with mixed strategies is analogous. Note that every Nash Equilibrium is equivalent to a -Nash
equilibrium where  = 0. In Chapter 4, we use this concept to approximate the Nash equilibrium
strategies for traders.
So far, in the description of Nash equilibrium, we have assumed that each player knows the
relevant information of all players, including their preferences on the outcomes (i.e. utility func-16 Chapter 2 Literature Review
tions). Such games are known as games of complete information. However, this is a very strong
assumption that does not hold in all settings. For example, in a double auction marketplace, a
trader may not know other traders’ preferences for the goods. To overcome this shortcoming,
the extension of Nash equilibrium, Bayes-Nash equilibrium was introduced by Harsanyi (1962).
Formally, in a Bayesian game, each player is assumed to share common knowledge about the
probability distributions of players’ preferences (which are also formally referred to as types)
F(θ1,...,θI), where θi denotes player i’s type. θi ∈ Θi, where Θi is the set of all possible types
for player i. Furthermore, in a Bayesian game, a pure strategy for player i is a function si(x),
which speciﬁes the player’s action choice for each possible type x ∈ Θi. The set of all possible
pure strategies for player i is denoted by S i. Moreover, in a Bayesian game, although a player
does not know other player’s types, it usually assumes that each player knows its own type. The
expected utility of a player i with type θi given a strategy proﬁle, ¯ s = hs1(·),..., sI(·)i, is then
described as:
˜ Ui(hs1(·),..., sI(·)i,θi) = Eθ−i[Ui(hs1(θ1),...sI(θI)i,θi)]
which is in expectation over probability distributions of all other players’ types . Ui(hs1(θ1),...,
sI(θI)i,θi)istheplayeri’sutilityontheoutcomeinducedbyplayers’strategyproﬁlehs1(·),..., sI(·)i
on the speciﬁc realisation of players’ types θ1,...,θI. Then a Bayesian game can be deﬁned as
[I,{S i},{ ˜ Ui(·)},Θ,F(·)], i ∈ I, where Θ = Θ1 × ... × ΘI.
Furthermore, the mixed strategy for player i in the Bayesian game can be deﬁned as a function
ωi(y), which speciﬁes the probability of the pure strategy y ∈ S i being used by player i. ωi(y) ∈
∆i, where ∆i is the set of all possible mixed strategies for player i. Then the expected utility of
a player i with type θi given a mixed strategy proﬁle hω1(·),...,ωI(·)i can be described as:
˜ Ui(hω1(·),...,ωI(·)i,θi) =
X
¯ s∈S
ω(¯ s) ∗ Eθ−i[Ui(hs1(θ1),...sI(θI)i,θi)]
which is in expectation over probability distributions of pure strategy proﬁles and over prob-
ability distributions of other players’ types. ω(¯ s) =
Q
i∈I ωi(si) is the probability of the pure
strategy proﬁle ¯ s taking place. Then a Bayesian game with mixed strategies can be deﬁned as
[I,{∆i},{ ˜ Ui(·)},Θ,F(·)], i ∈ I, where Θ = Θ1 × ... × ΘI.
In the Bayes-Nash equilibrium, each player selects a strategy to maximise its expected utility
given the expected utility maximising strategies of other players. Formally:
Deﬁnition 2.6. A pure strategy proﬁle hs∗
1(·),..., s∗
I(·)i constitutes a pure strategy Bayes-Nash
equilibrium of Bayesian game Γ = [I,{S i},{ ˜ Ui(·)},Θ,F(·)], if
∀i ∈ I,∀θi ∈ Θi,∀si(·) ∈ S i, ˜ Ui(hs∗
i(·), s∗
−i(·)i,θi) ≥ ˜ Ui(hsi(·), s∗
−i(·)i,θi)
Similarly, the deﬁnition can be extended to the game with mixed strategy:
Deﬁnition 2.7. A mixed strategy proﬁle hω∗
1(·),...,ω∗
I(·)i constitutes a mixed strategy Bayes-Chapter 2 Literature Review 17
Nash equilibrium of Bayesian game Γ = [I,{∆i},{ ˜ Ui(·)},Θ,F(·)], if
∀i ∈ I,∀θi ∈ Θi,∀ωi(·) ∈ ∆i, ˜ Ui(hω∗
i(·),ω∗
−i(·)i,θi) ≥ ˜ Ui(hωi(·),ω∗
−i(·)i,θi)
Furthermore, in some games, there may exist multiple Nash equilibria. For this situation, re-
searchers usually assume that players with the same type will adopt the same strategy in equilib-
rium, which is referred to as symmetric Nash equilibrium. In our work on analysing competing
marketplaces with incomplete information, as is common in game theory, we will also focus on
the symmetric Nash equilibrium of traders’ market selection and bidding strategies (see Chap-
ters 3 and 4).
2.1.1 Evolutionary Game Theory
Up to this point, we have introduced the key relevant deﬁnitions of game theory, which will
be useful in our analysis of competing marketplaces. However, the Nash equilibrium makes
an assumption that all players have the abilities to correctly anticipate the opposing players in
equilibrium. It fails to reﬂect the fact that in the real world, people may not make decisions un-
der this assumption. Furthermore, traditional game theory only provides a static explanation for
why populations playing Nash equilibrium strategies remain in that state since each population
makes a best response to the other populations’ strategies. It fails to indicate whether the Nash
equilibrium strategies can be reached and which of these equilibria is most likely to occur. To
address these limitations, Maynard (1982) adopted the idea of evolution from biology to game
theory, which originated evolutionary game theory (EGT). In the biological circumstances, it
is also impossible to determine what decisions are the most rational ones, and therefore each
“player” has to learn to optimise its strategy and maximise its utility (i.e evolution). Further-
more, the basic techniques developed in EGT were also initially formulated in the context of
evolutionary biology (Maynard, 1982; Weibull, 1996). Speciﬁcally, in EGT, a dynamic process
is constructed where the proportions of various strategies in a population evolve. In more detail,
replicator dynamics are adopted in EGT to specify how players gradually adjust their strategies
over time in response to the repeated observation of their opponents’ strategies. They are for-
malised as a system of differential equations. In the following, we will introduce the replicator
dynamics equation for a single and a multiple population setting.
In a single population setting, players have the same set of pure strategies to employ. Fur-
thermore, since a very large population is being considered, the population proportion of using
different pure strategies is equivalent to the mixed strategy1. Speciﬁcally, players are assumed to
choose a strategy from the set of M pure strategies {s1,..., sM}, and the probability of the strategy
sm being used is represented by ωm. Then the mixed strategy can be denoted as ω = (ω1,...,ωM),
where
PM
m=1 ωm = 1. The replicator dynamics will specify the dynamic adjustment of the prob-
1Note that the actual number of players in the game is not the size of the population. However, in the evolution,
players’ strategies are sampled from this large population.18 Chapter 2 Literature Review
ability of which pure strategy should be played, and it is deﬁned as ˙ ω = (˙ ω1,..., ˙ ωM), which
describes how players gradually evolve their strategies over time. In more detail, the element
˙ ωm in ˙ ω is deﬁned as follows:
˙ ωm =
dωm
dt
= [ ˜ U(sm,ω) − ˜ U(ω,ω)] ∗ ωm (m = 1,..., M) (2.1)
where ˜ U(sm,ω) is the expected utility of a player using pure strategy sm when all other players
employ the mixed strategy ω, and ˜ U(ω,ω) is the expected utility for the mixed strategy ω. To
get the dynamics of the game, one needs to calculate trajectories, which indicate how the mixed
strategies evolve. In more detail, initially, a mixed strategy ω is randomly chosen as a starting
point. The dynamics ˙ ω is then calculated according to equation 2.1. According to the changes
of the probabilities of which pure strategy should be played, their current mixed strategy can
be updated. This calculation is repeated until ˙ ω becomes a zero vector. At this moment, the
equilibrium is reached, which is the current mixed strategy. The replicator dynamics show the
trajectories and how they converge to a Nash equilibrium. We call a Nash equilibrium to which
trajectoriesconverge, anattractor, andcallaNashequilibriumtowhichnotrajectoriesconverge,
a saddle point. The region where all trajectories converge to a particular equilibrium is called
the basin of attraction of this equilibrium. The basin is very useful since when each starting
point is selected by players with an equal probability, its size indicates how likely the population
is to converge to that equilibrium (Bullock, 1997).
In the above, we introduced replicator dynamics where interaction takes place between players
from the same population, in which players evolve their mixed strategies in the same way. How-
ever, in many games, interaction may take place between players from different populations,
in which players from different populations evolve their mixed strategies differently. To this
end, we introduce replicator dynamics equations in the setting with two different populations.
Speciﬁcally, players from the two populations are assumed to choose strategies from {s1,..., sM}
and {s0
1,..., s0
M0} respectively. ω = (ω1,...,ωM) and ω0 = (ω0
1,...,ω0
M0) are used to denoted the
mixed strategies used by players from the two populations respectively. Then the replicator dy-
namics of the two populations are ˙ ω = (˙ ω1,..., ˙ ωM) and ˙ ω0 = (˙ ω0
1,..., ˙ ω0
M0) respectively. Their
individual elements ˙ ωm and ˙ ω0
m0 are calculated as follows:
˙ ωm =
dωm
dt
= [ ˜ U(sm,ω,ω0) − ˜ U(ω,ω,ω0)] ∗ ωm (m = 1,..., M) (2.2)
˙ ω0
m0 =
dω0
m0
dt
= [ ˜ U0(s0
m,ω,ω0) − ˜ U0(ω0,ω,ω0)] ∗ ω0
m0 (m0 = 1,..., M0) (2.3)
where ˜ U(sm,ω,ω0) is the expected utility of a player from a population using pure strategy sm
when all other players from this population use the mixed strategy ω and all players from the
other population use the mixed strategy ω0, and ˜ U(ω,ω,ω0) is the expected utility for the player
using the mixed strategy ω. Using equations 2.2 and 2.3, we can then calculate the dynamics of
the two populations’ strategies starting from various initial mixed strategies. From these equa-
tions, we can see that the dynamic change of a mixed strategy in each population is determined
by the mixed strategy of the other population. Furthermore, the replicator dynamics equationsChapter 2 Literature Review 19
for the two population setting can easily be extended in the same way to more population set-
tings.
Evolutionary game theory has been widely used to study the interaction of self-interested agents
(e.g. see Tuyls 2004; Phelps 2008). In Chapter 3, we will use evolutionary game theory to anal-
yse the dynamics of traders’ market selection strategies and ﬁnd which equilibrium is the most
likely to occur. Furthermore, we use will evolutionary game theory to analyse the marketplaces’
equilibrium charging strategies from a static and a dynamic approach respectively.
2.1.2 Fictitious Play
In the above, we have introduced traditional game theory and evolutionary game theory. How-
ever, ﬁnding a Nash equilibrium is usually computationally demanding. The Lemke-Howson
algorithm (Lemke and Howson, 1964), perhaps the best-known algorithm for computing Nash
equilibrium, has been shown to require exponential time on some instances (Savani and Sten-
gel, 2006). Given this, one possible way is to approximate the Nash equilibrium, i.e. compute
the -Nash equilibrium. There exist a number of algorithms to approximate Nash equilibrium
(Spirakis, 2008). A well-known algorithm for approximating Nash equilibrium is ﬁctitious play,
which is a computational learning approach (von Neumann and Brown, 1950; Brown, 1951). In
the following, we describe the basics of this algorithm in detail.
In the standard FP algorithm (von Neumann and Brown, 1950; Brown, 1951), opponents are as-
sumed to play a mixed strategy. Then by observing relative appearance frequencies of different
actions, the player can estimate their opponents’ mixed strategies, and take a best response to
those strategies. The observed frequencies of opponents’ actions are termed FP beliefs. In each
round, all players estimate their opponents’ mixed strategies and update their FP beliefs, and
play a best response to their FP beliefs. All players continually iterate this process until it con-
verges. This algorithm has two types of convergence. First, it may converge to a pure strategy,
which means that after a number of iterations, the best response strategy of each player is stable.
At this moment, all players’ best response strategies constitute a pure Nash equilibrium. Sec-
ond, it may converge in FP beliefs. At this moment, the converged FP beliefs constitute a mixed
Nash equilibrium. However, in reality, it is impossible to run the algorithm to convergence since
it involves an inﬁnite number of iteration rounds. Therefore, it is often used to approximate the
Nash equilibrium (i.e. deriving the -Nash equilibrium) by running the ﬁctitious play algorithm
for a limited number of rounds.
However, we should note that the standard FP algorithm is not suitable for analysing Bayesian
games in which there is incomplete information (i.e. the player’s type is not known to the other
players). In such games, a strategy is a function that maps the set of player types to the set
of allowed actions for the player. In the standard FP algorithm, by observing the frequency of
opponents’ actions, we cannot know the actual strategy of a player since we do not know which
type performs which action. To address this, Rabinovich et al. (2009) provided a generalised20 Chapter 2 Literature Review
ﬁctitious play algorithm to analyse Bayesian games with continuous types and a ﬁnite action
space. Using this algorithm, when the FP beliefs converge, they either directly converge to
a pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium, or can be puriﬁed to produce a pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(Radner and Rosenthal, 1982). Moreover, it is known that a pure Nash equilibrium always exists
given the conditions that the game is non-atomic, giving zero probability to any speciﬁc player
type to appear, and the action space is ﬁnite. However, in Rabinovich et al. (2009), researchers
only showed how to use this algorithm to analyse traders’ strategies in single-sided auctions.
Building on this, in Chapter 4, we will describe how to apply this ﬁctitious play algorithm to
approximate the Bayes-Nash equilibrium market selection and bidding strategies for traders in
the much more complex environment with multiple competing double auction marketplaces.
2.2 Background on Markets
After introducing the key basic deﬁnitions of game theory, we now give an overview on general
market theory from microeconomics. The key concepts introduced in the general market theory
will help us understand the double auction marketplace. In such settings, a market consists of
one or more buyers and sellers. Typically, each seller has a cost price for the item it possesses.
This is the lowest price it is willing to sell the item for. Similarly, each buyer has a limit price
for the item it wishes to buy, which is the highest price that it is willing to buy the item for.
The cost(limit) prices of traders are denoted by types in game theory. At each possible price,
the quantity of a commodity buyers wish to buy is referred to as demand, and the quantity of
a commodity that sellers want to sell is referred to as supply. Usually, the greater the price
of the commodity, the lower the demand, and the lower the price, the higher the demand. Such
characteristics of demand and supply are often represented by an underlying demand and supply
curve2, which is a function of demand and supply with respect to price (see Figure 2.1).
Given a stable underlying demand and supply, classical microeconomic theory claims that in a
marketplace with proﬁt-motivated3 traders, transaction prices will converge to an equilibrium
price p∗, where the quantity of demand is equal to the quantity of supply (Mas-Collel et al.,
1995). This quantity is referred to as the equilibrium quantity q∗. The reason why transac-
tion prices are beheld to converge to an equilibrium price is as follows. In a marketplace with
proﬁt-motivated traders, when transaction prices are below the equilibrium price, there is excess
demand. Because of this, sellers can raise their asks, and then in order to remain competitive,
buyers have an incentive to bid higher. This will raise the transaction prices towards the equi-
librium price. Similarly, when prices are above the equilibrium price, there is excess supply and
buyers can buy items from sellers with lower prices. This means that sellers have an incentive
to reduce their asks to compete against other sellers, thus lowering transaction prices towards
the equilibrium price. At the equilibrium price, neither buyers nor sellers have any incentive to
2Here, ‘underlying’ means that the demand and supply curve is determined by the buyers’ limit prices and the
sellers’ cost prices. It may be different from the reported demand and supply curve which is determined by traders’
shouts.
3 That is, a trader will always choose the action that maximises its expected proﬁt.Chapter 2 Literature Review 21
FIGURE 2.1: Demand and supply curve.
change their prices, and so the marketplace becomes stable. The value of the equilibrium price
and quantity can be determined according to the intersection of the demand and supply curve
(see Figure 2.1). In this context, we distinguish between two types of traders: intra-marginal
and extra-marginal. Traders to the left of the equilibrium point are known as intra-marginal
buyers (whose limit prices are higher than p∗) and intra-marginal sellers (whose cost prices are
less than p∗). On the right of the equilibrium point are extra-marginal buyers (whose limit prices
are less than p∗) and extra-marginal sellers (whose cost prices are higher than p∗). Intra-marginal
traders are more likely to make transactions than extra-marginal traders in practice. In addition,
we often refer to traders around the equilibrium point as marginal traders. These traders are
less likely to make transactions than intra-marginal traders, but more likely to make transactions
than extra-marginal traders.
In the marketplace, when an equilibrium quantity of goods is traded at the equilibrium price, the
optimal allocation is reached, which means that the allocative efﬁciency is maximised. Specif-
ically, the allocative efﬁciency E is the total proﬁt earned by all traders in the marketplaces
divided by the maximum possible total proﬁt that could have been earned by all traders:
E =
P
i∈T |vi − TPi|
P
i∈T∗ |vi − p∗|
× 100% (2.4)
where T is the set of traders making transactions in the marketplace, vi is the cost or limit price
of trader i, TPi is the transaction price of trader i, |vi − TPi| is trader i’s actual proﬁt in the
transaction, T∗ is the set of intra-marginal traders, |vi − p∗| is i’s expected proﬁt if it trades at the
equilibrium price. In a marketplace where all buyers’ limit prices and all sellers’ cost prices are
public, i.e. the underlying demand and supply are known to all traders and the marketplace, the
equilibrium quantity and equilibrium price can be computed, and an optimal resource allocation
can be performed.22 Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.3 Isolated Auction Marketplaces
Thus far we have introduced the demand and supply model of marketplaces, and described
the concept of equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity. Now, before we review related work
aboutcompetingmarketplaces, weﬁrstintroducerelatedworkaboutisolatedmarketplaceswith-
out inter-marketplace competition since the understanding of isolated marketplaces is the foun-
dation for further understanding competing marketplaces. Furthermore, in this thesis, since we
focus on the auction-based marketplaces, here we introduce relevant work on isolated auctions.
Note that, although in this thesis we focus on the double auction marketplaces, the work in the
single-sided auction marketplaces will be important for us to understand the double auction mar-
ketplaces. Therefore, here we ﬁrst introduce related work about isolated single-sided auctions,
and then introduce isolated double auction marketplaces.
2.3.1 Single-Sided Auctions
In a single-sided auction, there is either a single seller and multiple buyers competing to win the
good, or there are multiple sellers competing to provide a good or service to a single buyer (also
called a reverse or procurement auction). In the following, we will describe the formats of some
widely used single-sided auctions. Speciﬁcally, we introduce the auctions where each buyer has
a private value4 on the good, i.e. each buyer knows the value of the good to himself at the time
of bidding, but he does not know the exact values of other buyers to the good, and knowledge of
other buyers’ values will not affect his own value.
The open ascending price or English auction is probably the oldest and most prevalent auction
form in the world (Krishna, 2002). In the traditional English auction, only the bid that is higher
than the current standing bid (which is the highest bid at any given moment) is accepted by the
auctioneer. In a given time, if no competing buyer challenges the standing bid, then the buyer
with the standing bid will win the good and pay a price equal to the standing bid. Furthermore,
in addition to the traditional English auction, there exist many variations on this auction system.
For example, in eBay, there is a deadline for selling the good through the auction. In a Japanese
auction, eachbuyershouldindicatehisinterestinpurchasingthegoodatthecurrentprice. Asthe
price rises, he may indicate that he is no longer interested and quits the auction. Once he quits,
he cannot reenter the auction. The auction continues until only one buyer remains. The English
auction is commonly used for selling antiques and artwork, but also for selling used goods and
real estate. Another well-known auction is the Dutch auction, which has a descending price. In
this auction, the auctioneer begins by calling out a price high enough so that initially no buyer
is interested in buying the good at that price. This price is then gradually lowered until some
buyer indicates his interest. The good is then sold to this buyer at the given price. This type of
auction is usually used to sell perishable commodities, such as ﬁsh, ﬂowers and tobacco.
4This is the limit price for the buyer, and is also referred to as the type of the buyer, see Section 2.2.Chapter 2 Literature Review 23
Note that both English and Dutch auctions are open auctions where in the auction process, each
buyer’s behaviour is observed by all other buyers and the auctioneer. There also exist two well-
known sealed-bid auctions: ﬁrst-price and second-price. In both auctions, buyers submit bids
in sealed envelopes and the buyer submitting the highest bid wins the good. In contrast to the
English auction, in these auctions, buyers can only submit one bid. Furthermore, as buyers
cannot see the bids of other participants, they cannot adjust their own bids accordingly. Now,
in the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction, the winner will pay what he actually bids. In the second-
price sealed-bid auction (also called Vickrey auction), the buyer submitting the highest bid will
win the good, but pays the second highest bid. Although this auction is extremely important in
auction theory, in the real world, Vickrey auctions are rarely used.
After describing the above four common single-sided auction mechanisms, we now describe the
bidding strategies used in these auctions. Krishna (2002) points out that the Dutch auction is
strategically equivalent to the sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction. The reason is as follows. Although
in the Dutch auction, each buyer can observe that some buyer has agreed to buy at the current
price, since that causes the auction to end, the buyer cannot utilise such information to improve
his bid. Thus bidding a certain amount in a sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction is equivalent to bidding
to buy at that amount in a Dutch auction. Furthermore, when buyers have private values on
the goods, the English auction is also weakly equivalent to the sealed-bid second-price auction.
Because of the strategic equivalence of the different single-sided auctions, in the following, we
introduce equilibrium bidding strategies in the two sealed-bid auctions.
In the auctions, a bidding strategy for a buyer is deﬁned as a function mapping the set of possible
private values (types) to a set of allowable bids. In more detail, in a sealed-bid second-price
auction, the dominant strategy is to bid buyers’ private values truthfully. In a sealed-bid ﬁrst-
price auction, the equilibrium behaviour is more complicated than in a second-price auction.
Intuitively, no buyers will bid their private value truthfully since this causes zero utility if he
wins. Therefore, in the equilibrium, buyers should shade their bids (bid is less than the actual
private value), and the degree of shading depends on the number of competing buyers and the
probability distributions of buyers’ private values. When the number of buyers in the auction
increases, the degree of shading approaches 0, i.e. in this situation, buyers’ bids approach to
their true private values.
In the above, we have described single-sided auctions with private values. There also exist
settings with a common value, where the value, although unknown at the time of bidding, is the
same for all buyers. Furthermore, in addition to a single good traded in the auction, there exist
variations in which multiple goods can be traded. However, it is beyond the scope of this review
to discuss these variations. Details about these auctions can be found in Krishna (2002).24 Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.3.2 Double Auctions
In the above, we have introduced single-sided auctions. Now we introduce related work about
double auction marketplaces. As we discussed in Chapter 1, the double auction market mech-
anism is widely used in stock exchanges, commodity exchanges and even online exchanges.
Speciﬁcally, a double auction marketplace is a particular type of two-sided marketplace with
multiple buyers (one side) and multiple sellers (the other side). In such a marketplace, both
buyers and sellers can submit shouts at any time in a speciﬁed trading round, and the market
is cleared at a speciﬁc time and all possible transactions will be executed. Currently, there are
broadly two typical types of double auctions, which are Continuous Double Auction (CDA, in
which potential transactions are executed when a new shout arrives) and Clearing House (CH, in
which transactions are executed until all traders have submitted their shouts). In Section 2.3.2.2,
we will describe them in detail.
Intuitively, a double auction is a typical type of marketplace as we introduced in Section 2.2.
Buyers and sellers in double auctions will have limit and cost prices respectively. However, in
the double auction marketplace, the only known information is the bids submitted by buyers and
asks submitted by sellers, which typically do not correspond to the actual limit and cost prices.
This means that the equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity cannot be determined, and the
optimal allocation cannot be obtained in double auctions (see Section 2.2).
Despite this fact, in theory, the competition of proﬁt-motivated traders will eventually drive
transaction prices to converge to the equilibrium price (which is consistent with the market
theory detailed in Section 2.2). The reason is that, in order to remain competitive, the buyers
(sellers) need to raise (lower) their prices when there is excess demand (supply), and thus cause
transaction prices to move towards the equilibrium price. Such an hypothesis is conﬁrmed by
experimental analysis conducted by Smith (1962), where he stated:
“The most striking general characteristic of [this] test ... is the remarkably strong
tendency for exchange prices to approach the predicted equilibrium price for each
of these markets. As the exchange process is repeated ... the variation in exchange
prices tends to decline, and to cluster more closely around the equilibrium.”
In his experiments, a group of (human) traders were split into two groups: buyers and sellers.
Each trader could buy or sell one or more units of a homogenous commodity at a price, which
is no lower than the given cost prices for sellers and no higher than the given limit prices for
buyers. The transaction price was set at the average of the buyer’s bid and the seller’s ask.
In order to measure the convergence of transaction prices to the equilibrium price, Smith intro-
duced a coefﬁcient of convergence, α, given the history of H transaction prices TPh (h ∈ {1...H}),
which is expressed as a percentage and given by equation:
α =
q
1
H
PH
h=1(TPh − p∗)2
p∗ × 100 (2.5)Chapter 2 Literature Review 25
FIGURE 2.2: The left panel shows the underlying demand and supply of the marketplace. The
dotted horizontal line indicates the equilibrium price, and the shaded region indicates the intra-
marginal region of the marketplace, its area is equal to the theoretical overall proﬁts. The right
panel shows the history of transaction prices with α during the successive trading days (from
Smith (1962)).
where TPh is the price of the h-th transaction and p∗ is the equilibrium price. When α de-
creases as traders make transactions, then we can see transaction prices indeed converge to the
equilibrium price.
From Smith’s experimental results (see Figure 2.2), we can see that transaction prices are close
to the equilibrium price, and α decreases over time as the prices converge to the equilibrium
price. Thus, Smith drew the conclusion that, when there is no collusion and all traders’ shouts
and transaction prices are public, the convergence of transaction prices to the equilibrium price
can be reached in the marketplace. Smith’s work also suggests that double auction marketplaces
are bound to be efﬁcient irrespective of the way that traders bid, and can achieve close to optimal
allocative efﬁciency.
So far we have introduced the basics of double auctions. Research work about double auctions
also includes bidding strategies of traders and market policies used by double auctions. As
we will see, some existing bidding strategies are adopted in the speciﬁc context of the CAT
competition. Since we will evaluate our competing marketplace in this context, it is necessary to
introduce these bidding strategies. Furthermore, existing market policies will be the foundations
of designing market policies for competing marketplaces. Therefore, we also need to introduce
existing work about market polices. In addition to market policies, as we introduced in Section
1.1, the marketplace also needs a charging strategy to determine its fees. In the following, we
will describe existing work in these three areas in turn.26 Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.3.2.1 Bidding Strategies and Equilibrium Analysis
In double auction marketplaces, traders need to use bidding strategies to determine the shouts
submitted in the marketplaces. Existing literature describe a number of bidding strategies for
double auctions—including the truth-telling bidding strategy in which traders submit their limit
prices (resp. cost prices) as bids (resp. asks), the Fuzzy Logic based bidding strategy in
which traders use heuristic fuzzy rules and fuzzy reasoning mechanisms in order to determine
the best bid or ask given the current state of the marketplace (He et al., 2003), the adaptive-
aggressiveness bidding strategy in which traders adapt their bids or asks based on a short-term
and a long-term learning (Vytelingum et al., 2008), and the Q-strategy in which traders uses a
Q-learning reinforcement learning approach to adapt their bids (Borissov, 2009; Borissov et al.,
2010). However, in this thesis, since we choose to evaluate our design of a competing market-
place in the context of the CAT competition and these bidding strategies are not used in this
context, we will not discuss them here. Speciﬁcally, in the following, we will introduce the
bidding strategies used in the CAT competition, which are ZI-C, ZIP, GD and RE. Note that all
these bidding strategies are heuristic based. Thus they can be widely used in different auction
formats with different settings.
ZI-C Strategy:
Gode and Sunder (1993) developed a simple yet powerful strategy, called the Zero-Intelligence
(ZI) bidding strategy. Here, zero intelligence means the trader is not motivated to pursue proﬁt.
Speciﬁcally, whenthetraderwantstosubmitashout, itjustselectsabidoranaskfromauniform
distribution over a given range. In their experiments on allocative efﬁciency and equilibrium
formation, Gode and Sunder considered two kinds of ZI strategies: the constrained ZI strategy
(ZI-C) and the unconstrained ZI strategy (ZI-U). The former is restricted by budget constraints,
which means that traders cannot trade at loss, whereas the latter is allowed to make loss-making
transactions. Speciﬁcally, a ZI-C buyer draws a bid from a uniform distribution between the
minimum allowed bid and its limit price, and the ZI-C seller draws an ask from a uniform
distribution between its cost price and the maximal allowed ask. For ZI-U traders, their shouts
are drawn from a uniform distribution between the minimum and the maximum allowed price
in the marketplace.
The results of the simulations of marketplaces with ZI-C traders and ZI-U traders are shown in
Figure 2.3. From these, we can see the differences between the resulting transaction prices when
using ZI-C, ZI-U and human traders. In particular, we can see that the marketplace with ZI-U
traders showed no evidence that transaction prices converge to an equilibrium price. In human
marketplaces, on the other hand, transaction prices converge to the equilibrium price, and this is
consistent with the classical microeconomic theory (see Section 2.2). However, they also found
that, in the marketplace with ZI-C traders, there is a slow convergence to the equilibrium price
during each trading day. They explained this convergence in the following manner. They assume
that the buyers with the highest limit prices and the sellers with lowest cost prices have a greater
chance to trade ﬁrst. Then, the demand and supply curve shifts to the left as each good is traded,Chapter 2 Literature Review 27
until only extra-marginal traders remain. As the demand and supply curve shifts, the range of
feasible transaction prices narrows and transaction prices converge to the equilibrium price.
FIGURE 2.3: Result from one of Gode and Sunder’s experiments. Figures on the left show the
demand and supply used in the experiments. Figures on the right show transaction prices in
different marketplaces where the top is the marketplace with ZI-U traders, the middle is with
ZI-C traders and the bottom is with human traders (from Gode and Sunder (1993)).
The simulations also show that the allocative efﬁciency can be very high in the double auction
marketplace even though traders are not proﬁt-motivated and have no intelligence. Furthermore,
they found that the efﬁciency of marketplaces with ZI-C traders is close to the efﬁciency of
marketplaces with human traders. Thus they concluded that allocative efﬁciency is determined
by the market structure (i.e. market policies), not by the bidding strategies of traders. However,
they also pointed out that individual performance (i.e. an individual trader’s proﬁt) might be
sensitive to individual intelligence.
In this paper, Gode and Sunder made a signiﬁcant contribution to show that allocative efﬁciency
is determined by market structure, and individual proﬁt is determined by individual intelligence.
However, their conclusion that ZI-C traders’ transaction prices converge to the equilibrium price
is attacked by Cliff and Bruten (1997), who showed that if demand and supply are not symmet-
ric, the average transaction prices can be signiﬁcantly different from the equilibrium price. To
address this problem, they introduced the Zero-Intelligence Plus strategy which we describe in
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ZIP Strategy:
The Zero-Intelligence Plus (ZIP) strategy was designed by Cliff and Bruten (1997) to show that
more than zero intelligence is required to achieve efﬁciency close to that of marketplaces with
human traders. This also attacked Gode and Sunder’s claim that ZI-C traders could achieve and
stabilise at equilibrium in double auction marketplaces. First, we give a simple description of
the ZIP strategy, and then describe the experimental results to show ZIP’s performance.
In more detail, the ZIP strategy uses a history of market information, and adjusts the trader’s
proﬁt margin µ(t) according to the future market conditions in order to remain competitive.
Here, the proﬁt margin determines the difference between the trader’s limit price (cost price)
and the bid (ask). According to the proﬁt margin, the seller i submits its ask ai(t) at the time t:
ai(t) = λi(1 + µi(t)) (2.6)
where λi is the cost price of seller i. Similarly, a ZIP buyer j’s bid at the time t is:
bj(t) = λj(1 − µj(t)) (2.7)
where λj is the limit price of the buyer. The ZIP sellers raise or lower their proﬁts by increasing
or decreasing µi(t), and similar for buyers. By dynamically modifying µi(t) or µj(t), sellers or
buyers remain competitive against other traders in the marketplace. The adaptation of the proﬁt
margin is based on the simple Widrow-Hoff learning algorithm (Widrow and Hoff, 1960). The
actual adaption rules are shown in Figure 2.4.
Adaptive Rules for the ZIP Seller:
if (last shout was accepted at price q(t))
1. any seller i for which ai(t) ≤ q(t) should raise its proﬁt margin
2. if (last shout was a bid)
1. any active seller i for which ai(t) ≥ q(t) should lower its margin
else
2. if (last shout was an ask)
1. any active seller i for which ai(t) ≥ q(t) should lower its margin
Adaptive Rules for the ZIP Buyer:
if (last shout was accepted at price q(t))
1. any buyer j for which bj(t) ≥ q(t) should raise its proﬁt margin
2. if (last shout was an ask)
1. any active buyer j for which bj(t) ≤ q(t) should lower its margin
else
2. if (last shout was a bid)
1. any active buyer j for which bj(t) ≤ q(t) should lower its margin
FIGURE 2.4: The ZIP trading strategy.Chapter 2 Literature Review 29
FIGURE 2.5: The left panel illustrates the demand and supply used for the ﬁrst 11 trading
periods, and then the equilibrium price is increased to 225. The right panel shows the results
from simulations with ZIP traders, ∗ means price of each transaction (from Cliff and Bruten
(1997)).
The simulation results using ZIP strategies are shown in Figure 2.5. We can see that the transac-
tion prices converge towards the equilibrium prices after just a few days, and remain at that level
with low variance. Cliff also showed that the proﬁt dispersion of ZIP traders was signiﬁcantly
lower than that of ZI-C traders. Furthermore, by considering a sudden change in endowment of
limit and cost prices to buyers and sellers respectively at the beginning of period 12, where the
demand and supply changed and the equilibrium price increased from 200 to 225, they showed
that the transaction prices can rapidly converge to the new equilibrium price. This means this
strategy has a capacity to respond quickly to the changing market conditions.
GD Strategy:
Another well-known intelligent bidding strategy is called GD (Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998).
This strategy is based on a belief function that indicates the probability of a particular bid(ask)
being accepted in the marketplace. In more detail, the traders form their beliefs according to the
history of marketplace data, and particularly on the frequencies of submitted bids and asks and
of accepted bids and asks resulting in transactions. Based on the belief function, the GD trader
submits a shout which can maximise its expected proﬁt, i.e. the product of its belief function
and its proﬁt if a transaction occurs.
In the GD strategy, the seller’s belief function, ˆ p(a), is constructed as follows: if an ask a0 < a
has been rejected by the marketplace, then the ask a will also be rejected. Similarly, if an ask
a0 > a has been accepted, than the ask a will also be accepted. Furthermore, if a bid b0 > a is
accepted, then an ask a0 = b0 > a would have been accepted, and then a will be accepted by the
marketplace. Similarly, the buyer’s belief function ˆ a(b) can be constructed. In what follows, we
deﬁne the bid and ask frequencies ∀d ∈ D, where D is the set of all permissible shout prices in
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Bid Frequencies: ∀d ∈ D, B(d) is the total number of bids submitted at price d, TB(d) is the
frequency of accepted bids at d, and RB(d) is the frequency of rejected bids at d.
Ask Frequencies: ∀d ∈ D, A(d) is the total number of asks submitted at price d, TA(d) is the
frequency of accepted asks at d, and RA(d) is the frequency of rejected asks at d.
Now, the seller’s belief function for each possible ask price a is given by:
ˆ p(a) =
P
d≥a TA(d) +
P
d≥a B(d)
P
d≥a TA(d) +
P
d≥a B(d) +
P
d≤a RA(d)
(2.8)
and the buyer’s belief function for each possible bid price b is given by:
ˆ q(b) =
P
d≤b TB(d) +
P
d≤b A(d)
P
d≤b TB(d) +
P
d≤b A(d) +
P
d≥b RB(d)
(2.9)
Moreover, the seller and buyer’s belief function is modiﬁed to satisfy the NYSE shout accepting
policy5. That is, the belief function on the ask, which is higher than the current outstanding ask
Oask, is set to 0 and cannot be accepted, and when the bid is lower than the outstanding bid Obid,
then belief function on this bid is set to 0, and cannot be accepted.
In addition, because the belief function is deﬁned on the set of all bids and asks, then we need
to extend the beliefs to the space of all potential bids or asks, which are constrained by the
outstanding bid Obid and outstanding ask Oask and the step-size of the belief function. To this
end, Cubic spline interpolation is used on each successive pair of data points to calculate the
belief of points in between them. In particular, a cubic function, p(a) = α3a3 +α2a2 +α1a+α0,
is constructed with the following properties:
1. p(ak) = ˆ p(ak)
2. p(ak+1) = ˆ p(ak+1)
3. p0(ak) = 0
4. p0(ak+1) = 0
where ak and ak+1 are the successive ask prices. p0(ak) is the ﬁrst derivative of p(ak). The coef-
ﬁcients, αi, satisfying the above properties, are given by the solution to the following equation:

                  
a3
k a2
k ak 1
a3
k+1 a2
k+1 ak+1 1
3a2
k 2ak 1 0
3a2
k+1 2ak+1 1 0

                  

                  
α3
α2
α1
α0

                  
=

                  
ˆ p(ak)
ˆ p(ak+1)
0
0

                  
(2.10)
Now we have constructed the sellers’ belief function, the buyer’s belief function, q(b), can be
constructed similarly using the pairs (bk, ˆ q(bk)) and (bk+1, ˆ q(bk+1)). After deﬁning the belief
function, Gjerstad and Dickhaut proved (see Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998) for the proof) that
5The NYSE shout accepting policy requires that a submitted bid is higher than the outstanding bid (i.e. the current
highest unmatched bid in the marketplace), and a submitted ask is lower than the outstanding ask (i.e. the current
lowest unmatched ask in the marketplace) respectively.Chapter 2 Literature Review 31
the beliefs are monotonically non-decreasing(non-increasing) for bids(asks). In particular, from
Figure 2.6, we can see the belief that an ask a > a0 is accepted is lower than the belief of a0
being accepted, and, similarly, the belief of a bid that b < b0 is accepted is lower than that of b.
FIGURE 2.6: A typical belief function of a buyer (right) and seller (left) using GD strategy
(from Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998)).
After getting the belief function, the GD trader can form its bid or ask that maximises its ex-
pected proﬁt. The expected proﬁt is deﬁned as the product of the trader’s belief function and
its utility function. The utility function equals the difference between the seller i’s ask and its
cost price ci, or the difference between the buyer j’s bid and its limit price lj (i.e. the trader’s
hidden proﬁt through shading). We can see that as a trader increases its bid or decreases its ask,
its utility increases. However, from Figure 2.6, we can see that its belief of shout acceptance de-
creases. Thus the trader has to make a trade-off between increasing its belief of shout acceptance
and increasing its utility. In more detail, the trader’s utility function and its proﬁt maximisation
is given as follows:
For a seller i,
U(a) =

  
  
a − ci if a > ci
0 if a ≤ ci
For a buyer j,
U(b) =

  
  
lj − b if b < lj
0 if b ≥ lj
a∗ = arg max
a∈(oask,obid)

U(a).ˆ p(a)

(2.11)
b∗ = arg max
b∈(oask,obid)

U(b).ˆ q(b)

(2.12)32 Chapter 2 Literature Review
FIGURE 2.7: Left panel illustrates demand and supply of the marketplace. Note the change in
demand and supply after 5 trading days. Results of the simulations with GD traders are shown
in the right panel. The x-axis is divided into the different trading days, with the x-axis values
corresponding to the number of transactions on each trading day. The y-axis values correspond
to the transaction prices (from Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998)).
Again they carried out a series of simulations to evaluate the performance of this strategy. In
particular, the results of the simulations showed that the allocative efﬁciency of marketplaces
withGDtraderswasclosetooptimal, andtransactionpricesconvergedrapidlytotheequilibrium
price (see Figure 2.7). By shifting the demand and supply after several trading days, it was also
shown that GD traders responded quickly to the changing market conditions, and transaction
prices quickly converged to the new equilibrium price.
RE Strategy:
We now introduce another bidding strategy called Roth-Erev (RE), which attempts to mimic
human game-playing behaviour. In a series of studies, Roth and Erev attempted to understand
how people learn individually to behave in games with multiple strategic players. To this end,
they developed a myopic reinforcement learning algorithm, referred to as the RE algorithm
(Roth and Erev, 1998; Nicolaisen et al., 2001). We now describe this strategy in more detail.
The authors suppose that there are G feasible actions (i.e. bids or asks) for each trader in the
marketplace. At the initial trading round, each trader i assigns an equal propensity φig(1) to each
feasible action g given by φig(1) =
γ(1)X
G , where X is the average proﬁt that traders can achieve
in any given trading round, and γ(1) is a scaling parameter. Moreover, each trader i assigns
an initial equal choice probability ψig(1) to each of its feasible actions g, given by ψig(1) = 1
G.
Here, “1” means the initial trading round. The trader i then probabilistically selects a feasible
action g0 to submit according to its current choice probability. If the shout g0 can be matched,
then a transaction is executed and the trader i gets a proﬁt R(i,g0,1). Now we suppose that
the trader i is at the end of the nth trading round and in this round, the trader has submitted a
feasible action g0 and achieved a proﬁt R(i,g0,n). The trader i then updates its existing action
propensities φig(n) based on its newly earned proﬁt as follows. Given any feasible action g, the
propensity φig(n + 1) for choosing g in the next trading round n + 1 is determined as:
φig(n + 1) = (1 − r)φig(n) + ρ(i,g,g0,n,G,e) (2.13)Chapter 2 Literature Review 33
where r is the recency parameter, e is the experimentation parameter and ρ(·) is the update
function reﬂecting the experience gained from past trades. The recency parameter r slowly
reduces the importance of past experience. The update function ρ(·) is given by
ρ(i,g,g0,n,G,e) =

  
  
R(i,g0,n)(1 − e) if g = g0
R(i,g0,n)e
(G−1) if g , g0
The selected action g0 is reinforced or discouraged based on the proﬁt R(i,g0,n) earned subse-
quent to this selection. Given the updated propensities φig(n + 1) for trading round n + 1, the
trader i updates choice probability ψig(n + 1) for its feasible actions g in the trading round n + 1
given by the equation:
ψig(n + 1) =
φig(n + 1)
Pg=G
g=1 (φig(n + 1))
(2.14)
Finally the trader i selects a feasible action according to its current choice probability.
To date, there exists no literature on analysing the convergence of transaction prices to the equi-
librium price when traders adopt the RE strategy. However, in Section 5.1, we analyse this based
on the JCAT platform, and ﬁnd that transaction prices of traders adopting RE strategy do not
converge to the equilibrium price.
Equilibrium Analysis:
In the above, we have introduced four bidding strategies, and these strategies were usually eval-
uated in the homogeneous environment where all traders use the same strategy. However, in
double auctions, traders may be able to use different bidding strategies, which results in the
problem of determining which bidding strategy traders should choose and what is the Nash
equilibrium bidding strategy. In this context, Phelps et al. (2006) used evolutionary game the-
ory (EGT) to analyse the equilibrium bidding strategies when traders can use three different
bidding strategies: truth-telling (TT), RE, and PvT (a ZIP-like strategy, which is modiﬁed for
persistent-shout marketplaces (Preist and van Tol., 2003)) in two different types of double auc-
tion marketplaces (Clearing House and Continuous Double Auction, in the following section,
we will introduce these two double auctions in detail). They show that in the Clearing House
with 6 traders, in equilibrium, traders will have 50% probability of using RE strategy and 50%
probability of using PvT strategy, and in the case with 8 traders, traders have 17% probability of
using TT strategy, 18% probability of using RE strategy and 65% probability of using PvT strat-
egy. Furthermore, in the Continuous Double Auction, in equilibrium, traders will have 100%
probability of using RE strategy in both cases with 6 traders and 8 traders. Moreover, in Phelps
et al. (2010), they also extend their work to the case with four different bidding strategies: TT,
RE, GD and TK (Kaplan’s sniping strategy (Friedman and Rust, 1993)). Moreover, Vytelingum
et al. (2008) used EGT to evaluate their AA strategy against ZIP or GDX (which is a improved
bidding strategy based on GD (Tesauro and Bredin, 2002)), and showed that in equilibrium,
traders are more likely to use the AA strategy. Note that although the above works analyse the
Nash equilibrium of existing bidding strategies, they fail to answer what exactly traders will34 Chapter 2 Literature Review
bid in equilibrium. Furthermore, they do not analyse how market fees affect traders’ bidding
behaviour. In our work, we will use ﬁctitious play to derive what shouts traders will submit in
equilibrium and how different types of market fees affect their equilibrium bidding strategies
(see Section 4.3.1).
2.3.2.2 Market Policies
After describing the key bidding strategies, we now review related work about market policies
for double auctions. As we introduced in Section 1.1, in the design of a double auction, we need
to specify four market policies, which are timing policy (determining when to clear the market),
matching policy (determining how to match buyers with sellers), pricing policy (determining
the transaction price of the matched buyer and seller) and shout accepting policy (determining
whether to admit the shout placed by the trader or not). In the following, we will describe the
related work about these policies respectively.
Timing Policy:
A timing policy determines when to clear the market (i.e. when to match bids with asks to make
transactions). There are a number of alternatives. The ﬁrst is to collect all bids and asks and
to clear the market at the end of the trading day in order to maximise proﬁts. A double auction
adopting such an approach is often referred to as a Clearing House (CH). Another approach
is to continuously clear whenever a bid or ask is accepted in the marketplace. This kind of
double auction is often called a Continuous Double Auction (CDA). Phelps et al. (2006) used
evolutionary game theory to compare the efﬁciencies of these alternatives. In their experiments,
traders are free to choose the following bidding strategies: truth-telling (TT), RE, and PvT. The
simulation results are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, where the sum of traders’ proﬁts is equal to
the allocative efﬁciency of the marketplace since the sum of expected proﬁts is 1. The insights
obtained are as follows. In the CH, we can see that the most likely strategy to be used by traders
isthePvTstrategy, andintheCDA,theREstrategyisthemostlikelyonetobeused. Wealsosee
that the total proﬁts of all traders under the truth-telling strategy in the CDA are relatively low,
only 0.86 in this case (mean of 0.87 in Table 2.1 and 0.85 in Table 2.2). This might suggest that
the CDA has low allocative efﬁciency, only 86%. However, because the RE strategy outperforms
all other strategies, all traders will choose it eventually. Then, in this case, the proﬁt is 0.98. In
the CH, we can see that each strategy results in the same proﬁt, 1, and can conclude that the
CH will yield 100% allocative efﬁciency in all cases. Now, although the CDA may yield lower
efﬁciency, it is still widely used in real exchange marketplaces since it is better able to handle
larger volumes of trades by clearing the market quickly (Friedman and Rust, 1993). Moreover,
switching to a CDA from a CH, as the NYSE did in the 1860s, does not seem to cause a large
loss of efﬁciency in practice (actually, from the experiment we can see when all traders adopt
the RE strategy, the CDA is quite efﬁcient with 98% allocative efﬁciency).
In sum, the CDA is better for higher numbers of transactions since it clears the market wheneverChapter 2 Literature Review 35
Equilibrium CH probability proﬁt(allocative efﬁciency) CDA probability proﬁt(allocative efﬁciency)
TT 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.87
RE 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.98
PvT 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.93
TABLE 2.1: Equilibrium and proﬁt for 6 traders.
Equilibrium CH probability proﬁt(allocative efﬁciency) CDA probability proﬁt(allocative efﬁciency)
TT 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.85
RE 0.18 1.00 1.00 0.98
PvT 0.65 1.00 0.00 0.92
TABLE 2.2: Equilibrium and proﬁt for 8 traders.
a new bid or ask arrives. This means traders can buy or sell items quickly, but the CDA is
worse for allocative efﬁciency since some extra-marginal traders may steal a deal. CH is better
for allocative efﬁciency since it clears the market when all traders have submitted shouts. This
means intra-marginal buyers will most likely be matched with intra-marginal sellers, but it is
worse in terms of the number of transactions since it cannot clear the market quickly in practice.
Given this, it is clear that, when determining when to clear the market, we need to consider the
trade-off between maximising proﬁts and maximising the number of transactions.
Matching Policy:
A matching policy determines how to clear the market (i.e. how to match bids with asks to
make transactions). In this context, equilibrium matching (ME) is the most commonly used one
(Niu et al., 2008a). This policy will match intra-marginal buyers with intra-marginal sellers,
and the transaction prices are set as the equilibrium price. Since intra-marginal traders can
make transactions to guarantee their proﬁts, ME achieves a high allocative efﬁciency. Note that
when using this matching policy, since the transaction prices are set at the equilibrium price,
the marketplace can arbitrarily match successful bids and asks to each other. However, in our
theoretical analysis (see Chapters 3 and 4), since we use the k-pricing policy with k = 0.5 to set
the transaction prices (see the below), we need to operate the equilibrium matching in a speciﬁc
way. In more detail, we will match buyers having the v-th highest bids with sellers having v-th
lowest asks. By so doing, we still guarantee intra-marginal traders’ proﬁts. Another matching
policy, named Max-volume matching (MV) (Niu et al., 2008a), aims to increase transaction
volume based on the observation that a high intra-marginal bid can be matched with an extra-
marginal ask which is a little lower than the high bid. The MV matching policy can increase the
number of transactions, but at the same time can cause a loss of proﬁts, and thus result in a low
allocative efﬁciency. Under this situation, a trade-off is also needed between maximising proﬁts
(using ME) and maximising the number of transactions (using MV).
Pricing Policy:
The pricing policy determines the transaction prices for matched bids and asks. This means that
the pricing policy redistributes the proﬁts among the traders and thus inﬂuences the proﬁts of
the buyers and sellers. When designing the pricing policy, we need to consider the allocative ef-36 Chapter 2 Literature Review
ﬁciency, buyers’ efﬁciency and sellers’ efﬁciency6. Furthermore, the degree of transaction price
ﬂuctuation also needs to be considered (Niu et al., 2006). This is because with reduced price
ﬂuctuations, transaction prices are guaranteed to be close to the equilibrium price. With this
guarantee for a fair transaction price, more traders are likely to prefer to join this marketplace,
which should, in turn, make the marketplace more proﬁtable.
To this end, Phelps et al. (2003) consider how to design a pricing rule for the CDA to max-
imise V, which is the combination of allocative efﬁciency, the buyers’ efﬁciency and the sellers’
efﬁciency:
V =
allocative eﬃciency
2
+
buyers0 eﬃciency
4
+
sellers0 eﬃciency
4
(2.15)
They propose two approaches to designing the pricing policy. First, the transaction price is
calculated according to:
TP = k · pa + (1 − k) · pb (k ∈ [0,1]) (2.16)
where pa is the matched ask and pb is the matched bid. This is called the k-pricing policy and is
a traditional pricing policy used in double auction marketplaces. In order to maximise V, they
want to optimise k. To this end, their simulation results are shown in Figure 2.8, and as we can
see the best value for k in this setting is 0.5.
FIGURE 2.8: Fitness V (with standard deviation) plotted against k for a marketplace with 12
traders (from Phelps et al. (2003)).
6This is the ratio of actual proﬁts of buyers(sellers) to their expected proﬁts when transactions are executed at the
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The second approach considers all possible combinations of the buyer’s bid pb and the seller’s
ask pa. The pricing policy was then allowed to evolve using genetic programming (see Phelps
et al. (2003) for details), and ﬁnally it was approximately equal to 0.5pb + 0.5pa, apart from a
small variation when the ask is small or when the difference between the bid and ask is marginal.
As can be seen, both approaches show that the k-pricing policy (k = 0.5) is efﬁcient both in
terms of allocative efﬁciency and the traders’ efﬁciency.
In terms of reducing price ﬂuctuations, Niu et al. (2006) explore modifying the traditional policy,
referred to as the k-pricing (given by Equation 2.16) to the n-pricing policy. The n-pricing policy
keeps a sliding window of size n of matching pairs of bids and asks which are used to set the
transaction prices. It is given by:
TP =
1
2n
T X
z=T−n+1
(paz + pbz) (paT ≤ TP ≤ pbT) (2.17)
where pbz and paz are the accepted bid and ask corresponding to the z-th transaction respectively,
T is the latest transaction and TP is the price at which the transaction is set using the n-pricing
policy. Here, TP is bounded between the buyer’s bid pbT and the seller’s ask paT. Note that the
n-pricing policy becomes the k-pricing policy with k = 0.5 when n = 1, and the auction is then
a traditional CDA. On the other hand, when n is equal to the total number of transactions, the
n-pricing policy is the rule commonly used in a CH. Thus, n ranges over a continuous space of
double auctions, with the Continuous Double Auction and the Clearing-House Double Auction
at either end.
The authors then compare the price ﬂuctuations of n-pricing policy with n = 4 with k-pricing
policy with k = 0.5 in the CDA by measuring the coefﬁcient of convergence α given a simple
and non-intelligent behaviour (with ZI-C traders) and a more complex and intelligent behaviour
(with GD traders). As an example, the marketplace named kCDA-ZIC means the CDA with
k-pricing policy and populated by ZI-C traders. The results, given in Figure 2.9 and Table 2.3,
showed that the price ﬂuctuations were reduced in both marketplaces which use n-pricing policy,
with the better improvement in the marketplace with ZI-C traders (indicated by the relatively
largerdecreaseinα). ThisisbecauseZI-Ctradersrandomlysubmitbidsandasks, andthespread
of matching bids and asks is typically quite high. On the other hand, the more intelligent GD
traders submit bids and asks that tend to converge towards the equilibrium price, such that the
spread is then greatly reduced, and the n-pricing policy is then only marginally more effective.
To sum up, the effect of reducing price ﬂuctuations by using the n-pricing policy is restricted by
traders’ bidding strategies. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that the allocative efﬁciency
improves when a marketplace adopts the n-pricing policy, and in some cases, the allocative
efﬁciency even decreases.
Shout Accepting Policy:
The shout accepting policy considers which bids and asks should be accepted by the market-38 Chapter 2 Literature Review
FIGURE 2.9: Transaction prices, plotted as 10 different runs for the k-pricing policy and for
the n-pricing policy (from Niu et al. (2006)).
TABLE 2.3: Metrics for KCDAs, nCDAs and nCDAEEs measured over 10 trading days. Bold
face indicates the corresponding marketplace outperforms or equals its traditional kCDA coun-
terpart. Bold italic points out the best result in the corresponding ZI-C or GD marketplace
group (from Niu et al. (2006)).
place. This policy is typically used to speed up the transaction process, and to reduce the price
ﬂuctuation. For example, when the marketplace only accepts bids considerably above the equi-
librium prices and asks considerably below the equilibrium price, bids and asks are much more
easily matched, and thus the transaction process is speeded up.
In more detail, the most common shout accepting policy is the NYSE shout accepting policy,
which requires that a submitted bid or ask improves on the outstanding bid or the outstand-
ing ask respectively. Such a policy is also called a quote-beating accepting policy (Niu et al.,
2008a). In order to reduce price ﬂuctuation, Niu et al. (2006) replaced the traditional NYSE
shout accepting policy with a novel estimated equilibrium shout accepting policy (EE). Speciﬁ-
cally, they estimated the equilibrium price, denoted by ˆ p∗, using a sliding window of the n0 latest
transactions:
ˆ p∗ =
1
n0
T X
x=T−n0+1
TPx (2.18)
where TPx is the transaction price calculated in equation 2.17. According to the estimated
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(ˆ p∗ + ) ( ≥ 0). Since transaction prices deviate considerably from the equilibrium price at
the beginning of trading, a parameter  is introduced to relax the range of allowed bids and
asks. The efﬁciency and price ﬂuctuations with the new shout accepting policy (denoted by
CDAEE) are given in Table 2.3, where when  = 0, marketplaces are called kCDAEE-ZIC,
nCDAEE-ZIC, kCDAEE-GD and nCDAEE-GD, and when  = 5,10,15,20, marketplaces are
called nCDAEEd5-ZIC, nCDAEEd5-GD, nCDAEEd10-ZIC, nCDAEEd10-GD, nCDAEEd15-
ZIC, nCDAEEd15-GD, nCDAEEd20-ZIC, nCDAEEd20-GD. As an example, the marketplace
named nCDAEEd15-GD means the CDA with n-pricing policy and estimated equilibrium shout
accepting policy with  = 15 and populated by GD traders. Through simulations, a number
of observations can be made. Firstly, they consider the case where  = 0. We can see α is
then considerably smaller for nCDAEE-ZIC, although the new shout accepting policy decreases
efﬁciency in that case. However, with GD traders, the performance is even worse. The price
ﬂuctuations actually increase and the allocative efﬁciency decreases. The authors conjectured
that the GD trader adapts its bids or asks even though they are on the wrong side of the estimate
and thus get rejected, and it has insufﬁcient time to adapt sufﬁciently to be efﬁcient. Because
of this, the authors consider relaxing the shout accepting policy and consider different values
for the parameter . The results showed that, the marketplaces with  ≥ 5 were indeed more
efﬁcient with either ZI-C or GD traders, than with  = 0, although when they increased , the
price ﬂuctuations decreased with GD traders, but increased with ZI-C traders.
In summary, when the marketplace adopts the estimated equilibrium shout accepting policy,
in some cases, its allocative efﬁciency indeed increases. Thus when we compare the different
market policies, we will also consider the estimated equilibrium shout accepting policy.
2.3.2.3 Charging Strategy
In addition to establishing market polices, the double auction marketplaces also need to deter-
mine fees charged to participating traders. There are many kinds of fees charged to traders, such
as a registration fee charged when traders enter the marketplace, or a transaction fee charged
when a transaction is executed. By charging fees, marketplaces earn proﬁts. In isolated market-
places, charging strategies are typically not considered since traders have no other marketplace
they can go to and thus fees have little impact on the behaviour of the traders. Currently, there
is no literature particularly considering a charging strategy in an isolated double auction mar-
ketplace. However, works on charging strategies for competing marketplaces exist (see Section
2.4.2.1 and 2.5.1). Furthermore, even in an isolated marketplace environment, when traders can
can choose whether or not to trade, how to set fees to maximise the market proﬁt is also in-
teresting. Speciﬁcally, the total proﬁt extracted from traders depends on the number of traders
participating in the marketplace and the fee charged to each trader. A higher fee causes more
traders not to choose the marketplace (even though they have no other marketplaces to enter).
Therefore, an appropriate fee should be set to maximise the proﬁt. In 4.4.1, we will address this
problem in an isolated marketplace environment.40 Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.4 Competing Marketplaces
In the previous section, we have introduced related work about isolated single-sided and double-
sided auctions, and discussed both bidding strategies and market policies for these settings.
However, asthedevelopmentofglobaleconomycontinues, moreandmoremarketplacesemerge,
and traders have greater choices of which marketplaces to select and trade in. To this end, in this
section, we present existing work related to the competing marketplaces. In particular, when
trading in multiple marketplaces, traders need to consider where to trade and how to trade, i.e.
the market selection strategy and the bidding strategy. In the following, we will describe the
related work about traders’ strategies, in terms of both how they should bid (the bidding strat-
egy) and which marketplace they should choose (the market selection strategy), and then we
introduce the related work about competition between marketplaces.
2.4.1 Single-Sided Marketplaces
In this section, we describe the traders’ strategies and marketplaces’ strategies in the context of
multiple single-sided auctions (i.e. English auctions, Dutch Auctions, etc), since as we men-
tioned before, research work about competing single-sided marketplaces will provide us some
insights for analysing competing double auction marketplaces.
2.4.1.1 Traders’ Strategies
In the environment with multiple competing single-sided auctions, in order to make effective
trading decisions, traders need to determine the best set of auctions in which to bid, and deter-
minehowmuchtobidinthechosenauctions. Speciﬁcally, theyoftenhavetomakedecisionsina
dynamic, unpredictable and time-constrained environments. Thus it is often difﬁcult for traders
to ﬁnd an optimal strategy that can be used in practical contexts. For this reason, researchers
mainly adopt empirical approaches to design trading strategies across multiple marketplaces.
To this end, Preist designed an algorithm for traders that purchase one or more identical goods
from multiple English auctions which may terminate simultaneously or at different times (Preist
et al., 2001b,a). When all auctions terminate simultaneously, the trader uses a coordination
mechanism to ensure that he has the lowest leading bids to purchase the appropriate number of
goods. Furthermore, when auctions terminate at different times, the trader ﬁrst calculates its
expected utility in the auction which is about to terminate, and compares it to expected utilities
in the remaining non-terminating auctions (the calculation is based on the trader’s beliefs about
other traders’ private values). Given the comparison, the trader must decide whether to place
a higher bid in the auction which is about to terminate, or withdraw from it. How the traders
update their beliefs of other traders’ private values is in a similar spirit to the GD strategy, except
that GD strategy is only applied in a single double auction marketplace. They also demonstrated
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In addition to Preist’s work, Byde also proposed a dynamic programming approach for traders
that participate in multiple English auctions to buy a single good (Byde, 2001a,b), and shows
that the dynamic programming approach is more effective at obtaining high utilities compared to
other algorithms. Based on this initial work, Byde et al. (2002) further developed a framework
in which traders can make rational bidding decisions to buy multiple identical goods across
multiple heterogenous single-sided auctions (English, Dutch, sealed-bid ﬁrst-price and Vickrey
auctions) with varying start and end times (i.e. the times for starting auctions and terminating
auctionscanbedifferent). Suchaframeworkaimstoﬁndtheoptimaldecisionmakingbehaviour
for traders. Furthermore, since ﬁnding the optimal decision making behaviour is infeasible given
the time-constrained nature of auctions, in order to get a practical solution, Byde et al. (2002)
also implemented a heuristic algorithm to approximate the decision making behaviour.
Moreover, He et al. (2006) developed a heuristic algorithm for traders to buy multiple identical
goods from multiple English auctions with varying start and end times. This algorithm works by
using a fuzzy neural network to predict auctions’ closing prices and to decide the allocation of
the goods to the customers, and then calculates the satisfaction degree of the allocation. Based
on this, it calculates the set of auctions which it believes are the best to bid in. Moreover, rather
than just bidding in the best set of auctions, the trader also decides to bid in other auctions
which are likely to have broadly the same outcome. By this, the trader’s chance of winning the
desired goods is increased. Moreover, since they consider that goods have multiple attributes
(for example, in auctions selling ﬂights, the goods can be described by their dates of departure
and return, by their carrier, and the class of ticket being bought), the trader has to make trade-offs
between them during its bidding process in order to satisfy the user’s preferences.
Furthermore, Anthony and Jennings (2002, 2006) proposed an approach for traders to buy a
single good from heterogenous auctions (English, Dutch and Vickrey auctions) with varying
start and end times. Their decision making model works as follows. Each trader constructs an
active auction list and collects relevant information (such as current standing bid in each auc-
tion). After this, the trader determines the maximum bid it is willing to make at the current
time, which is dependent on four bidding constraints: (i) the remaining time, (ii) the number of
remaining auctions, (iii) the desire for a bargain and (iv) the desperation of the trader. Based on
the current maximum bid, the trader determines the auctions which it can bid in and calculates
what it should bid in these potential auctions. Then, the trader selects the auction with the high-
est expected utility as the target auction. Finally, the trader submits a bid in the target auction.
In addition, they use a genetic algorithm (GA) to search for effective strategies for each of the
various environments since the strategy’s effectiveness is heavily affected by the environment.
The trader will adopt the strategy that is most appropriate to its prevailing context by evolving
strategies. In addition, Yuen et al. (2006) also investigate heuristic utility maximising bidding
strategies for traders to buy one or more items from multiple heterogenous auctions with differ-
ent starting and closing times. They design a two-stage strategy to approximate the best response
bidding strategy for a global bidder. In the ﬁrst stage, it computes a maximum bid or threshold
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from the ﬁrst stage and decides which auctions it should participate in.
In addition to empirical approaches to the bidding across multiple homogenous or heterogenous
auctions reviewed above, Gerding et al. (2008) adopted a theoretical approach for analysing the
optimal bidding strategy used in multiple, simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substi-
tutes. They consider a single bidder, called the global bidder, that is able to bid in any number
of auctions, whereas the other bidders, called the local bidders, can only bid in a single auction.
By theoretical analysis, they ﬁnd the following results. In the multiple simultaneous Vickrey
auctions context, the best strategy for a global bidder is to bid below its true private value, in
contrast to that in a single Vickrey auction context, where the dominant strategy of a bidder is
to bid its true private value. Furthermore, the expected utility of the global bidder is maximised
by participating in all auctions even though it only requires one item. They prove that, when
all auctions are identical, the strategy to maximise the global bidder’s expected utility is to bid
either uniformly across all auctions, or relatively higher in one of the auctions, and the same
or lower in the other auctions. They argue that even though a global bidder has a considerably
higher expected utility than a local one, not all bidders should necessarily bid globally. They
also show that a global bidder has a positive effect on the allocative efﬁciency.
Inadditiontotheabovework, inthespeciﬁccontextofTACTravelCompetition(http://www.
sics.se/tac), travel agents need to decide how to trade in multiple auctions in order to pro-
cure travel packages (ﬂights, hotels and entertainment). Details about trading strategies in this
context can be found in Stone et al. (2003); Vetsikas and Selman (2003); Toulis et al. (2006); He
and Jennings (2003).
Now we have introduced related work about traders’ strategies across multiple single-sided auc-
tions. We can see that when buyers want to purchase multiple goods from multiple single-side
auctions, they ﬁrst need to decide which auction(s) they want to participate in, and then decide
what bids to submit. This analysis will be insightful for us to analyse how traders select mar-
ketplaces and submit shouts in the context of multiple competing double auction marketplaces.
However, our analysis in the double auctions will be much more complex. The reason is as
follows. In multiple single-side auctions where there is a seller staying in each single-sided
auction, researchers only need to consider the market selection of buyers. However, in the dou-
ble auctions, there are multiple buyers and multiple sellers. We need to consider the market
selection of both buyers and sellers. The market selection of buyers(sellers) not only depends
on market policies and market fees, but also depends on the number and types of other traders
in marketplaces. Furthermore, in single-sided auctions, only the buyer bidding the highest wins
the good, and thus how buyers bidding depends on other buyers’ bidding behaviour. However,
in double auctions, the transactions can happen between multiple buyers and multiple sellers.
Thus how buyers(sellers) submitting shouts not only depends how other buyers(sellers) bidding,
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2.4.1.2 Competition between Single-Sided Marketplaces
So far we have described related work about traders’ strategies in the context of multiple single-
sided auctions. However, this work does not consider the interaction between auctions them-
selves. Actually, auctioneers (or sellers, when sellers determine the auction rules) need to com-
pete with each other to attract traders (in terms of, e.g. charging fees, setting the duration of the
auction, setting reserve prices, and so on). In the following, we will describe the related work
about how single-sided auctions compete against each other.
McAfee (1993) was the ﬁrst to consider mechanism design and reserve prices (which is the
lowest price that the seller will agree to sell the good for) in the context of competing sellers.
In his paper, sellers can choose any direct mechanism and these mechanisms are conducted
for multiple periods with discounted future payoffs. He studies the relationship between the
auction mechanism (which is determined by the sellers) and type distributions of buyers across
sellers, and the consequences of this relationship for sellers choosing an auction mechanism
in equilibrium. He ﬁnds that the equilibrium reserve prices posted by sellers are equal to the
sellers’ values. However, his work is based on some strong assumptions (e.g. it assumes that
any individual seller has no signiﬁcant impact on buyers’ proﬁts, and that buyers’ expected
proﬁts in future periods are invariant to deviation of a seller in the current period), which are
only reasonable in the case of inﬁnitely many players. Burguet and Sakovics (1999) then relax
some of these strong assumptions. Speciﬁcally, they derive a unique equilibrium strategy for the
buyers when two sellers are competing with each other by setting reserve prices. They prove
that there always exists an equilibrium strategy for the sellers, but it cannot be a symmetric
one in pure strategies. They show that in the mixed equilibrium, sellers will set a reserve price
above their own private value of the good. Another work about the competition between sellers
is Hernando-Veciana (2005), which considers a large number of sellers. This paper shows that
each seller announces a reserve price equal to its private values when the number of sellers and
buyers is large.
Another important work is done by Gerding et al. (2007), which considers the setting with a
small numbers of buyers and competing sellers, and considers that a mediator charges fees to
the competing seller for running the auction. This work shows that pure Nash equilibria for
the asymmetric seller setting exist. In addition, they also ﬁnd that by shill bidding (where the
seller pretends to be a buyer to bid in its own auction), the seller can further improve its utility.
Finally, they evaluate the ability of different fees to deter shill bidding and quantify their impact
on market efﬁciency. They show that auction fees based on the difference between the payment
and the reserve price are more effective than the more commonly used auction fees with regards
to deterring shill bidding and increasing market efﬁciency.
Now we have introduced the related work about the competition between single-sided auctions.
In this competition, sellers who determine the auction rules, compete with each other to attract
buyers by setting reserve prices. Therefore, this work only considered single-sided auctions
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compete with each other to attract both sides of traders (i.e. buyers and sellers), and the market
selection strategies of buyers and sellers also interact with one another.
2.4.2 Two-Sided Marketplaces
After describing related work about competing single-sided auctions, we now turn to two-sided
double auction marketplaces with multiple buyers and multiple sellers. So far there exists no
literature that deals with trading strategies which are speciﬁcally designed to operate across
multiple double auctions (in Section 4.3, we will use ﬁctitious play to analyse traders’ equilib-
rium strategies across multiple marketplaces). However, for the setting with single-home trading
where traders can only enter one marketplace at a time, the bidding strategies introduced in Sec-
tion 2.3.2.1 (i.e. ZI-C, ZIP, GD, RE, TT, PvT, GDX, AA, FL and so on), which are designed
for isolated marketplace environment, are appropriate and efﬁcient for traders to use. Then to
select which marketplace to choose, Niu et al. (2008b) propose two market selection strategies
for traders to search for the most proﬁtable marketplace (we will introduce them in Section 2.5.1
when we describe the CAT competition). Note that there is comparatively little theoretical work
focusing on the competition between double auction marketplaces. However, there exists a con-
siderable body of work on analysing competing two-sided marketplaces. As we mentioned in
Section 1.1, the double auction marketplace is a particular type of two-sided marketplace. Thus
research on general two-sided marketplace competition should beneﬁt research on the more
speciﬁc double auction marketplace setting. In the following, we describe the existing work
about how two-sided marketplaces compete with each other, where researchers mainly focus on
determining fees charged to traders (i.e. charging strategy).
2.4.2.1 Competition between Two-Sided Marketplaces
There exist various two-sided marketplaces in the real world. Examples of such two-sided mar-
ketplaces are dating websites where males are on one side and females are on the other side,
operating systems for PCs where software developers are on one side, and consumers are on the
other side, card payment systems where shops are on one side and cardholders are on the other
side, and so on.
In a two-sided marketplace, the traders’ choice of marketplaces is signiﬁcantly affected by the
number of traders on the other side. This comes from the positive size effect (Caillaud and
Jullien, 2003), which means that traders have larger expected proﬁts in the marketplace which
has the larger number of traders on the other side. This is because a large number of one side
gives the other side access to more diversity. Thus, the two-sided marketplaces need to try to
attract traders on both sides (since a small number of traders on one side will cause less expected
proﬁtsfortraderson theothersideand, inturn, causethosetraderstoleave themarketplace). For
example, paymentcardsystemsneedtoattractbothretailersandcardholderstoadopttheircards,
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to attract both males and females. However, this gives rise to a “chicken and egg” problem: to
attract buyers (one side), a marketplace should have a large base of the registered sellers (the
other side), but these will be willing to register only if they expect many buyers to show up.
One of the most important works on this problem is from Caillaud and Jullien (2003), who
analyse the competition between two marketplaces. In their work, they assume that traders are
homogeneous with the same preference (type), and traders’ utilities only depend on the number
of traders on the other side. Furthermore, two types of fees are allowed in their model: a registra-
tion fee charged when traders enter the marketplace, and a transaction fee charged when traders
are successfully matched. In addition, they allow the marketplaces to charge negative regis-
tration fees, which means that the marketplaces can subsidize traders in order to attract them.
Firstly, they analyse the case with single-home trading. Speciﬁcally, they analyse a “divide-and-
conquer” strategy of subsidizing one side of the traders (by charging negative registration fees)
while recovering loss (by charging positive transaction fees) from the other side. They show
that, when traders can only enter one marketplace at a time, competition between marketplaces
is severe and, in equilibrium, all traders enter the same marketplace, but this marketplace has
to give up all proﬁt. They further analyse the more complicated case with multi-home trading,
which induces lower degree of competition and, as a result, generates positive proﬁts in equi-
librium. They show that in the multi-home environment, an efﬁcient equilibrium always exists
in which traders register with the marketplace with cheaper registration fees, and are willing to
register with the marketplace which provides the lower transaction fee.
Another signiﬁcant work on competition in two-sided marketplaces is Rochet and Tirole (2003),
whose analysis can be understood in the context of competing credit card platforms with two
sides: consumers and the set of retailers. In their analysis, the credit card platforms charge
fees for each transaction. When a credit card offers a lower transaction fee to retailers than its
opponent, then a retailer needs to make a choice between only accepting the cheaper card or
accepting both cards. When the retailer accepts only the cheaper card, then its consumers have a
stark choice between paying by this card or not using this card at all. However, if the retailer ac-
cepts both cards, then it may happen that fewer consumers use the retailer’s preferred lower-cost
card to pay. By theoretical analysis they ﬁnd that, in equilibrium, all retailers accept both credit
cards while consumers use their preferred cards. The split of transaction fee charged to both
sides depends on how consumers consider the substitute of the two competing cards. If they
consider the two cards as close substitutes, then retailers need to bear most of the transaction fee
in equilibrium. They also derive a simple formula which can be used to govern fees in two-sided
marketplaces. However, in both Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003), it is
assumed that buyers(sellers) are homogeneous with the same preference (type), and will choose
the same marketplace. In the real-world double auctions, this assumption is not appropriate
since traders are usually heterogeneous with different preferences. In addition, Damiano and
Hao (2008) consider a setting with heterogeneous traders. They assume that traders select mar-
ketplaces only according to the types of other traders, instead of the number of traders, and thus
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Furthermore, another important work is done by Lee (2008), who analyses under what condi-
tions two competing marketplaces can co-exist. They point out that strong marketplace differ-
entiation or weak positive size effect can make competing marketplaces co-exist. In our work,
we will also analyse whether competing marketplaces can co-exist and under what conditions if
they can.
Although the above works are related and can beneﬁt the research on competing double auc-
tion marketplaces, none of these papers speciﬁcally consider the double auction mechanism to
match traders. This changes the problem because in the competition of double auction market-
places, the market selection strategy of the traders not only depends on the number of traders
choosing the marketplaces, but also on their own types and those of other traders choosing the
marketplaces. Furthermore, in addition to the positive size effect, there also exists the negative
size effect. Buyers(sellers) have to compete with each other in order to be matched with sell-
ers(buyers). Therefore, buyers(sellers) prefer the marketplace with few buyers(sellers). Com-
petition between two double auction marketplaces is considered by Ellison et al. (2004). They
show that, in some cases, the negative size effect has a larger impact than the positive size ef-
fect, and traders will not migrate from this state, which means that two competing marketplaces
can co-exist in equilibrium. This model is similar to ours since we also consider heterogeneous
traders and both positive and negative size effects. However, Ellison et al. (2004) make the sim-
plifying assumption that traders choose a marketplace before learning their own types, and thus
the market selection strategy is independent of a trader’s type. Therefore, unlike in our model,
using their model, they show that similar marketplaces can co-exist in equilibrium. In contrast,
we ﬁnd that in our model, traders will converge to one marketplace except for the case when
there is strong market differentiation (i.e. where competing marketplaces charge different types
of fees).
2.5 The CAT Competition
After describing the related work about competing marketplaces, now we introduce a speciﬁc
competition between double auctions since our design of a competing marketplace will be evalu-
ated in this context. In order to promote the research on competing double auction marketplaces,
an annual Market Design Competition (CAT) was introduced as part of the Trading Agent Com-
petition (TAC) (Cai et al., 2009). To this end, a marketplace competition platform was provided,
which is called JCAT (Niu et al., 2008b). In the following, we will detail this platform according
to technical reports issued by CAT competition organisers (see Cai et al. 2009; Niu et al. 2009)
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2.5.1 Basic Structure and Rules
The CAT competition was ﬁrst introduced as part of TAC in 2007, in order to promote research
on efﬁcient and effective competing marketplace design. The underlying platform, JCAT, allows
multiple marketplaces to compete against each other and allows marketplaces to be evaluated
in a uniform way. Furthermore, this competition has been run successfully in 2007, 2008, 2009
and 2010, and can provide an international benchmark for evaluating the competing marketplace
design. Given this, in this thesis, we will evaluate our design of a competing marketplace based
on this platform.
As depicted in Figure 2.10, the CAT competition consists of traders, i.e. buyers and sellers,
and specialists. Traders can buy or sell goods in one of the available marketplaces which are
operated by specialists. In the competition, the traders are provided by the CAT organisers, and
specialists (with the market policies and charging strategies) are designed by the competition
entrants. Each entrant can only operate a single marketplace in the competition.
FIGURE 2.10: Architecture of CAT competition.
Each CAT competition lasts for a number of trading days7, and each day consists of a ﬁxed
number of rounds, during which traders submit shouts to the specialist they are registered with.
Each round lasts for a known constant length of time. In the competition, each trader is assigned
a private value for the goods it wishes to buy or sell. For the buyer, the private value is its limit
price, and for the seller, the private value is its cost price. In the competition, traders’ private
values remain constant during a day, but may change from day to day, depending on the conﬁg-
uration of the game parameters. Traders need to enter marketplaces to make transactions. Here,
each trader can only register with one marketplace on a particular day, i.e. only single-home
7A trading day is a virtual day, not an actual tournament day in real time.48 Chapter 2 Literature Review
trading is considered. Thus bidding strategies in isolated marketplaces can be used. Typically,
ZI-C, ZIP, GD and RE strategies (see Section 2.3.2.1 for details) are permitted in this setting.
In addition to the bidding strategies, traders have one of several market selection strategies to
decide which marketplace to register with. These market selection strategies implemented in
JCAT are as follows:
• random strategy: the trader randomly chooses a marketplace to participate in.
• -greedy exploration strategy: the trader treats the choice of marketplace as an n-armed
bandit problem8 which it solves using an -greedy exploration strategy where 0 ≤  ≤ 1.
With such a strategy, a trader updates its value function according to its recent proﬁts,
and then it chooses the most proﬁtable marketplace with probability 1 − , and randomly
chooses one of the remaining marketplaces with probability . The probability  can
remain constant or can vary over time, depending on the value of a parameter α. If α is 1,
 remains constant, while if α takes any value in (0,1), then  will decrease over time.
• softmax exploration strategy: This market selection strategy is similar to the above -
greedy exploration strategy except that it uses a softmax exploration strategy in the n-
armed bandit algorithm. This means the trader does not treat all marketplaces, except the
best marketplace, as the same. If this strategy does not choose the most proﬁtable market-
place, it weighs the choice of remaining marketplaces in order to choose more proﬁtable
marketplaces. A parameter τ, which is similar to , controls the relative importance of
the weights a trader assigns to marketplaces. It can also be ﬁxed or have a variable value
determined by α.
Specialists facilitate transactions by matching bids and asks and determining the transaction
price. AsdiscussedinSection1.1, adoubleauctionmarketplaceconsistsofthefollowingmarket
policies: timing, matching, pricing and shout accepting policies. Furthermore, the marketplace
also needs to specify its charging strategy. An overview of the policies implemented in JCAT is
listed in Table 2.4. In the pricing policy, in addition to k-pricing policy and n-pricing policy we
introduced in Section 2.3.2.2, JCAT implements two other pricing policies:
• Uniform pricing policy: sets the transaction prices for all matched ask-bid pairs at the
same point.
• Side-biased pricing policy: is a kind of k-pricing policy with varying k, where k is set to
split the proﬁt in favour of the side where fewer shouts exist.
In addition to the quote-beating accepting and equilibrium accepting policy introduced in Sec-
tion 2.3.2.2, JCAT implemented four other accepting policies:
8This is a machine learning problem, similar to the slot machine, where there are n levers, and each lever provides
a reward drawn from a distribution associated with that lever Sutton and Barto (1998). The objective is to maximize
the reward sum through iterative pulls. There is no initial knowledge about the levers. In each pull, a trade-off is made
between “exploitation” of the lever that has the highest expected reward and “exploration” to get more information
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• Always accepting policy: accepts any shouts submitted by traders.
• Transaction-based accepting policy: records the most recently matched bids and asks,
and then uses the lowest matched bid and the highest matched ask as thresholds to restrict
the allowed shouts.
• History-based accepting policy: is derived from the GD bidding strategy. GD forms the
belief about how likely a given shout is to be matched based on the history of previous
shouts. Then, according to this belief, the marketplace accepts shouts that can be matched
with the probability no lower than a speciﬁed threshold.
• Self-beating accepting policy: accepts all shouts of traders who have not submitted shouts
yet, but then only allows traders to modify their standing shouts with more competitive
prices.
For the charging strategy, JCAT provides ﬁve types of fees which can be set:
• Registration fee: a ﬂat fee charged for participating in a marketplace.
• Information fee: a ﬂat fee charged by the specialist to traders and specialists who require
market information from the marketplace. This information consists of the entire history
of the accepted shouts and the transactions in that marketplace.
• Shout fee: a ﬂat fee charged for successfully submitted bids or asks.
• Transaction fee: a ﬂat fee charged on each successful transaction.
• Proﬁt fee: a share of the observed proﬁt made by traders, where a trader’s observed
proﬁt is calculated as the difference between the shout and transaction price. Note that a
trader’s observed proﬁt is different from its actual proﬁt (which is the difference between
its private value and transaction price).
Given this, JCAT comes with ﬁve pre-set charging strategies. The ﬁve pre-set charging strategies
in the JCAT platform are as follows:
• Fixed charging: imposes fees at a speciﬁed ﬁxed level.
• Bait-and-switch charging: makes a specialist reduce its charges until it captures a certain
market share, and then it slowly increases charges to increase proﬁt. The specialist adjusts
its charges downward again when the market share drops below a certain level.
• Charge-cutting charging: sets the charges to the lowest charges set by the other market-
places on the previous day. This will attract many traders, but may sacriﬁce proﬁts.
• Learn-or-lure-fast charging: adapts charges towards some desired target according to the
scheme used by the ZIP bidding strategy.50 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Timing Policy (Section 2.3.2.2) Matching Policy (Section 2.3.2.2)
Continuous clearing9 ME
Round clearing10
Pricing Policy (Section 2.3.2.2) Charging Strategy
k-pricing Fixed charging
n-pricing Bait-and-switch charging
Uniform pricing Charging-cutting charging
Side-biased pricing Learn-or-lure-fast charging
Shout Accepting Policy (Section 2.3.2.2)
Quote-beating accepting
Estimated equilibrium Accepting
Self-beating accepting
Transaction-based accepting
History-based accepting
TABLE 2.4: Market policies implemented in the JCAT.
Although JCAT has provided some pre-set market policies and charging strategies, specialists
can design their own in order to effectively compete with one another in making proﬁt, attracting
traders and ensuring shouts submitted in the marketplace result in transactions. To evaluate their
performance, the marketplaces are scored based on a combination of three different metrics:
• Proﬁt Share: the proﬁt obtained by the specialist on a particular day as a percentage of
the total proﬁts obtained by all specialists on that same day. The proﬁt share score is a
number between 0 and 1 for each specialist for each day.
• Market Share: the percentage of traders who have registered with that specialist on a
given day. The market share score is between 0 and 1.
• Transaction Success Rate: the percentage of shouts accepted by the marketplace result-
ing in transactions. The transaction success rate score is between 0 and 1.
These metrics are weighted equally (i.e. weighted one-third each) and added together to produce
a combined score for each specialist for each Assessment Day11. Scores are then summed across
all Assessment Days to produce a ﬁnal game score for each specialist. The specialist with the
highest ﬁnal score is the winner of the competition.
2.5.2 Traders Migrating between Marketplaces
In the competing marketplace context with single-home trading, traders move freely between
the different marketplaces to search for the one which they believe to be the most proﬁtable.
9It is the implementation of CDA policy in the JCAT.
10It is the implementation of CH policy in the JCAT.
11In order to avoid effects arising from the fact that the competition has a start day and an end day, not all the
trading days will be used for assessment purpose. In more detail, the organisers randomly choose a day as a starting
trading day and a day as an ending day, and then randomly choose days between the starting day and the ending day
on which assessment will be undertaken. These days are called “Assessment Days”.Chapter 2 Literature Review 51
Such migration will signiﬁcantly determine the ﬁnal competition results of marketplaces, and
thus needs to be researched in detail. To this end, based on the JCAT platform, Niu et al. (2007)
provided an experimental analysis on this aspect of the traders’ behaviour. Speciﬁcally, in their
experiments, traders’ market selection strategies are chosen from random selection strategy,
-greedy exploration strategy or softmax exploration strategy, which we described in Section
2.5.1. From the results, the authors concluded that, when traders choose marketplaces randomly,
marketplaces charging higher fees tend to make larger proﬁts. However, as soon as traders are
able to learn, they exhibit a strong tendency to concentrate towards marketplaces charging low
fees. They also showed that the traders’ market selection is dependent on how traders learn.
In particular, using -greedy exploration allows traders to settle on the cheaper marketplace
more quickly, while the softmax exploration allows traders to better distinguish the range of
non-optimal marketplaces.
Buildingonthis, Caietal.(2008)ranexperimentstoanalysetheimpactofmultiplemarketplaces
on the efﬁciency of trading. From their results, they found that, while dividing traders into
multiple marketplaces leads to a loss of allocative efﬁciency, this loss is reduced when traders
are allowed to move among marketplaces in search of greater proﬁts. In particular, they showed
that when traders can move among marketplaces, this can cause segregation. For example, most
intra-marginal traders may concentrate on one marketplace because, in this marketplace, they
have more possibilities to trade. In the speciﬁc context of CDAs, extra-marginal traders may, in
general, be able to steal a deal from intra-marginal traders, but when such segregation occurs, it
is hard for extra-marginal traders to do so. This, in turn, leads to increased allocative efﬁciency.
In addition, they showed that fees can drive traders that are not making proﬁts to try different
marketplaces, andthusallowmarketplacestoridthemselvesofunproductivetraders. IntheCHs,
although extra-marginal traders cannot steal a deal from intra-marginal traders, the movement
of traders can still increase proﬁts by allowing a trader that is extra-marginal in one marketplace
to become intra-marginal in another. Generally speaking, because traders are proﬁt-motivated,
they migrate towards marketplaces that provide more proﬁts, and overall this increases the total
proﬁts of the set of marketplaces, increasing the global efﬁciency. This effect is enhanced by the
application of fees since these tend to reduce proﬁts and then discourage traders from remaining
in marketplaces that are unproﬁtable for them.
To sum up, from the above experimental analysis, we can see that proﬁt-motivated traders with
a learning ability will migrate towards proﬁtable marketplaces, and this migration process is en-
hanced by fees imposed by marketplaces since they reduce traders’ proﬁts. The way that traders
move between marketplaces is important when considering the design of market policies. Ef-
fective market policies are needed to provide highly efﬁcient allocation in order to guarantee
traders’ proﬁts and attract traders. Moreover, the charging strategy should be given particular
consideration since it has been shown to have a large impact on the traders’ decision of which
marketplace they will register with. However, this experimental analysis considered heuristic
strategies adopted by traders and marketplaces and the results depend on the choices of heuris-
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In addition, in Sohn et al. (2009), PSUCAT proposes a simple game-theoretic model to analyse
traders’ market selection in the CAT context, which assumes a game with complete information
about the traders’ private values. They analyse how registration fees affect the market selection
of intra-marginal and extra-marginal traders. They show that extra-marginal traders are the ﬁrst
to leave the marketplace when it starts charging a registration fee. Intra-marginal traders are the
next to leave the marketplace as the registration fee increases. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that the
resulting number of Nash equilibria drop as the registration fee increases. However, this analysis
assumes a game with complete information about the traders’ types, in contrast to reality, where
traders’ types are usually privately known.
2.5.3 Competition Results
In this section, we introduce the market policies and charging strategy used by specialists in the
CAT competition (2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010), where IAMwildCAT is the entry of University
of Southampton, that I have been involved since 2008. This existing work, which is directly
related to the competing marketplace design in the context of the CAT competition, will give us
further understanding of the design of competing marketplaces.
2.5.3.1 2007
The2007CATCompetitionconsistedof10specialists: IAMwildCAT,PSUCAT,CrocodileAgent,
jackaroo, Havana, PersianCat, PhantAgent, Mertacor, TacTex and Manx, and the result is shown
in Table 2.5. In Niu et al. (2010), the competition organisers analyse the policies used in the
competition by inferring the market policies from the binaries of the specialists submitted by the
participants12. They analysed the competition through two approaches: while-box approach and
black-box approach. The white-box approach attempts to relate the internal logic and features of
strategies to the competition outcomes. In more detail, they showed that most specialists use ME
to clear markets at the equilibrium price. IAMwildCAT and Mertacor are the only two which at-
tempt to match intra-marginal shouts with extra-marginal shouts close to the equilibrium point in
order to reach high transaction success rates. Furthermore, about half the specialists use a round
clearing policy which means the marketplace is cleared at the end of each round, and the other
half use a continuous clearing policy. The specialists in the competition used a wide range of
shout accepting policies. In particular, IAMwildCAT, PSUCAT, CrocodileAgent and Mertacor
used a modiﬁed or improved estimated equilibrium shout accepting policy. Havana, jackaroo
and MANX adopted the quote-beating accepting policy. TacTex used an always-accepting pol-
icy and PersianCat used a transaction-based accepting policy. For the pricing policy, Havana,
PersianCat, TacTex and MANX used the k-pricing policy. On the other hand, IAMwildCAT,
PSUCAT and Mertacor used a modiﬁed or improved side-biased pricing policy. jackaroo used
12The CAT competition organisers require the participants to submit the binaries of the specialist they used in the
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Rank Specialist Score
1 IAMwildCAT 365.496
2 PSUCAT 328.333
3 CrocodileAgent 308.813
4 jackaroo 272.239
5 Havana 256.441
6 PersianCat 218.458
7 PhantAgent 146.208
8 Mertacor 133.912
9 TacTex 107.925
10 MANX 95.976
TABLE 2.5: Result of 2007 CAT competition
the n-pricing policy, whereas CrocodileAgent used a combination of modiﬁed n-pricing policy
and side-biased pricing policy. From all the market policies, most effort seems to have been
placed in the charging strategy and most specialists designed their own or modiﬁed charging
strategies provided by JCAT. Considering how fees are updated over time, some specialists
adapted their charges, whereas other specialists directly calculated the charges such that they
would expect to achieve a certain target proﬁt, and some specialists combine the above two ap-
proaches by changing the fees gradually from the current level to the target level. For different
type of fees, about half of the specialists mainly or exclusively charged registration fees and
proﬁt fees. TacTex charged only shout fees. Three specialists, CrocodileAgent, Havana and
MANX charged each kind of fees without any preference on a certain kind of fee. Moreover,
most specialists utilise the start effect (which means attracting traders by charging less in the
early stage of game) and the end effect (which means imposing higher charges to earn more
proﬁt when the competition is about to end) even though the starting and ending days may not
be included in the Assessment Days.
Furthermore, they use a black-box approach to analyse the competition, which will consider the
strategies as atomic entities. A black-box analysis abstracts away the internal structure of the
specialists and many details of the dynamics during the interaction between specialists, making
it possible to consider many more situations. In more detail, in this approach, they consider
two sets of experiments: multilateral simulations with games involving all the specialists and
bilateral simulations with games each involving two specialists. Through the analysis, they
show that in these simulations, the winner IAMwildCAT still dominates other entrants. They
further introduce a specialist MetroCat (which is designed by organisers for evaluation purpose),
and show that this specialist quickly dominates all entrants including IAMwildCAT. The success
of MetroCat also suggests that there is a signiﬁcant room for the improvement of entrants in this
year’s competition.54 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Rank Specialist Score
1 PersianCat 425.773
2 MANX 384.921
3 jackaroo 380.554
4 PSUCAT 379.416
5 Mertacor 354.283
6 IAMwildCAT 331.708
7 DOG 314.014
8 CrocodileAgent 287.8
9 MyFuzzy 259.503
10 BazarganZebel 252.128
11 Hairball 242.853
TABLE 2.6: Result of 2008 CAT competition
2.5.3.2 2008
Inthe2008CATCompetition, therewere11specialists: BazarganZebel, CrocodileAgent, DOG,
Hairball, IAMwildCAT, MANX, Mertacor, MyFuzzy, PSUCAT, PersianCat and jackaroo, and
the result is shown in Table 2.6. Up to now, only three entrants have published their strategies
in the 2008 CAT Competition: PersianCat (the winner of the 2008 CAT Competition), Mertacor
and CrocodileAgent. In the following, we introduce their policies brieﬂy, and then introduce the
analysis of the 2008 CAT Competition by the competition organisers.
In the 2008 CAT Competition, the market policies adopted by PersianCat are as follows (Honari
et al., 2009):
• timing policy: it adopts continuous clearing policy, which clears the marketplace imme-
diately when a new shout is admitted.
• matching policy: it uses the equilibrium matching policy, i.e. matching high bids with
low asks.
• shout accepting policy: it adopts an equilibrium accepting policy. Speciﬁcally, it calcu-
lates the equilibrium price on day i according to the equation: ˆ p∗
i = 1
2n
Pj=i−n
j=i−1(MaxAj +
MinBj), where n is the length of sliding window, and is equal to 4 in the competition,
MaxAj and MinBj are the maximum transacted ask and the minimum transacted bid on
day j. Then it set a slack value  to moderate the restriction of the accepting policy. It
sets ˆ p∗
i −  and ˆ p∗
i +  as the minimum acceptable bid and the maximum acceptable ask
respectively in PersianCat on day i. In the competition, the  is 10% of the ˆ p∗
i.
• pricing policy: it sets the transaction price to its estimated equilibrium price. If the equi-
librium price is outside the range of the matched bid and ask, it sets the transaction price
to the nearest price of the matched bid and ask.
• charging strategy: it adopts a charging strategy, which only charges a ﬁxed proﬁt fee.Chapter 2 Literature Review 55
The market policies adopted by Mertacor are as follows (Stavrogiannis and Mitkas, 2009):
• timing policy: it uses a round clearing policy for the earlier rounds, and then switches to
a continuous clearing policy to increase the volume of its transactions.
• matching policy: it uses the equilibrium matching policy, i.e. matching high bids with
low asks.
• shout accepting policy: it designs a global equilibrium accepting policy, which allows
only globally intra-marginal traders to place shouts in the earlier rounds of a given trading
day. It then subsequently switches to the quote-beating accepting policy. Speciﬁcally, the
global equilibrium price is calculated as follows. It continually keeps track of the highest
bids and the lowest asks in Mertacor. It believes that these prices constitute the closest
available estimation of traders’ private values. Moreover, it estimates the number of goods
traded every day as traders’ daily endowment. When a sufﬁcient number of traders have
beenexplored, itformstheglobal demandandsupplycurves andthencomputesthe global
equilibrium price.
• pricing policy: it adopts a uniform global equilibrium pricing policy, which sets the price
of all transactions at the global equilibrium price.
• charging strategy: it only charges a proﬁt fee, and sets the fee according to its market
statistic and opponent scores.
The market policies adopted by CrocodileAgent are as follows (Petric et al., 2008):
• timing policy: it clears the market every second round.
• matching policy: it uses the equilibrium matching policy, i.e. matching high bids with
low asks.
• shout accepting policy: it uses an equilibrium accepting policy provided by the JCAT
platform.
• pricing policy: it adopts a slightly modiﬁed n-pricing policy in order to reduce the loss of
traders and ensure that both buyers and sellers will obtain proﬁts from transactions.
• charging strategy: it divides the game into two phases. In the luring phase, it tries to
attract traders by charging no fees. Then once obtaining a good market share, it switches
to the charging phase, and begins to charge fees to make proﬁts.
The competition organisers also analysed specialists in the 2008 CAT Competition in order
to better understand the characteristics of the policies adopted by specialists in relation to the
competition context (Robinson et al., 2009). Speciﬁcally, they empirically evaluate the gener-
alisation abilities of marketplaces in the different trader populations, different competing spe-
cialists populations and different scoring periods. They show that specialists in the 2008 CAT56 Chapter 2 Literature Review
Rank Specialist Score
1 jackaroo 542.6
2 CUNY.CS 533.1
3 IAMwildCAT 512.9
4 PSUCAT 499.7
5 Mertacor 395.0
6 rucat0 391.2
7 UMTac09 379.4
8 cestlavie 365.1
9 PersianCat 327.0
10 BazarganZebel 315.6
11 TWBB 294.0
12 Tianuani 261.0
13 CrocodileAgent 217.7
14 WaterCAT 167.1
TABLE 2.7: Result of 2009 CAT competition
Competition are not robust, which means that a specialist which performs well in a particular
competition context may not perform well if the competition context changes. Thus the market
policies adopted by specialists seem not to generalise, and the competition organisers suggest
entrants should make their specialists more robust in the future competition.
2.5.3.3 2009 and 2010
The results of the CAT competition in 2009 and 2010 are shown in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 respec-
tively. We found that jackaroo performed well in these two years’ competition (ranked ﬁrst in
2009 and second in 2010), and Mertacor’s performance was improved signiﬁcantly from the
ﬁfth in 2009 to the ﬁrst in 2010. We also can see that our entrant, IAMwildCAT, performed
well in these two years’ competition (ranked third in both years). Furthermore, we found that
the performance of competition marketplaces changed in different days’ competition since com-
petition operators changed traders’ strategies. Up to now, neither entrants nor competition or-
ganisers have published their analysis for these two years’ competition. Therefore, we do not
know market policies and charging policies used by other competing marketplaces. However,
for the market fee charged to traders, which is the information we can directly observe from the
competition, we ﬁnd that most effective marketplaces only charge proﬁt fees, and set other types
of fees as zero.Chapter 2 Literature Review 57
Rank Specialist Score
1 Mertacor 627.394
2 jackaroo 589.667
3 IAMwildCAT 548.238
4 PoleCAT 521.918
5 TWBB 461.398
6 PSUCAT 447.459
7 MyFuzzy 428.547
8 AstonCAT 393.911
9 PersianCat 255.724
TABLE 2.8: Result of 2010 CAT competition
2.5.3.4 IAMwildCAT
In this section, we introduce the market policies and charging policy used by IAMwildCAT in
the 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 CAT competition.
2007:
In terms of the timing policy, IAMwildCAT clears the market at the end of each round, i.e.
round clearing. In terms of the matching policy, it is observed that intra-marginal traders are
expected to trade earlier than marginal traders such that the amount of proﬁt to be extracted in
the marketplace is higher earlier in the trading day, and with less proﬁt to be made at the end
of trading day. Thus IAMwildCAT chooses the following strategy to deal with the trade-off: it
clears the market for maximising proﬁts in the end of earlier rounds of the trading day. Then,
on the following rounds, with less proﬁts to be made in the marketplace, IAMwildCAT clears to
maximise the number of transactions.
For the pricing policy, IAMwildCAT uses a variation of the k-pricing policy. In particular,
IAMwildCAT looks at a window of the 10 trading days for the average number of buyers and
sellers it attracts. If the difference between the number of buyers and sellers is bigger than 10%
of the total number of traders, k is adjusted in order to give more proﬁt to the side (buyers or
sellers) which is under represented. Such a pricing policy is similar to the side-biased pricing
policy implemented in the JCAT.
In the design of the shout accepting policy, IAMwildCAT adopts the equilibrium shout accepting
policy to reject bids below the equilibrium price and asks above the equilibrium price. Because
of the error of estimating the equilibrium price, IAMwildCAT provides some slack when de-
termining the minimum accepted bid and the maximum accepted ask. Furthermore, in order to
increase TSR, on the last few trading rounds, IAMwildCAT only accepts bids and asks that can
be currently cleared.
Finally, in the design of the charging policy, initially, IAMwildCAT explores the marketplace in
order to build up its market share. Speciﬁcally, it attracts as many traders as possible by giving
up all proﬁts, scoring only by its higher market share and its transaction success rate. With a58 Chapter 2 Literature Review
large market share, it then starts exploiting these traders by charging registration and proﬁt fees
to extract proﬁts from them. With increasing fees, the marketplace becomes less attractive to
potential traders, and then gradually, the effect of increased fees decreases the market share.
At this point, IAMwildCAT stops exploiting and goes back to exploring to increase its market
share back to a predetermined threshold. Once it reaches that target, it has a sufﬁcient number of
traders registered to start exploiting. By following this policy, the marketplace can maintain the
market share at a reasonably high level while exploiting the traders whenever the market share
is very high. This charging policy would then oscillate between the exploiting and exploring
behaviours until the end of the game.
2008:
In 2008, in the design of IAMwildCAT, for the timing policy, the same as 2007, the marketplace
adopts the round clearing policy. For the matching policy, IAMwildCAT makes a trade-off be-
tween maximising traders’ proﬁts and maximising the number of transactions. In more detail,
when shouts are far away from the equilibrium price, it uses the ME matching policy to max-
imise traders’ proﬁts. Then when traders’ shouts are within an area close to the equilibrium
price, it uses the MV matching policy to maximise the number of transactions. For the pricing
policy, it is the same as that in 2007 CAT competition. For the shout accepting policy, IAMwild-
CAT uses a quote-beating accepting policy. Finally, for the charging policy, it adopts a concept
of positive feedback loop. In more detail, IAMwildCAT begins to charge fees until it obtains
the highest market share, and because of the highest market share, it may obtain the highest
market proﬁt among all competing marketplace by charging lower fees. Because of lower fees,
the marketplace can still maintain and attract more traders. Then attracting more traders means
charging even lower fees to traders to obtain the highest market proﬁt. In this situation, we
can see that IAMwildCAT can charge lower fees to obtain good market proﬁt, but still remain
competitive.
2009:
In 2009, IAMwildCAT uses the same timing and matching policies as those in 2008. For the
pricing policy, it uses an equilibrium pricing policy, where the equilibrium price is set as the
transaction prices. The estimation of the equilibrium price is similar to that PersianCat did in
2008 (see Section 2.5.3.2). For the shout accepting policy, IAMwildCAT uses an equilibrium-
beating accepting policy. For the charging policy, from the competition of 2008, it is observed
that IAMwildCAT fails to obtain the highest market share, but is able to keep market share at a
good level. In this situation, the charging policy used in 2008 does not charge enough to make
proﬁt. In this year, the charging policy is improved according to this observation. In more detail,
when the marketplace fails to obtain the highest market share, but can keep it at a good level,
the marketplace still begins to charge fees.Chapter 2 Literature Review 59
2010:
In 2010, according to insights from the analysis done in this thesis, we design market policies
and the charging policy. In more detail, IAMwildCAT makes a trade-off between the round
clearing and the continuous clearing policies. It also makes a trade-off between maximising the
numberoftransactionsandmaximisingtraders’proﬁts. Forthepricingpolicy, itadoptstheequi-
librium pricing policy, and for the shout accepting policy, IAMwildCAT switches between the
quote-beating and the equilibrium beating accepting policies. For the charging policy, IAMwild-
CAT uses an adaptive charging policy which adapts fees based the number of transactions. For
details, refer to Chapter 4.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we began by outlining the background on game theory and market theory in
microeconomics. We then introduced related work on isolated single-sided auctions and double
auctions. After this, we introduced existing work about competing single-sided auctions and
competing two-sided marketplaces. Finally, we introduced the CAT competition for evaluat-
ing the competing double auction marketplace and reviewed the relevant work in this speciﬁc
context.
Although existing work analyses the competition between marketplaces, they do not fully ad-
dress the research challenges introduced in Section 1.2. In the following, we discuss why they
fail to address our research challenges in detail, and brieﬂy introduce what we do in this thesis
to address these challenges.
Firstly, from the literature review, we can see that a number of theoretical models have been
proposed to analyse how traders select two-sided marketplaces and how competing two-sided
marketplaces set fees to make proﬁts and keep traders. They are related to our work on com-
peting double auction marketplaces since the double auction marketplace is a particular type of
a two-sided marketplace. However, most of this work only considers the positive size effect,
whereby buyers(sellers) prefer marketplaces which have a larger number of sellers(buyers). As
we discussed in Section 1.2, in double auction marketplaces, the negative size effect also exists,
since traders on one side will compete with each other in order to be matched with traders on the
other side. This negative size effect will encourages traders to distribute across different mar-
ketplaces, thereby making it more likely for several competing marketplaces to co-exist in the
long term. In this thesis, our analysis of competing double auction marketplaces will inherently
consider both positive and negative size effects, and we ﬁnd that the positive size effect has a
larger impact than the negative size effect, and traders will concentrate in one marketplace (see
Chapters 3 and 4).
Moreover, most existing work assumes that all traders are homogeneous (i.e. have the same
type), and the marketplaces have complete information about the types of traders. These simpli-60 Chapter 2 Literature Review
fying assumptions fail to fulﬁll our research challenge that traders usually have heterogeneous
types which are privately known. In this situation, the traders, in choosing their marketplaces,
not only care about fees charged by the marketplaces and the number of other traders, but also
their types. Although in the CAT competition there exists some work that considers these fac-
tors, they consider speciﬁc heuristic strategies adopted by traders and marketplaces and the
results depend on the choices of heuristics, and thus cannot easily be used to derive general
conclusions. In our analysis, we will consider that traders have privately known heterogeneous
types. Speciﬁcally, in Chapter 3, we analyse equilibrium strategies of traders and marketplaces
under the assumption that traders have heterogeneous discrete trader types which are privately
know. In Chapter 4, we extend the analysis to the setting with privately know continuous trader
types.
Furthermore, comparativelylittleexistingworkconsidersdifferenttradingenvironments(single-
home, multi-home and hybrid trading) and currently no literature considers different good prop-
erties (independent, substitutes and complementary) when analysing competing two-sided mar-
ketplaces. As we discussed in Section 1.2, strategies of marketplaces and traders will be affected
by these factors. Moreover, in fact, currently no work has considered traders’ strategies across
multiple double auction marketplaces in the multi-home trading environment (although trading
strategies across multiple single-sided auction indeed exist, and heuristic bidding strategies used
for isolated double auctions can be used in the single-home trading environments with multi-
ple double auction marketplaces). In Chapter 4, we will address this challenge by considering
different trading environments and different good properties.
Finally, as we saw in Section 2.3.2.2, a considerable body of work exists on the market pol-
icy design of an isolated double auction marketplace. However, we do not know which market
policy performs well when competing with other policies. Furthermore, the performance of
different market policies are affected by traders’ behaviour. Currently, there is no systematic
work on analysing the performance of market policies in the competing environments by con-
sidering different behaviours for traders. To address this research challenge, in Chapter 5, we
experimentally analyse how different market policies inﬂuence the performance of competing
marketplaces in different environments where different bidding strategies are used. Further-
more, based on insights obtained from this analysis, we design our market policies in the CAT
competition.Chapter 3
Analysis of Competing Marketplaces
with Discrete Trader Types
In this chapter, we theoretically analyse the market selection strategies for traders and charging
strategies for marketplaces in the context of multiple competing double auction marketplaces.
This work addresses the research challenges 1 (analysing market selection strategies for traders)
and 4 (analysing charging strategies for marketplaces) in Section 1.2. The rationale for so doing
is to provide useful insights to guide the design of a charging strategy. As we discussed in
Section 1.3, the strategies of traders and marketplaces are affected by each other, and thus we
use game theory to analyse the Nash equilibrium strategies. In this chapter, we focus on the
single-home trading environment where traders can only enter one marketplace at a time. Such
an environment is highly competitive because the marketplaces have to compete ﬁercely to fully
attract a trader (compared to a multi-home trading environment where traders can participate in
multiple marketplaces at a time). For this setting, we are interested in analysing how both traders
and marketplaces behave strategically. We will analyse the settings with multi-home trading and
hybrid trading in Chapter 4.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Firstly, we propose a game-theoretic framework for
analysing competing marketplaces (Section 3.1). Then, based on the framework, we analyse the
Nashequilibriummarketselectionstrategiesfortradersthatarerestrictedtoapredeﬁnednumber
of discrete types (Section 3.2). After having established the traders’ equilibrium strategies, we
goontousetwodifferentapproachestoanalyseequilibriumchargingstrategiesformarketplaces
(Section 3.3). Finally, we summarise in Section 3.4.
3.1 A Game-Theoretic Framework for Competing Marketplaces
In this section we introduce the game-theoretic framework which models a setting with com-
peting marketplaces and forms the basis of our analysis. Speciﬁcally, in our framework, a trad-
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ing round is considered1 and it proceeds as follows. First, all marketplaces publish their fees.
Second, based on the observed fees, each trader selects a marketplace according to its market
selection strategy. Third, traders submit their shouts according to their bidding strategies. Fi-
nally, after all traders have submitted their shouts, the marketplace matches buyers and sellers
and then executes transactions. In the following, we start by introducing the basic notation of
our framework. Then we introduce the marketplaces’ charging strategies and the traders’ market
selection strategies respectively. Finally, we provide the deﬁnition of equilibrium strategies in
the context of our system.
3.1.1 Buyers and Sellers
We consider a set of buyers, B = {1,2,...B}, and a set of sellers, S = {1,2,...S}. Each buyer is
interested in purchasing one item, and each seller has one item for sale. All items are identical.
Each buyer and seller has a type, which is denoted as θb and θs respectively. The type of a buyer
denotes its limit price, i.e. the highest price it is willing to buy the item for, and the type of a
seller denotes its cost price, i.e. the lowest price it is willing to sell the item for (see Section
2.2). We assume that the types of all buyers are independently drawn from the same cumulative
distribution function Fb, with support [l, ¯ l], and the types of all sellers are independently drawn
from the same cumulative distribution function Fs, with support [c, ¯ c]. The distributions Fb and
Fs are assumed to be common knowledge and differentiable. The probability density functions
are fb and f s respectively. However, the type of each speciﬁc trader is not known to the other
traders or the marketplaces. In addition, we assume that there is a set of competing marketplaces
M = {1,2,...M}, that offer places for trade and provide a centralised matching service between
the buyers and sellers.
3.1.2 Marketplaces and Fees
Since we consider marketplaces to be commercial enterprises that seek to make a proﬁt, we
assume that they charge fees for their service as match makers. Recall that in Section 1.1, we
introduced two types of fees which are common in the real-world marketplaces: ex ante fees,
which are charged to traders before they make transactions (e.g. the listing fees adopted by
eBay), and ex post fees, which are charged to traders after they successfully make transactions
(e.g. the ﬁnal fees adopted by eBay and Amazon). In this analysis, we consider registration and
proﬁt fees which are typical examples of such fees. In more detail, we deﬁne a fee structure
of a marketplace m to be the tuple pm = (rm,qm) ∈ P, rm ≥ 0 and qm ∈ [0,1], where rm is a
1This means that we consider a one-shot game. The competition between multiple double auctions is usually
regarded as a repeated game. However, the analysis on this game is very complicated, and currently there is no
existing work or models we can build upon. Therefore, in this thesis, we look at a one-shot game. In the future
work, we would like to extend the analysis to the repeated game. However, we note that the repeated game consists
of single one-shot games, and any sequence of one-shot game Nash equilibria is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the repeated game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Therefore, insights from analysing the one-shot game will be also
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ﬁxed registration fee charged to a trader when it enters the marketplace, qm is the percentage
fee charged on the trader’s proﬁt, which is the difference between the trader’s shout and the
transaction price, and in the following, we refer to such a fee as a proﬁt fee, and P is the set of
all allowable fee structures. Then the fee structures of all competing marketplaces constitute a
fee system ¯ P = hp1, p2,...pMi ∈ PM, where PM is the set of all allowable fee systems. Now we
describe how a marketplace will set its fee structure. In this work, we consider a mixed charging
strategy, where each fee structure is selected with some probability. A pure strategy can be
regarded as a degenerate case of a mixed strategy, where the particular pure strategy is selected
with probability 1 and every other strategy with probability 0. Now, a mixed charging strategy of
marketplace m is deﬁned as µm : P → [0,1], which means that the probability that marketplace
m sets fee structure pm is µm(pm), where
P
pm∈P µm(pm) = 1. We use ¯ µ = hµ1(·),...µM(·)i
to represent the charging strategy proﬁle of all marketplaces. In addition, we use µ−m(·) to
represent the charging strategy proﬁle of all marketplaces except for marketplace m. Then we
can rewrite ¯ µ as ¯ µ = hµm(·),µ−m(·)i.
Finally, we use the k-pricing policy to determine the transaction price of a matched buyer and
seller (see Section 2.3.2.2), where the transaction price of a successful interaction in marketplace
m is determined by a pricing parameter km ∈ [0,1], which sets the transaction price of a matched
buyer and seller at the point determined by km in the interval between their shouts. For example,
when a bid db is matched with an ask ds in marketplace m, the transaction price is
TP = km ∗ ds + (1 − km) ∗ db (3.1)
The pricing parameters of all marketplaces constitute the pricing system ¯ K = hk1,k2,...,kMi2.
3.1.3 Traders’ Market Selection Strategies
After describing the charging strategies of the marketplaces, we now introduce the traders’
market selection strategies. We assume that each trader has a mixed market selection strat-
egy, whereby each marketplace is selected with some probability. Furthermore, since the fees
are determined before the traders choose their marketplaces, the strategy is a function of the
fee system. Speciﬁcally, a mixed market selection strategy of buyer i is deﬁned as a func-
tion ωb
i : [l, ¯ l] × M × PM → [0,1], where ωb
i (θb,m, ¯ P) denotes the probability that buyer
i with type θb ∈ [l, ¯ l] chooses the marketplace m ∈ M given the fee system ¯ P, satisfying
P
m∈M ωb
i (θb,m, ¯ P) ≤ 1. Here, 1 −
P
m∈M ωb
i (θb,m, ¯ P) is the probability that buyer i with type
θb chooses no marketplace. This happens when buyer i ﬁnds it has a negative expected proﬁt in
each marketplace. We use ¯ ωb( ¯ P) = hωb
1(·, ¯ P),...,ωb
B(·, ¯ P)i to represent the strategy proﬁle of all
buyers in the fee system ¯ P. In addition, we use ωb
−i(·, ¯ P) to represent the strategy proﬁle of all
buyers except i. Then ¯ ωb( ¯ P) can be rewritten as ¯ ωb( ¯ P) = hωb
i (·, ¯ P),ωb
−i(·, ¯ P)i. Similarly, we use
ωs
j : [c, ¯ c] × M × ¯ P → [0,1] to deﬁne the probability of selecting a marketplace of seller j and
2In this work we use a ﬁxed pricing policy and so it does not form part of the strategy of a marketplace, but the
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use ¯ ωs( ¯ P) = hωs
1(·, ¯ P),...,ωs
S(·, ¯ P)i to represent the strategy proﬁle of all sellers in the fee system
¯ P, and rewrite it as ¯ ωs( ¯ P) = hωs
j(·, ¯ P),ωs
−j(·, ¯ P)i.
3.1.4 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium Strategies for Selecting a Marketplace and Set-
ting Fees
Before we can analyse how traders actually select marketplaces and how competing market-
places set fees (which we discuss in Section 3.2 and 3.3 respectively), we ﬁrst need to specify
the expected utility functions for traders and marketplaces, and deﬁne an appropriate solution
concept in the context of competing marketplaces.
To this end, we ﬁrst describe a buyer’s expected utility equation for a given fee system ¯ P. A
seller’s expected utility can be given analogously. Given a buyers’ strategy proﬁle ¯ ωb( ¯ P) and a
sellers’ strategy proﬁle ¯ ωs( ¯ P) in the fee system ¯ P, the expected utility of a buyer i with type θb
in the fee system ¯ P and pricing system ¯ K is deﬁned by:
˜ Ub
i ( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),θb) =
M X
m=1
ωb
i (θb,m, ¯ P) × ˜ Ub
i,m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),θb) (3.2)
where ˜ Ub
i,m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),θb) is buyer i’s expected utility if it chooses to trade in market-
place m.
Furthermore, marketplace m’s expected utility given a charging strategy proﬁle ¯ µ, pricing pa-
rameter km and traders’ market selection strategy proﬁles ¯ ωb(·) and ¯ ωs(·), is as follows:
˜ Um(¯ µ) =
X
¯ P∈PM
µ( ¯ P) ∗ ˜ Um( ¯ P,km, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P)) (3.3)
where µ( ¯ P) =
Q
m∈M µm(pm) is the probability that fee system ¯ P = hp1,..., pMi is selected, and
˜ Um( ¯ P,km, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P)) is marketplace m’s expected utility given fee system ¯ P. Note that both
the buyer’s expected utility in marketplace m, ˜ Ub
i,m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),θb), and marketplace m’s
expected utility, ˜ Um( ¯ P,km, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P)), depend on the speciﬁc bidding strategies adopted by
traders and the matching policy adopted by marketplace m. We will detail them in Section 3.2.1
and 3.3.2.2 respectively where we consider a particular market setting.
After providing general forms for the traders and the marketplaces’ expected utilities, we are
now ready to deﬁne the equilibrium strategies for traders and marketplaces in our system. Since
we consider a game with incomplete information about traders’ types, the Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium (BNE) solution concept (see Section 2.1), in which each player’s strategy maximises its
expected utility given other players’ strategies, is the most appropriate to deﬁne this equilibrium
behaviour. Here, we deﬁne equilibrium strategies of both traders and marketplaces as a whole,
since in our system, traders’ market selection strategies and marketplaces’ charging strategies
affect each other. Formally, the mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium in our setting is deﬁned as:Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 65
Deﬁnition Given pricing system ¯ K, a charging strategy proﬁle ¯ µ∗ and market selection strategy
proﬁles ¯ ωb∗(·) and ¯ ωs∗(·) constitute a mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium, if:
∀i ∈ B,∀θb ∈ [l, ¯ l],∀ ¯ P ∈ PM,∀ωb
i (·, ¯ P) ∈ ∆T :
˜ Ub
i ( ¯ P, ¯ K,hωb∗
i (·, ¯ P),ωb∗
−i(·, ¯ P)i, ¯ ωs∗( ¯ P),θb) ≥ ˜ Ub
i ( ¯ P, ¯ K,hωb
i (·, ¯ P),ωb∗
−i(·, ¯ P)i, ¯ ωs∗( ¯ P),θb);
i.e. each buyer’s strategy is a best response to other traders’ strategies for each possible fee system.
and∀j ∈ S,∀θs ∈ [c, ¯ c],∀ ¯ P ∈ PM,∀ωs
j(·, ¯ P) ∈ ∆T :
˜ Us
j( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb∗( ¯ P),hωs∗
j (·, ¯ P),ωs∗
−j(·, ¯ P)i,θs) ≥ ˜ Us
j( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb∗( ¯ P),hωs
j(·, ¯ P),ωs∗
−j(·, ¯ P)i,θs);
i.e. each seller’s strategy is a best response to other traders’ strategies for each possible fee system.
and∀m ∈ M,∀µm(·) ∈ ∆M :
˜ Um(hµ∗
m(·),µ∗
−m(·)i) ≥ ˜ Um(hµm(·),µ∗
−m(·)i)
i.e. each marketplace’s charging strategy is a best response to other marketplaces’ charging strategies.
where ∆T is the set of all possible (mixed) market selection strategies and ∆M is the set of all
possible (mixed) charging strategies.
Given the equilibrium deﬁnition, in what follows, we will analyse the both the traders’ equi-
librium market selection strategies (in Section 3.2) and the marketplaces’ equilibrium charging
strategies (in Section 3.3).
3.2 Equilibrium Analysis of the Market Selection Strategies
After describing the framework for analysing competing double auction marketplaces, we now
use this to analyse the equilibrium strategies of market selection for the trading agents. Before
doing this, however, we ﬁrst need to specify the bidding strategies adopted by the traders and
the matching policies adopted by the marketplaces. In this analysis, we make a simplifying
assumption that traders use a truth-telling bidding strategy, which means that they will submit
their types as their shouts during the trading process3. For the matching policy, we consider the
equilibrium matching policy (see Section 2.3.2.2) since this aims to maximise traders’ proﬁts
and thus maximises the allocative efﬁciency for the marketplace. Given the speciﬁc bidding
strategy and matching policy, in the following, we will derive traders’ expected utilities in this
setting, and then game-theoretically and dynamically analyse traders’ equilibrium strategies of
market selection for a given fee system. We are interested in calculating the symmetric Bayes-
Nash equilibria (BNEs), as is common in game theory for settings with incomplete information,
3As we said in Section 1.2, deriving the traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies in double auctions is a challeng-
ing problem. Furthermore, in this chapter, we want to focus the relationship between marketplaces’ fees and traders’
market selection. Therefore, here we consider a simple bidding strategy, which can be easily mathematically repre-
sented, to simplify the analysis. While the bidding strategies can affect traders’ expected proﬁts, and in turn affect
their market selection, the analysis based on this bidding strategy will still provide us valuable insights about the re-
lationship between marketplaces’ fees and traders’ market selection strategies. In Chapter 4, we will analyse traders’
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and so we can assume that (in equilibrium) traders with the same type will employ the same
strategy. Thus in the following equations, we omit the indexes i and j when referring to speciﬁc
buyers and sellers, and we add the convention that the market selection strategy proﬁle consists
of the market selection strategy of each type, instead of each trader.
3.2.1 A Trader’s Expected Utility
In what follows, we derive the expected utility of a buyer with type θb in the fee system ¯ P
given the market selection strategy proﬁles of buyers and sellers, ¯ ωb( ¯ P) and ¯ ωs( ¯ P). The seller’s
expected utility is calculated analogously. According to Equation 3.2, we need to calculate
the trader’s expected utility in each marketplace m. Intuitively, the trader’s expected utility in
marketplace m not only depends on its own type, but also on the number and types of other
traders choosing this marketplace. While Fb and Fs are the overall type distribution functions
of buyers and sellers respectively, the distribution of types within an individual marketplace can
differ depending on which types choose what marketplace. We refer to the type distribution of
a speciﬁc marketplace m as the local type distribution, which is also a cumulative distribution
function. This is derived as follows. For a given fee system ¯ P and market selection strategy
ωb(·), the probability that the type of a buyer is less than θb in marketplace m is:
Hb
m(θb| ¯ P) =
Z θb
l
fb(x) ∗ ωb(x,m, ¯ P)dx (3.4)
We can see that the prior probability that a buyer (irrespective of its type) will choose market-
place m is given by Hb
m(¯ l| ¯ P). Note that the above function is not a proper local type distribution
function because the function range may be smaller than 1. Then, to obtain a proper local type
distribution function of buyers in marketplace m, we need to normalise the above equation:
Gb
m(θb| ¯ P) =
Hb
m(θb| ¯ P)
Hb
m(¯ l| ¯ P)
(3.5)
This is also called the local type distribution. Furthermore, the local probability density function
of buyer types is:
gb
m(θb| ¯ P) =
fb(θb) ∗ ωb(x,m, ¯ P)
Hb
m(¯ l| ¯ P)
(3.6)
The equations of the sellers can be derived in the same way.
Recall that, in addition to the types of traders, the expected utility also depends on the (expected)
number of traders choosing this marketplace. To this end, we calculate the probabilities that
there are exactly τb other buyers (excluding the buyer for which we are calculating the expected
utility) and τs sellers choosing marketplace m, which are given by the binomial distributions:
ρb
m(τb) =
 
B − 1
τb
!
∗

Hb
m(¯ l| ¯ P)
τb
∗

1 − Hb
m(¯ l| ¯ P)
B−1−τb
(3.7)Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 67
ρs
m(τs) =
 
S
τs
!
∗

Hs
m(¯ c| ¯ P)
τs
∗

1 − Hs
m(¯ c| ¯ P)
S−τs
(3.8)
We now proceed to calculate the buyer’s expected utility, which is affected by the matching pol-
icy of marketplaces. To this end, recall that in the equilibrium matching policy, the marketplace
matches the buyer with the v-th highest limit price with the seller with the v-th lowest cost price.
We then calculate the probability that the buyer’s type θb is at a certain position. Speciﬁcally,
for given fee system ¯ P, when τb +1 buyers choose marketplace m, the probability that the buyer
with type θb is the v-th (v = 1,...,τb + 1) highest is given by:
Prb
m(v|θb, ¯ P) =
 
τb
v − 1
!
∗

1 −Gb
m(θb| ¯ P)
v−1
∗

Gb
m(θb| ¯ P)
τb+1−v
(3.9)
Similarly, the probability that the seller’s type θs is the v-th (v = 1,...,τs) lowest among τs sellers
in marketplace m is given by:
Prs
m(v|θs, ¯ P) =
 
τs − 1
v − 1
!
∗

Gs
m(θs| ¯ P)
v−1
∗

1 −Gs
m(θs| ¯ P)
τs−v
(3.10)
Furthermore, the prior probability that a seller is the v-th lowest is given by:
Prs(v| ¯ P) =
Z ¯ c
c
Prs
m(v|θs, ¯ P) ∗ gs
m(θs| ¯ P)dθs (3.11)
Now using Bayes’ theorem, we can calculate the probability density function of a seller at
position v:
gs
m(θs|v, ¯ P) =
Prs
m(v|θs, ¯ P) ∗ gs
m(θs| ¯ P)
Prs(v| ¯ P)
(3.12)
At this moment, we can get the buyer’s expected gross proﬁt (without taking into account any
fees that the buyer pays to the marketplace) in marketplace m with strategy proﬁles of buyers
and sellers, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P):
˜ Λb
m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),θb) =
B−1 X
τb=0
ρb
m(τb)∗
τb+1 X
v=1
Prb
m(v|θb, ¯ P)∗
 S X
τs=v
ρs
m(τs)∗
Z θb
θs=c
km∗(θb−θs)∗gs
m(θs|v, ¯ P)dθs

(3.13)
where θb − θs is called the trading surplus, and km ∗ (θb − θs) is the share of the buyer’s surplus,
which is determined by the pricing parameter km. By also considering the registration fee and
proﬁt fee from marketplace m, a buyer’s expected utility in this marketplace becomes:
˜ Ub
m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),θb) = ˜ Λb
m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),θb) ∗ (1 − qm) − rm (3.14)
Theaboveequationgivestheexpectedutilityofthebuyerinaparticularmarketplace. Therefore,
a buyer’s expected utility over all marketplaces in the fee system ¯ P is:
˜ Ub( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),θb) =
M X
m=1
ωb(θb,m, ¯ P) ∗ ˜ Ub
m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),θb) (3.15)68 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
After deriving traders’ expected utilities, in the next section, we will game theoretically analyse
the equilibrium market selection strategies for traders.
3.2.2 A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Market Selection Strategies
In this section, we analytically derive the traders’ equilibrium market selection strategies for a
given fee system ¯ P = hp1,..., pMi (i.e. each marketplace m ∈ M sets the fee structure pm with
100% probability (µm(pm) = 1)). As we said before, we focus on the symmetric BNE which
means that traders with the same type will adopt the same strategy in equilibrium. Furthermore,
in order to get insights from this complicated game with more traders and more types while
allowing for tractable results, we initially make several simplifying assumptions (speciﬁed be-
low). In the next section, we will use evolutionary game theory to computationally determine
the equilibrium which will allow us to relax some of these assumptions.
Speciﬁcally, we make the following assumptions. First of all, we consider the competition
between two marketplaces, i.e. M = 2 (this is consistent with the previous theoretical work
introduced in Section 2.4. However, in Section 3.2.3.4, we discuss the setting with more than
two competing marketplaces), and we restrict our analysis to two buyers and two sellers, i.e.
B = S = 2, (although we will relax this in Subsection 3.2.3 and Section 3.3). In addition, we
restrict our analysis to discrete trader types. In particular, we assume that there are two types of
buyers and two types of sellers: rich and poor, which are denoted by tb
2 and tb
1 respectively for
buyers, and ts
1 and ts
2 for sellers. A rich buyer is deﬁned as having a higher limit price than a poor
buyer, i.e. tb
2 > tb
1, and a rich seller is deﬁned as having a lower cost price than a poor seller, i.e.
ts
1 < ts
2. Trader types are independently drawn from the discrete uniform distribution (i.e. both
types are equally likely). In Chapter 4, we will extend this analysis by considering continuous
trader types. Furthermore, we only consider proﬁt fees at this stage (i.e. r1 = r2 = 0). This
simpliﬁes the analysis since traders always have non-negative proﬁts when participating, and
they will always choose one of the marketplaces. In this way we can reduce the strategy space
since ωb(θb,1, ¯ P) = 1 − ωb(θb,2, ¯ P), and similar for sellers. We will extend our analysis to
registration fees in Subsection 3.2.3 and Section 3.3.
Given these assumptions, we now investigate the traders’ market selection equilibrium be-
haviour. Intuitively, we can see that all traders selecting one marketplace constitutes a pure
strategy BNE, since given all other traders selecting one marketplace, the best response of a
trader is also to select this marketplace (otherwise they will have nobody to trade with). In
addition to the pure strategy BNEs, we are also interested in the mixed symmetric BNE of the
traders’ market selection strategies since we would like to know whether two competing mar-
ketplaces can co-exist. Previously, note that we derived a trader’s expected utility considering
continuous trader types (see Equation 3.15). Now we need to adapt this equation to discrete
trader types. However, since this is straightforward, we will not show it in detail. As we know,
in the mixed Nash equilibrium, a player should be indifferent between choosing each of the pure
strategies that form part of the mixed strategy, i.e. its expected utility for each of these pureChapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 69
strategies should be the same (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). Since in our setting each trader
has only two pure strategies, i.e. choosing marketplace 1 or 2, in any non-pure Nash equilibrium
the traders should be indifferent between these choices. Thus we get the following equations to
calculate the mixed BNE (one for each type of buyers and sellers):
˜ Ub
1( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
2) = ˜ Ub
2( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
2) (3.16)
˜ Ub
1( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
1) = ˜ Ub
2( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
1) (3.17)
˜ Us
1( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),ts
1) = ˜ Us
2( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),ts
1) (3.18)
˜ Us
1( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),ts
2) = ˜ Us
2( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),ts
2) (3.19)
If the solution is in the range [0,1], then this constitutes a mixed symmetric BNE.
By expanding the above equations (see Appendix A), we ﬁnd that the solution such that
ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P) = ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P) (3.20)
and
ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P) = ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P) (3.21)
always exists. This means that there always exists a mixed BNE whereby buyers adopt the
same mixed strategy no matter whether they are rich or poor, and the same for sellers. In the
following, we analyse this solution in more detail to better understand the traders’ equilibrium
behaviour.
To this end, we ﬁrst rewrite Equations 3.16-3.19 as the following two equations:

2 ∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) −

ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P)
2
− ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) + ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗

ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P)
2
∗k1 ∗ (1 − q1)
=

1 − ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) + ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) − ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗

ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P)
2
∗k2 ∗ (1 − q2) (3.22)

2 ∗ ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) −

ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P)
2
− ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) + ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) ∗

ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P)
2
∗(1 − k1) ∗ (1 − q1)
=

1 − ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) + ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) − ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) ∗

ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P)
2
∗(1 − k2) ∗ (1 − q2) (3.23)
Note that the solution for the above two equations depends on how both marketplaces set pricing
parameters k1 and k2, and how they charge proﬁt fees q1 and q2. Now we analyse how these
two factors affect the mixed BNEs respectively. Firstly, we assume that both marketplaces
charge the same proﬁt fee (from Equations 3.22 and 3.23, we can see that when q1 = q2, they
can be cancelled from both left- and right-hand sides of equations), but have different pricing
parameters. Then the resulting mixed BNEs are shown in Figure 3.1(a), from which we ﬁnd that
when the marketplace sets a high value for the pricing parameter, i.e. allocates more proﬁts to
buyers and thus less to sellers, buyers have a higher probability of choosing this marketplace,
and sellers have a lower probability of choosing it. In this situation, buyers(sellers) have the
same expected utility in marketplaces 1 and 2, and thus a mixed BNE is constituted. Then we
consider the case where both marketplaces have the same pricing parameter (when k1 = k2, they70 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
k1 k2
(a) The mixed BNE strategy of traders when both marketplaces
chargethesameproﬁtfee, buthavedifferentpricingparameters.
k1 is the pricing parameter of marketplace 1 and k2 is the pricing
parameter of marketplace 2.
q1 q2
(b) The mixed BNE strategy of traders when both marketplaces
havethesamepricingparameter, butchargedifferentproﬁtfees.
q1 is the proﬁt fee of marketplace 1 and q2 is the proﬁt fee of
marketplace 2.
FIGURE 3.1: The mixed BNE strategy of traders.
can be cancelled in equations), but charge different proﬁt fees. In this situation, by analysing
Equations 3.22 and 3.23, we can see that all traders have the same market selection strategy.
The results are shown in Figure 3.1(b). Counter-intuitively, we ﬁnd that, in equilibrium, traders
have a higher probability of choosing marketplace 1 when it charges a higher proﬁt fee. This is
because when buyers have beliefs that sellers have a higher probability of choosing marketplace
1, then they will prefer to choose marketplace 1 even though it charges a higher fee, and they
still have the same expected utility in marketplaces 1 and 2. Mutatis mutandis for sellers. This
implies that it is possible for the competing marketplace to charge a higher fee to make more
proﬁts while still maintaining market share at a good level. In the following section, we will
analyse this phenomenon in more detail.
3.2.3 An Evolutionary Analysis of Market Selection Strategies
In the above, we game-theoretically analysed the traders’ equilibrium behaviour with regards to
market selection strategies and showed that there exist at least three BNEs: all traders choosing
marketplace 1 or 2 and the mixed BNE. As we discussed in Section 2.1.1, such equilibria only
provide a static explanation for why populations playing BNE strategies remain in that state
since each population makes a best response to the other populations’ strategies. Therefore, this
solution concept fails to indicate whether the BNE can be reached and which of these equilibria
is most likely to be converged to. To overcome this and to analyse settings with more than 2
buyers and 2 sellers, in what follows, we use evolutionary game theory (EGT) to analyse this
game, which focuses on the dynamic change of strategies rather than the static properties of
Nash equilibria (see Section 2.1.1). In EGT, players gradually adjust their strategies over time
in response to the repeated observation of their opponents’ strategies4. In the following, we ﬁrst
4Note that, although this process is a repeated learning process, the game itself is not a repeated game, but a
one-shot game. We just use such a repeated learning process to analyse how traders learn to change their strategies,Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 71
describe the replicator dynamics equations used in our analysis, which capture the dynamics of
traders’ market selection strategies, and then give the evolutionary analysis in detail.
3.2.3.1 Replicator Dynamics
In EGT, the replicator dynamics equation is often used to specify the dynamic adjustment of
the probability of which pure strategy should be played (see Section 2.1.1). In our work, we
consider 4 different types of traders (rich buyers, poor buyers, rich sellers and poor sellers). In
order to allow different types of traders to converge to different equilibrium strategies, we use
a different population to evolve the strategy of each type. Therefore ﬁrst we introduce the 4-
population replicator dynamics equations which show the dynamic changes of traders’ market
selection strategies with respect to time t:
˙ ωb(tb
1,m, ¯ P) =
dωb(tb
1,m, ¯ P)
dt
=
  ˜ Ub
m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
1) − ˜ Ub( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
1)

∗ ωb(tb
1,m, ¯ P) (3.22)
˙ ωb(tb
2,m, ¯ P) =
dωb(tb
2,m, ¯ P)
dt
=
  ˜ Ub
m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
2) − ˜ Ub( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
2)

∗ ωb(tb
2,m, ¯ P) (3.23)
˙ ωs(ts
1,m, ¯ P) =
dωs(ts
1,m, ¯ P)
dt
=
  ˜ Us
m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),ts
1) − ˜ Us( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),ts
1)

∗ ωs(ts
1,m, ¯ P) (3.24)
˙ ωs(ts
2,m, ¯ P) =
dωs(ts
2,m, ¯ P)
dt
=
  ˜ Us
m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),ts
2) − ˜ Us( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),ts
2)

∗ ωs(ts
2,m, ¯ P) (3.25)
Note that the 4 populations interact through the utility functions, which depend on the strategies
of other trader types. As an example, ˙ ωb(tb
1,m, ¯ P) describes how the poor buyer with type tb
1
changes its probability of choosing marketplace m in the fee system ¯ P. Here, ˜ Ub
m( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P),
¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
1) is the poor buyer’s expected utility when choosing marketplace m given market se-
lection strategy proﬁles ¯ ωb( ¯ P) and ¯ ωs( ¯ P), and ˜ Ub( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
1) is the poor buyer’s
overall expected utility (see Subsection 3.2.1). In order to get the dynamics of the strate-
gies, we need to calculate trajectories, which indicate how the mixed strategies evolve. In
more detail, initially, a mixed strategy is chosen as a starting point (in our results, we ex-
periment with a large number of points). In the following, we denote a starting point by
 
ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P),ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P),ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P),ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P)

. The dynamics are then calculated according
to the above replicator equations. According to the dynamic changes of traders’ strategies, their
current mixed strategies can be calculated. Such calculations are repeated until ˙ ωb(·) and ˙ ωs(·)
become zero, at which point the equilibrium is reached. When considering traders evolving from
all possible starting points, we get several regions. The region from which all trajectories con-
verge to a particular equilibrium is called the basin of attraction of this equilibrium. The basin
is very useful since given the assumption that each starting point is selected by traders with an
equal probability, its size can be used as an indicator of the probability of traders converging to
and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached.72 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
(t)
BNE 2
BNE 1
mixed BNE
(a) Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers with three
chosen starting points.
(t)
BNE 2
BNE 1
mixed BNE
(b) Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers with start-
ing points around (0.5, 0.5, 0.5 0.5).
FIGURE 3.2: Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers in the setting with 2 identical
marketplaces when q1 = q2 = 10% and r1 = r2 = 0.
that equilibrium. However, we should note that replicator dynamics equations are only used to
ﬁnd which equilibrium traders are likely to converge to, and they do not show the realistic way
that traders select marketplaces.
3.2.3.2 Experimental Results
After providing replicator dynamics equations, we now analyse how traders dynamically evolve
their market selection strategies to converge to the equilibrium.
4-population with two identical marketplaces:
Firstly, we analyse the general cases with four different populations (rich buyers, poor buyers,
rich sellers and poor sellers). For illustrative purposes, we assign the traders’ types as follows:
tb
1 = 4, tb
2 = 8, ts
1 = 0 and ts
2 = 3.5 At this stage, we assume that both marketplaces only charge
proﬁt fees. We ﬁrst consider the case where the two competing marketplaces are identical.
Speciﬁcally, we consider k1 = k2 = 0.5 and q1 = q2 = 10% as an example. According to
Equations 3.22 and 3.23, we know that (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) is a mixed BNE. We now show
the evolutionary results of two representative starting points (0.6, 0.4, 0.7, 0.2), (0.1, 0.8, 0.3,
0.9) and a speciﬁc starting point (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) in Figure 3.2(a). The x-axis is the time at
which the mixed strategies evolve, the points at t = 0 correspond to the starting points, from
which traders evolve their strategies. As can be seen, traders eventually converge to BNE 1 (i.e.
marketplace1)orBNE2(i.e. marketplace2)exceptthatwhenstartingatthemixedBNE,traders
will stay at the mixed BNE. Furthermore, we analyse the area of the starting points around the
equilibrium (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5) and ﬁnd that these do not converge to (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5). This is
described in Figure 3.2(b), which shows the evolutionary results when starting points are chosen
from 0.499 to 0.501 with step size 0.0005. Therefore, we can conclude that even though (0.5,
0.5, 0.5, 0.5) is a mixed BNE, it is a saddle point where no trajectories converge, and is unlikely
to be reached.
5Other type values can be chosen. However, our experiment analysis conﬁrms that the conclusions are similar.Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 73
(t)
BNE 2
BNE 1
mixed BNE
(a) Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers with three
chosen starting points.
(t)
BNE 2
BNE 1
mixed BNE
(b) Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers with start-
ing points around (0.3679, 0.3679, 0.3994, 0.3994).
FIGURE 3.3: Equilibrium behaviour of 2 buyers and 2 sellers in the setting with 2 different
marketplaces when q1 = 20%, q2 = 40% and r1 = r2 = 0.
4-population with two different marketplaces:
Now we consider the traders’ evolved strategies when fees and pricing parameters are different
across marketplaces. As an example, we let k1 = 0.48, k2 = 0.51, q1 = 20% and q2 = 40%. By
solving Equations 3.22 and 3.23, we ﬁnd one mixed BNE at (0.3679, 0.3679, 0.3994, 0.3994).
Then we show the evolutionary results of two representative starting points (0.2, 0.4, 0.3, 0.1),
(0.7, 0.9, 0.8, 0.6), and the speciﬁc starting point (0.3679, 0.3679, 0.3994, 0.3994) in Figure
3.3(a) and the evolutionary results with starting points around the equilibrium (0.3679, 0.3679,
0.3994, 0.3994) in Figure 3.3(b). We still ﬁnd that traders ﬁnally converge to either marketplace
1 or 2, and the mixed BNE is unlikely to occur. Furthermore, we also ran experiments from a
large number of starting points, and still ﬁnd that traders eventually converge to one marketplace
in equilibrium.
2-population:
In the above, we have analysed the dynamics of traders’ market selection strategies with 4
populations. However, in these cases, it is difﬁcult to clearly visualise how traders evolve to
converge to the equilibrium when considering a variety of starting points. Therefore, in order
to be able to further illustrate the dynamics of EGT when traders evolve from various starting
points, we run all next sets of experiments by assuming that rich buyers and rich sellers have
the same behaviour, and poor buyers and poor sellers have the same behaviour. In order to
reasonably make this assumption, rich(poor) buyers and rich(poor) sellers should be treated
equally by marketplaces. Thus, we assume pricing parameter km = 0.5, i.e. the transaction
price is set in the middle of shouts of the matched buyers and sellers, which means that the
marketplaces have no bias in favor of buyers or sellers when allocating surpluses. Furthermore,
we assume that surpluses of buyers and sellers are symmetric and, as an example, we let tb
1 = 4,
tb
2 = 6, ts
1 = 0 and ts
2 = 2. Based on these assumptions, in the following experiments, Equations
3.22 and 3.25 are equivalent, as are Equations 3.23 and 3.24. By so doing, we reduce the 4-
population replicator dynamics to 2-population, and can visualise traders’ dynamics of market
selection strategies in 2-dimensional graphs.74 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
BNE 2
BNE 1
(0.4090, 0.4090)
FIGURE 3.4: Evolutionary process of market selection strategies with 2 buyers and 2 sellers
when q1 = 50%, q2 = 60% and r1 = r2 = 0. The dotted line denotes the boundary between the
basins of attractions.
2-population with 2 buyers and 2 sellers:
Firstly, we still consider 2 buyers and 2 sellers. We assume that marketplace 1 charges 50%
proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charges 60% proﬁt fee. Then the mixed BNE satisfying Equations
3.20 and 3.21 is (0.4090, 0.4090). The evolutionary results are shown in Figure 3.4, where the
x-axis is the rich buyer(seller)’s probability of choosing marketplace 1, and the y-axis is the poor
buyer(seller)’s probability of choosing marketplace 1. We ﬁnd that all traders either converge
to BNE 1 (i.e. marketplace 1) or BNE 2 (i.e. marketplace 2) in equilibrium depending on the
initial starting points, and no trajectory converges to (0.4090, 0.4090) (the solid circle in Figure
3.4), i.e. the mixed BNE is a saddle point. This indicates that the mixed BNE is hard to reach.
Furthermore, the ﬁgure also shows that the basin of attraction to BNE 1 is bigger, which means
that traders have a higher probability of converging to marketplace 1 since this marketplace
charges less than marketplace 2. From the results, we also ﬁnd that two competing marketplaces
cannot co-exist in equilibrium. We then try various fee systems with different combinations of
proﬁts fees charged by marketplaces, and still ﬁnd that all traders converge to one marketplace
in equilibrium.
2-population with 5 buyers and 5 sellers:
Now, we extend the above analysis to the case with 5 buyers and 5 sellers (in the following
analysis, unless mentioned otherwise, we always assume that there are 5 buyers and 5 sellers).
The same as above, we still assume that both marketplaces only charge proﬁt fees. For example,
we assume that marketplace 1 charges 20% proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charges 30% proﬁt fee.
The dynamic results for different starting points are shown in Figure 3.5. We still ﬁnd that all
traders eventually converge to one marketplace. By experimenting with various fee systems with
different combinations of proﬁt fees, we still ﬁnd that all traders converge to one marketplace
in equilibrium. We then extend our analysis to the case that both competing marketplaces only
charge registration fees, and still ﬁnd that traders eventually converge to one marketplace inChapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 75
BNE 2
BNE 1
FIGURE 3.5: Evolutionary process of market selection strategies with 5 buyers and 5 sellers
when q1 = 20%, q2 = 30% and r1 = r2 = 0. The dotted line denotes the boundary between the
basins of attractions
equilibrium if they want to select a marketplace6. These show that in our framework, the positive
size effect has a larger impact than the negative size effect, which will cause traders to converge
to one marketplace in equilibrium.
2-population with different marketplaces charging different types of fees:
Then we consider the case that different types of fees are charged by competing marketplaces
(i.e. marketplace 1 charges proﬁt fees, and marketplace 2 charges registration fees). In this case,
we ﬁnd that for some fee systems (when the proﬁt fee of marketplace 1 is higher than 10%,
and the registration fee of marketplace 2 is higher than 0.4), traders may converge to different
marketplaces in equilibrium when evolving from certain starting points. As an example, we
assume that marketplace 1 charges 50% proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charges 0.8 registration
fee. The results are shown in Figure 3.6. We found that, in this case, when traders evolve from
certain starting points, they will converge to BNE 3, where rich traders converge to marketplace
1 which charges a registration fee, and poor traders converge to marketplace 2 which charges a
proﬁt fee. At this moment, two competing marketplaces co-exist. In contrast to Ellison et al.
(2004), where co-existence of competing marketplaces is caused by negative size effect, here
the co-existence is caused by the strong differentiation of competing marketplaces by setting
different types of fees. In more detail, rich traders prefer the marketplace charging a lump
sum fee since this fee is likely to be smaller than the absolute extracted proﬁt obtained from
charging proﬁt fees on a large transaction proﬁt. However, poor traders prefer the marketplace
which charges a proﬁt fee, since this can guarantee non-negative proﬁts for them, and a high
registration fee may lead to negative proﬁts.
6Note that when high registration fees are charged, eventually, poor traders (and rich traders) may not choose any
marketplace since high registration fees may cause negative proﬁts for them.76 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
BNE 2
BNE 1 BNE 3
FIGURE 3.6: Evolutionary process of market selection strategies with 5 buyers and 5 sellers
when q1 = 50%, q2 = 0, r1 = 0 and r2 = 0.8. The dotted line denotes the boundary between
the basins of attractions.
3.2.3.3 Lock-in Region
In the above analysis where both marketplaces charge proﬁt fees, we ﬁnd that when evolving
from certain starting points, traders may converge to BNE2 (i.e. marketplace 2, which is the
more expensive one). This is interesting since it means that the marketplace can charge higher
fees to make more proﬁts but still keep traders (even if the size of the basin of attraction is
smaller when fees are relatively higher). In the following, we analyse this phenomenon in
detail. In doing so, we consider proﬁt fees as an example (i.e. both marketplaces charge no
registration fees). Since EGT only works with a ﬁnite set of strategies, we discretize the proﬁt
fees of the marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, we discretize the continuous proﬁt fee from 0 and 1 with
a step size of 0.1 (it can also be discretized with other step sizes, such as 0.05). Furthermore,
in the following analysis, we still assume that there are 5 buyers, 5 sellers and 2 competing
marketplaces, and let tb
1 = 4, tb
2 = 6, ts
1 = 0, ts
2 = 2 and k1 = k2 = 0.5. Clearly, the traders’
evolution of their market selection strategies depends on two factors: the starting point and the
fees charged to them. We now choose a starting point (0.8, 0.7, 0.8, 0.7), where traders have
higher initial probabilities of choosing marketplace 1. Figure 3.7 then shows the results after
we evolve the traders’ market selection strategies in the competing marketplaces with different
proﬁt fees. The red area is what we call the “lock-in region”, which shows when proﬁt fees of
marketplace 1 and 2 are within this area, even though marketplace 1 charges a higher proﬁt fee
than marketplace 2, traders still converge to marketplace 1. This result is interesting since at
this moment, the expensive marketplace can make more proﬁts while still maintaining traders.
Note that when the proﬁt fee of marketplace 2 is higher than 60%, marketplace 1 can no longer
maintain traders if its proﬁt fee is higher than marketplace 2, i.e. the lock-in region disappears.
Furthermore, by running experiments, we also ﬁnd the existence of the lock-in region when
both competing marketplaces charge registration fees, or charge different types of fees. Now
we can see that it is possible for traders to converge to the expensive marketplace if currentlyChapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 77
FIGURE 3.7: Lock-in region of marketplace 1 with 5 buyers and 5 sellers.
traders have higher probabilities of choosing this marketplace. This result gives useful insights
into a strategy for setting fees in competing marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrstly, a marketplace
should lower its fees to attract or maintain traders. After obtaining an advantageous position,
the marketplace should then increase its fees higher than its opponents, while still keeping its
traders since traders still have higher expected utilities in the expensive marketplace. This so-
called bait-and-switch strategy has been adopted by a number of entrants in the CAT competition
(Niu et al., 2008a), where initially they charge lower and even no fees to attract traders, and
once they have built up a larger market share, they will charge fees to make proﬁts, but still can
maintain market share at a good level. While such a strategy is quite intuitive and common in
many marketplaces, our analysis provides a more formal justiﬁcation for it. Furthermore, we
can use the strategy as an indication of the level at which the fees should be set.
The effect of the number of traders on the lock-in region:
After obtaining the preliminary conclusion that it is possible for traders to stay in the expensive
market, we investigate what factors can affect the size of the lock-in region. In particular, we
investigate how the number of traders can affect the size of lock-in region. In the following, we
calculate the size of the lock-in region as the sum of the differences of the two marketplaces’
discretized proﬁt fees in the lock-in region. For example, the size of the lock-in region in Figure
3.7 is 1.2.7 From Figure 3.8 we ﬁnd that, as the number of traders in the competing market-
place environment increases, the size of the lock-in region decreases, which means traders will
increasingly select the cheap marketplace. The reason for this is as follows. The traders’ choice
of marketplaces is determined by their expected utilities, which, in turn, depend on two parts:
the gross proﬁt and fees charged to them (see Equation 3.14). From Figure 3.9 we can see that,
as the number of traders in the multiple competing marketplaces environment increases, the dif-
ference of the traders’ gross proﬁts in two marketplaces (i.e. Λb
1(·) − Λb
2(·), Λs
1(·) − Λs
2(·), see
7Since we consider discretized fees, the size of the lock-in region is deﬁned as the sum of differences of the two
marketplaces’ discretized fees, which is: (0.3 − 0.0) + (0.3 − 0.1) + (0.4 − 0.2) + (0.5 − 0.3) + (0.5 − 0.4) + (0.6 −
0.5) + (0.7 − 0.6).78 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
FIGURE 3.8: The size of lock-in region with respect to the number of traders.
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FIGURE 3.9: Gross proﬁt difference in two marketplaces with the mixed strategies of traders
(0.8, 0.7, 0.8, 0.7).
Equation 3.13) gradually decreases. This means that the gross proﬁts of traders in two market-
places gradually become closer to each other. Then the traders’ choice of marketplace is mainly
determined by the market fees. Thus they will increasingly choose the cheap marketplace. This
indicates that, in a multiple competing marketplaces context with a large number of traders, it is
difﬁcult for the marketplace to maintain both a high number of traders and high proﬁts.
The effect of the trader types on the lock-in region:
Furthermore, intuitively, competing marketplaces want to attract traders of a rich type since
they are more likely to make transactions. Given this, we now analyse what happens when a
certain type of trader initially has a bias towards selecting a particular marketplace. First, we
consider the rich type’s effect on the lock-in region, where we ﬁx the poor traders’ probabilities
of choosing marketplace 1 to be 0.5, and then change the strategies of the rich traders from
0.55 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. The results are shown in Figure 3.10. From this, we can seeChapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 79
FIGURE 3.10: The size of lock-in region with respect to rich traders’ strategy with 5 buyers
and 5 sellers.
that, when rich traders have a higher initial probability of selecting marketplace 1, the size of the
lock-in region increases. This means that rich traders have a positive effect on the lock-in region.
In contrast, if we ﬁx the rich traders’ probabilities of choosing marketplace 1 to be 0.5, and then
increase the poor traders’ probabilities of choosing marketplace 1 starting from 0.05, we ﬁnd no
lock-in regions exist. This is because the surpluses were chosen such that poor traders can make
relatively good proﬁts, which means they are not poor enough. Thus we reduce the poor traders’
surpluses to enhance their effect on the lock-in region. If we let tb
1 = 1, tb
2 = 8, ts
1 = 0 and ts
2 = 7,
we get the following result. When the poor traders’ probability of choosing market 1 is 0.1, the
lock-in region exists and its size is 0.1. When the probability increases to 0.2, the lock-in region
disappears. Thus we can see that poor traders have a negative effect on the size of the lock-in
region.
The effect of randomisation of market selection strategies on the lock-in region:
So far, we assumed that traders always evolve from their current market selection strategies.
Now we analyse how the lock-in region will be affected when some traders are able to explore
other marketplaces randomly. We do this because, ﬁrst of all, traders usually have incomplete
information about other traders’ market selection decisions. Thus they need to explore and try
different marketplaces to obtain more information. For this reason, in the CAT competition,
traders have some probability of randomly selecting a marketplace to explore other market-
places. Secondly, in reality, not all traders are (fully) rational, i.e. they may not always choose
the cheapest marketplace. Thus we consider the case where some traders randomly select mar-
ketplaces. For example, when the randomisation probability is 10%, then traders will have
90% probability of using their current market selection strategies and 10% probability of se-
lecting each marketplace with equal probability to explore other marketplaces. For this setting,
we analyse how the probability of randomisation affects the size of lock-in region. Then the
relationship between the randomisation probability and the size of lock-in region is shown in
Figure 3.11. We ﬁnd that when the probability of randomly selecting marketplaces increases,80 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
FIGURE 3.11: Relationship between the probability of randomly selecting marketplaces and
the size of lock-in region with 5 buyers and 5 sellers.
the size of lock-in region decreases. Furthermore, when the probability of randomly selecting
marketplaces is higher than 70%, the lock-in region disappears completely. This means that, as
exploration increases, it is more difﬁcult for the competing marketplace to keep traders when
charging higher fees even though it initially has a larger market share. Thus in the environment
with traders having greater probabilities to explore to search for the cheaper marketplace, the
marketplace with a large market share has only a limited advantage.
3.2.3.4 Greater Numbers of Competing Marketplaces
So far we have analysed the market selection strategies of traders in the setting with two compet-
ing marketplaces. As stated previously, this analysis is in line with all previous theoretical work
which has focused on this canonical case, see Section 2.4.2.1. However, in the real world, it is
often the case that more than two marketplaces compete with one another to attract traders and
make proﬁts. Now, intuitively, we expect that our results will carry over to this more complex
setting. Speciﬁcally, when multiple competing marketplaces only charge the same type of fees
(i.e. registration or proﬁt fees), we expect that traders will still converge to one marketplace in
equilibrium. On the other hand, when multiple competing marketplaces charge different types
of fees (i.e. some marketplaces charge proﬁt fees, and others charge registration fees), we be-
lieve that traders will either converge to only one marketplace, or only two marketplaces where
one charges a proﬁt fee and the other charges a registration fee. To explore these hypotheses, we
ran experiments with larger numbers of marketplaces8. By so doing, we found that, consistent
with the previous analysis, when all marketplaces charge proﬁt fees (or registration fees), traders
will converge to one of them in equilibrium9. Exactly which one depends on the initial starting
8We still assume that there are 5 buyers and 5 sellers, and let tb
1 = 4, tb
2 = 6, ts
1 = 0 and ts
2 = 2. For the pricing
parameters, we assume that k1 = k2 = 0.5.
9This means that multiple marketplaces cannot co-exist. This conclusion is different from what we observe in
practice. We believe that this is because in our model, different marketplaces adopt the same mechanism and haveChapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 81
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(a) Rich traders.
(t)
(b) Poor traders.
FIGURE 3.12: Evolutionary process of traders in the setting with 5 buyers, 5 sellers and 3
competing marketplaces when q1 = 10%, q2 = 20%, q3 = 30% and r1 = r2 = r3 = 0.
point and market fees. Moreover, consistent with the previous analysis, in such experiments,
we also found that traders may converge to the expensive marketplace in equilibrium when this
marketplace initially has a larger market share. For example, when there are three competing
marketplaces where marketplaces 1, 2 and 3 charge 10%, 20% and 30% proﬁt fees respectively,
and initially rich traders choose marketplaces 1, 2 and 3 with probabilities 0.1, 0.2 and 0.7 re-
spectively, and poor traders choose marketplaces 1, 2 and 3 with probabilities 0.3, 0.2 and 0.5
respectively, the dynamic changes of traders’ probabilities of choosing marketplaces are shown
in Figure 3.12. From the evolutionary results, we can see that eventually traders choose one
marketplace with 100% probability, i.e. converge to one marketplace. Speciﬁcally, in this case,
traders converge to marketplace 3 which is the most expensive since initially this marketplace
has a larger market share. Furthermore, when some of them charge registration fees and others
charge proﬁt fees, we found that traders either converge to one marketplace in equilibrium or the
rich traders converge to the marketplace which charges a registration fee and the poor traders
converge to the marketplace which charges a proﬁt fee (multiple competing marketplaces which
charge the same type of fees do not co-exist in equilibrium and only one of them can survive).
For example, when there are three competing marketplaces where marketplaces 1 and 2 charge
40% and 50% proﬁt fees respectively and marketplace 3 charges a 0.8 registration fee, and
initially rich traders choose marketplaces 1, 2 and 3 with probabilities 0.15, 0.2 and 0.65 re-
spectively, and poor traders choose marketplaces 1, 2 and 3 with probabilities 0.35, 0.25 and 0.4
respectively, the dynamic changes of traders’ probabilities of choosing marketplaces are shown
in Figure 3.13. From this ﬁgure, we can see that eventually rich traders converge to marketplace
3 charging a registration fee, and poor traders converge to marketplace 1 charging a proﬁt fee.
We also can see that marketplaces 1 and 2 charging the same types of fees cannot co-exist, and
only marketplace 1 survives.
identical goods, and thus cannot provide enough diversity for traders to select different marketplaces.82 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
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FIGURE 3.13: Evolutionary process of traders in the setting with 5 buyers, 5 sellers and 3
competing marketplaces when q1 = 45%, q2 = 50%, q3 = 0, r1 = r2 = 0 and r3 = 0.8.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis of Charging Strategies
In the previous subsection, we analysed the traders’ equilibrium strategies of market selection
for a given fee system. Now, given the insights from this analysis, we analyse how marketplaces
should set fees to make proﬁts in equilibrium. In the following, we analyse this problem through
two different approaches. In the ﬁrst, we investigate the equilibrium charging strategies from a
static analysis. This approach is based on the assumption that marketplaces set their fees once
at the beginning and so the charging strategies are not affected by the changes in the traders’
market selection strategies. In the second approach, we address this limitation by modelling the
game as a two-stage game where the strategies of the traders and the marketplaces are affected
by each other.
3.3.1 Static Analysis
In this section, we derive equilibrium charging strategies for the marketplaces through a static
analysis, where we assume that the marketplaces’ charging strategies are not affected by dy-
namic changes in the traders’ market selection strategies (although they are affected by the
traders’ equilibrium market selection strategies, which is described in the following). Speciﬁ-
cally, in this analysis, we ﬁrst derive the marketplaces’ expected utilities corresponding to each
possible fee system, which are dependent on the traders’ equilibrium market selection strategies
in this fee system and the probability of traders converging to that equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, we
use EGT to analyse how traders evolve their market selection strategies in the given fee system,
and approximate the probability of traders converging to a speciﬁc equilibrium by approximat-
ing the size of basin of attraction of that equilibrium under the assumption that each starting
point is equally likely selected by traders. After calculating the marketplaces’ expected utilities
for each possible fee system, we obtain the payoff table10. Finally, we analyse the equilibrium
10It is a matrix, where the ﬁrst column(row) represents the corresponding marketplace’s fee, and the cell represents
the marketplaces’ utilities, which correspond to marketplaces’ fees.Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 83
charging strategies according to the payoff table. We can see that in this analysis, how the mar-
ketplaces’ expected utilities are calculated is a key issue. Therefore, in the following, we ﬁrst
derive equations to calculate these expected utilities. Based on this, we will analyse how mar-
ketplaces set fees in equilibrium in two different cases where marketplaces charge the same type
of fees and different types of fees.
3.3.1.1 Expected Utilities of Marketplaces
In this section, we describe how to calculate the marketplaces’ expected utilities for a given
market fee system ¯ P. Intuitively, we can see that the marketplaces’ expected utilities not only
depend on the current fee system ¯ P, but also on the traders’ market selection strategy proﬁles
¯ ωb( ¯ P) = hωb(tb
1,m, ¯ P),ωb(tb
2,m, ¯ P)i and ¯ ωs( ¯ P) = hωs(ts
1,m, ¯ P),ωs(ts
2,m, ¯ P)i, which is condi-
tional on the fee system. In order to derive marketplace m’s expected utility, we ﬁrst calculate
the probability that there are exactly τb
1 poor buyers and τb
2 rich buyers choosing m:
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Furthermore, marketplace m’s expected utility in the fee system ¯ P given its pricing parameter
km when there are exactly τb
1 poor buyers, τb
2 rich buyers, τs
1 rich sellers and τs
2 poor sellers in
this marketplace is calculated by:
˜ Um( ¯ P,km,τb
1,τb
2,τs
1,τs
2) = (τb
1 + τb
2 + τs
1 + τs
2) ∗ rm + (Λb + Λs) ∗ qm (3.28)
where Λb, Λs are the buyers’ and the sellers’ share of the trading surplus respectively when
τb
1 poor buyers, τb
2 rich buyers, τs
1 rich sellers and τs
2 poor sellers are matched according to the
equilibrium matching policy11. At this moment, we can get the marketplace’s expected utility
given the fee system and the traders’ market selection strategy proﬁles:
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Now given the fee system ¯ P, we need to calculate the marketplace’s expected utility at the
point where all traders use equilibrium market selection strategies, which are conditional on
11This can be easily calculated. For example, when there are 2 rich buyers, 3 poor buyers, 3 rich sellers and
2 poor buyers in marketplace m, Λb =
 
max(tb
2 − ts
1,0) ∗ 2 + max(tb
1 − ts
1,0) + max(tb
1 − ts
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
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this fee system. As we discussed previously, there can exist multiple BNEs. In such cases, the
marketplace’s expected utility depends on which BNE strategy the traders will choose and the
probability of choosing this BNE strategy. Given a fee system, we have used EGT to analyse
how traders choose BNE strategies in Section 3.2.3.2. Similarly, here, we use EGT to ﬁnd which
BNE strategies traders will choose and with what probability. Recall that in EGT, we use the
replicator dynamics to show the trajectories and how they converge to an equilibrium. The size
of the basin, where all trajectories converge to a particular equilibrium, can be used to indicate
the probability of traders converging to that equilibrium (see Section 3.2.3.1). However, there
are inﬁnitely many possible starting points, which means that we have to approximate the size
of basins. In this work, we do this by discretizing the starting points. Speciﬁcally, we calculate
the size of basin of attraction by discretizing the mixed strategy of each type from 0.01 to 0.99
with step size 0.049, which gives 214 = 194481 different starting points12. Note that if we use
even more points, we can estimate the probability of traders’ convergence to each equilibrium
more accurately.
Now that we know, given a fee system ¯ P, what BNE strategies traders will choose and with what
probabilities, we are able to calculate the expected utility for a marketplace. Speciﬁcally, given
that there are X possible BNEs, we use hx1, x2,..., xXi to represent the probabilities of traders
converging to these BNEs. Then marketplace m’s expected utility in the fee system ¯ P is:
˜ Um( ¯ P) =
X X
z=1
xz ∗ ˜ Um
  ¯ P,km,hωzb(tb
1,m, ¯ P),ωzb(tb
2,m, ¯ P)i,hωzs(ts
1,m, ¯ P),ωzs(ts
2,m, ¯ P)i

(3.30)
where ωzb(tb
1,m, ¯ P), ωzb(tb
2,m, ¯ P), ωzs(ts
1,m, ¯ P) and ωzs(ts
2,m, ¯ P) denote the z-th BNE market
selection strategies.
Now we have derived equations to calculate the marketplace’s expected utility given the fee
system ¯ P. Based on this, we can analyse the equilibrium charging strategy for marketplaces.
As we know, the range of possible fees is continuous, which results in inﬁnitely many possible
fee systems. It is too complicated to analyse the game with an inﬁnite strategy space. However,
in Wellman (2006), researchers claim that for this kind of game, it is useful to approximate the
game by restricting the strategy space, and results from the restricted strategy space still provide
insights into the original game. Similarly, in this work, in order to obtain tractable results,
we also restrict the fee space by discretizing these fees. Then we calculate the marketplaces’
expected utilities corresponding to these fees, and generate the payoff table for marketplaces, by
which we can analyse the equilibrium fee system.
3.3.1.2 Experiment Results
After deriving equations to calculate the marketplaces’ expected utilities and describing the
analysis process, we now analyse the equilibrium charging strategies for marketplaces. We ﬁrst
12The discretization is not from 0 to 1 since when the mixed strategy is 0 or 1, it constitutes an equilibrium of
replicator dynamics, but may be not a Nash equilibrium.Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 85
consider the case that only proﬁt fees can be charged to traders. We still assume that there are 5
buyers, 5 sellers and 2 competing marketplaces, and let tb
1 = 4, tb
2 = 6, ts
1 = 0 and ts
2 = 2. For the
pricing parameters, we assume that k1 = k2 = 0.5.13 Furthermore, we discretize proﬁt fees from
0 to 1 with step size 0.1. Therefore, each marketplace can choose from 11 different proﬁt fees.
For two competing marketplaces, there are 112 = 121 different fee systems. For each of these
combinations, we use EGT to obtain the basin of attraction to each BNE of the market selection
strategies. Then by approximating the size of each basin, we get the probability of traders
choosing each BNE, which is shown in Figure 3.14. Then using Equation 3.30, we calculate the
marketplaces’ expected proﬁts. The results are shown in Table 3.1. From this table, by using
Gambit (http://gambit.sourceforge.net), we ﬁnd that both marketplaces charging
30%proﬁtfeeconstitutesauniquepureNashequilibrium(NEQ)feesystem. Inthisequilibrium,
both competing marketplaces charge non-zero proﬁt fees and therefore make positive proﬁts.
Furthermore, we also analyse the case that both competing marketplaces only charge registration
fees, and ﬁnd that both marketplaces charging a 0.1 registration fee constitutes a unique NEQ.
Now we will consider the case where different competing marketplaces charge different types
of fees: marketplace 1 charges only proﬁt fees, and marketplace 2 charge only registration fees.
We discretize registration and proﬁt fees from 0 to 1 with step size 0.1. Then there are again
121 different fee systems. By exploring the traders’ market selection strategies under all pos-
sible fee systems, we obtain the probabilities of traders converging to each BNE, which are
shown in Figure 3.15. Note that, as we discussed in Section 3.2.3.2, when different types of fees
are charged, traders may converge to different marketplaces in the equilibrium. Figure 3.15(c)
shows in which fee systems, traders may converge to different marketplaces. After estimating
the probabilities of traders’ convergence to each BNE, we then calculate the marketplaces’ ex-
pected utilities using Equation 3.30. The marketplaces’ expected utilities are shown in Table 3.2,
from which we can see that in this case, marketplace 1 charging 30% proﬁt fee, and marketplace
2 charging 0.5 registration fee constitutes the unique NEQ fee system.
13In this situation, rich(poor) buyer and rich(poor) seller have the same behaviour.86 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
(a) Size of basin of attraction to BNE 1 (marketplace 1). (b) Size of basin of attraction to BNE 2 (marketplace 2).
FIGURE 3.14: Sizes of basins of attraction when both competing marketplaces only charge
proﬁt fees.
(a) Size of basin of attraction to BNE 1 (marketplace 1). (b) Size of basin of attraction to BNE 2 (marketplace 2).
(c) Size of basin of attraction to BNE 3.
FIGURE 3.15: Sizes of basins of attraction when competing marketplaces charge different
types of fees.Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 87
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3.3.2 Co-Evolutionary Analysis
In the above, we have investigated the marketplaces’ equilibrium charging strategies through a
static analysis, which is restricted to the assumption that their charging strategies do not change
in response to the traders’ market selection strategies. In this section, we address this limita-
tion by modelling the game as a two-stage game where, in the ﬁrst stage, marketplaces publish
their fee structures according to their charging strategies and then, in the second stage, traders
select marketplaces according to their market selection strategies, which are conditional on the
fee system from the ﬁrst stage. Given this complicated setting of a two-stage game with incom-
plete information about traders’ types, it is difﬁcult to use traditional game-theoretic methods to
analyse equilibrium charging strategies. Intuitively, we can see that the traders’ market selection
strategies and the marketplaces’ charging strategies will affect each other. Hence, we use a co-
evolutionary approach to analyse this problem. This approach can capture the dynamic process
of how marketplaces evolve their charging strategies to converge to equilibrium while taking
into account the dynamic changes of the traders’ market selection strategies. In the following,
before we perform the co-evolutionary analysis, we ﬁrst describe the co-evolutionary process in
more detail.
3.3.2.1 The Co-Evolutionary Process
In the co-evolutionary process, both the competing marketplaces and the traders dynamically
learn to adapt their strategies to maximise their own expected utilities. This learning process
is repeated until both traders and marketplaces do not change their strategies. At this moment,
an equilibrium is reached. In each learning round (i.e. a co-evolutionary step), traders update
their expected utilities before they evolve their market selection strategies. Now in order to
calculate the expected utilities, they require information about the local type distribution (i.e.
the type distribution of traders in a speciﬁc marketplace, see Section 3.2.1) of other traders.
While in Section 3.2.1 the local type distribution was calculated for a given fee system, the
strategies of the marketplaces are mixed (i.e. each fee system is selected by marketplaces with a
certain probability) and therefore in this case we calculate the local type distribution taking into
account the mixed marketplace strategies. Speciﬁcally, these local type distributions depend
on the traders’ market selection strategies (which are conditional on each fee system) and the
marketplaces’ charging strategies (which determine the probability of each possible fee system
being selected). This is important since it creates a link between the strategy composition of
the marketplaces and its effect on the expected utility of the traders, enabling co-evolution to
occur14.
Now we describe the co-evolutionary process in detail, which is depicted in Figure 3.16. First,
we initialise the marketplaces’ charging strategies and the traders’ market selection strategies.
Then we calculate the initial local type distributions of buyers and sellers (see Equation 3.32 in
14An alternative approach is to keep the local distribution conditional on the fees, but then the population dynamics
of the charging strategies will have no effect on the traders’ expected utilities.90 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
FIGURE 3.16: The co-evolutionary process.
the following subsection). From the initial local distributions, traders calculate their expected
utilities, and then evolve their market selection strategies. After traders evolve their market
selection strategies, the marketplaces calculate their expected utilities (which depend on the
traders’ mixed market selection strategies and the marketplaces’ charging strategies) and then
evolve their charging strategies. After the marketplaces evolve their charging strategies, we
updatethelocaldistributionsofthetraders, andthenenterthenextco-evolutionarystep. Thisco-
evolutionary process continues until all dynamic changes of traders’ market selection strategies
and marketplaces’ charging strategies become zero. At this point, an equilibrium is reached.
In the following, before giving the experimental analysis in detail, we ﬁrst need to derive equa-
tions to calculate the expected utilities of traders and marketplaces, and give the replicator dy-
namics equations.
3.3.2.2 Expected Utilities of Traders and Marketplaces
As discussed above, in the co-evolutionary process, a trader’s expected utility depends on the
local type distributions of the other traders. In Subsection 3.2.1, we calculated the local type
distributions for a given fee system. However, since the charging strategies of the marketplaces
are mixed, here we consider the traders’ local type distributions under all allowable fee systems.
These new local type distributions are derived in the following way. First, the probability that
the type of a buyer is less than θb in marketplace m is:
Hb
m(θb) =
X
¯ P∈PM
µ( ¯ P) ∗ Hb
m(θb| ¯ P) =
X
¯ P∈PM
µ( ¯ P) ∗
Z θb
l
fb(x) ∗ ωb(x,m, ¯ P)dx (3.31)
where µ( ¯ P) =
Q
m∈M µm(pm) is the probability of the fee system ¯ P = hp1,..., pMi appearing, and
Hb
m(θb| ¯ P) is the probability that the type of a buyer is less than θb in marketplace m for a given
fee system ¯ P (see Equation 3.4). Then, by normalising the above equation, we obtain a properChapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 91
local type distribution of the buyers in marketplace m:
Gb
m(θb) =
Hb
m(θb)
Hb
m(¯ l)
(3.32)
The local probability density function of buyer types is:
gb
m(θb) =
P
¯ P∈PM µ( ¯ P) ∗ fb(θb) ∗ ωb(θb,m, ¯ P)
Hb
m(¯ l)
(3.33)
The equations for sellers can be calculated in the same way. All other equations to calculate
the traders’ expected utilities are the same as before except that in these equations we need to
replace Hb
m(θb| ¯ P), Gb
m(θb| ¯ P) and gb
m(θb| ¯ P) (which are conditional on a speciﬁc fee system ¯ P) by
Hb
m(θb), Gb
m(θb) and gb
m(θb) (which are under all possible fee systems) respectively.
In addition to the traders’ expected utilities, in this two-stage game, we also need to calcu-
late the expected utility of each marketplace. In Section 3.3.1.1, we have derived the market-
place’s expected utility given a particular fee system ¯ P and the traders’ market selection strat-
egy proﬁles: ¯ ωb( ¯ P) and ¯ ωs( ¯ P). This calculation assumes that each marketplace adopts a pure
charging strategy, i.e. µm(pm) = 1 (m = 1,..., M). Here, we need to calculate the expected
utility of the marketplace adopting a mixed charging strategy. Intuitively, a marketplace’s ex-
pected utility not only depends on its own charging strategy, but also on the charging strategies
of the other marketplaces and the traders’ mixed market selection strategies (which are con-
ditional on the fee systems announced in the ﬁrst stage). In the following, we calculate the
expected utility of marketplace m given a charging strategy proﬁle ¯ µ and the market selection
strategy proﬁles of traders ¯ ωb(·) and ¯ ωs(·). In the ﬁrst step, we use Equation 3.29 to calculate
˜ Um( ¯ P,km, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P)), which is marketplace m’s expected utility given the fee system ¯ P, pric-
ingparameterkm, thebuyers’strategyproﬁle ¯ ωb( ¯ P) = hωb(tb
1,m, ¯ P),ωb(tb
2,m, ¯ P)iandthesellers’
strategy proﬁle ¯ ωs( ¯ P) = hωs(ts
1,m, ¯ P),ωs(ts
2,m, ¯ P)i. Then marketplace m’s expected utility with
a (mixed) charging strategy proﬁle ¯ µ is:
˜ Um(¯ µ) =
X
¯ P∈PM
µ( ¯ P) ∗ ˜ Um( ¯ P,km, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P)) (3.34)
where µ( ¯ P) =
Q
m∈M µm(pm).
3.3.2.3 Replicator Dynamics
We now describe the replicator dynamics equations for traders and marketplaces respectively
for the two-stage game. In addition to adding the replicator dynamics equations for the market-
places, the two-stage game also requires a considerable increase in the number of equations for
the traders. This is because, while in Section 3.2.3, the equations were for a given fee system,
these are now conditional on the fee system. For each possible fee system, a different population
evolves the strategy of each trader type (there are 4 populations: rich buyer, poor buyer, rich92 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
seller and poor seller). Speciﬁcally, when the fee system is ¯ P, the replicator dynamics equations
for each population of traders are given by Equations 3.22, 3.23, 3.24 and 3.25. We can see
that, for each fee system, there are 4 × M replicator dynamics equations. Since there are |PM|
different fee systems, in total, there are |PM| × 4 × M replicator equations for traders.
Now we describe replicator dynamics equations for the marketplaces. Since there are |P| al-
lowable fee structures, for each marketplace, there are |P| replicator dynamics equations for its
charging strategy. In total there are M × |P| replicator dynamics equations for marketplaces15.
Speciﬁcally, marketplace m’s replicator dynamics equation for fee structure p0
m is as follows:
˙ µm(p0
m) =
dµm(p0
m)
dt
=

˜ Um(p0
m,µ−m(·)) − ˜ Um(¯ µ)

∗ µm(p0
m) (3.35)
where ˙ µm(p0
m) describes how marketplace m changes its probability of choosing fee structure
p0
m, ˜ Um(¯ µ) is m’s overall expected utility as derived in Section 3.3.2.2, and ˜ Um(p0
m,µ−m(·)) is m’s
expected utility of choosing fee structure p0
m given the other marketplaces’ charging strategy
proﬁle µ−m(·):
˜ Um(p0
m,µ−m(·)) =
X
¯ P∈PM: pm=p0
m
Y
l∈M\{m}
µl(pl) ∗ ˜ Um( ¯ P,km, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P))

(3.36)
3.3.2.4 Experimental Results
Afterdescribingtheco-evolutionaryprocessandthereplicatordynamicsequations, weareready
to analyse how marketplaces evolve their charging strategies over time. Speciﬁcally, in the
following analysis, we still discretize the proﬁt and registration fees from 0 to 1 with step size
0.1. We also assume that there are 2 competing marketplaces, 5 buyers and 5 sellers, and let
tb
1 = 4, tb
2 = 6, ts
1 = 0, ts
2 = 2. Furthermore, for the pricing parameters, we assume that
k1 = k2 = 0.5.
Two identical marketplaces initially having the same charging strategy:
First, we consider that both marketplaces only charge proﬁt fees. Then there are 11 possible fee
structures16 for each marketplace, which implies that there are 968 replicator dynamics equa-
tions for the traders and 22 replicator dynamics equations for the two competing marketplaces.
We assume that initially both marketplaces are identical. That is, they have the same probabil-
ities of choosing each fee structure, and for each fee system, the initial probability of traders
choosing marketplace 1(2) is the ratio of proﬁt fee of marketplace 2(1) to the sum of proﬁt
fees of both competing marketplaces (this means that traders have higher initial probabilities of
choosing the cheaper marketplace). Then the initial probability of traders choosing each market-
place under all possible fee systems is equal, i.e. 0.5. From this setting, we evolve the charging
15Here we consider that different marketplaces are from different populations since different marketplaces may
adopt different types of fees, or even though they use the same type of fees, different marketplace may set their initial
charging strategies differently.
16They are (0,0), (0,0.1), (0,0.2), (0,0.3), (0,0.4), (0,0.5), (0,0.6), (0,0.7), (0,0.8), (0,0.9), (0,1.0).Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 93
FIGURE 3.17: Evolutionary process of charging strategies of marketplace 1 and 2 when they
have identical initial charging strategies.
strategies of marketplaces and the market selection strategies of the traders. The evolutionary
process of charging strategies is shown in Figure 3.17 where the x-axis is the possible proﬁt fees
the marketplace can charge, the y-axis is the evolutionary time, and the z-axis is the probability
of the marketplace choosing each proﬁt fee during the evolutionary process. Note that, in this
case, the evolutionary processes of two initially identical marketplaces are still identical. From
the ﬁgure, we can see that during the evolutionary process, both marketplaces gradually set low
fees with higher probability, and in equilibrium, both marketplaces set a 10% proﬁt fee with
100% probability. This is because two identical marketplaces have to undercut each other by
decreasing fees to attract traders. Eventually, they converge to a pure strategy where both mar-
ketplaces charge a 10% proﬁt fee, which is the minimum allowed proﬁt fee which can guarantee
positive proﬁt for the marketplaces17. In addition, for the traders’ evolutionary process, we look
at the traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1 considering all possible fee systems. In
this case, the probability of traders choosing each marketplace is unchanged, which is 0.5. This
shows that in a highly competitive environment, competing marketplaces have to charge the low-
est fees, and even no fees, in order to keep traders. This is different from the static analysis in
Section 3.3.1, where in equilibrium both competing marketplaces charge a 30% proﬁt fee. The
reason is that in the co-evolutionary analysis, competing marketplaces respond to the dynamic
changes in the traders’ market selection strategies, and in order to remain competitive, eventu-
ally, they have to charge the lowest proﬁt fee. However, in the static analysis, the competing
marketplaces set their fees once at the beginning, and their charging strategies do not respond to
the changes in the traders’ market selection strategies.
In the previous analysis (see Section 3.2.3.2), we introduced randomisation for the traders’ mar-
ket selection strategies to analyse the effect of exploration and bounded rationality. Now we do
the same for the above co-evolutionary setting. In doing so, we ﬁnd that, as the probability of
17If a lower minimal proﬁt fee would have been allowed, e.g. 1%, then both competing marketplaces will converge
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FIGURE 3.18: Equilibrium charging strategies of marketplace 1 and 2 with respect to randomi-
sation of market selection when two competing marketplaces have identical initial charging
strategies.
traders randomly choosing marketplaces increases, in equilibrium, fees increase. For example,
when we introduce 20% randomisation, then in equilibrium, both marketplaces will charge a
20% proﬁt fee. The result is shown in Figure 3.18. From this, we can see when randomisation
goes above 50% (i.e. when traders have a very high probability of randomising their market
selection), in equilibrium, the marketplaces charge very high fees. Especially, when the ran-
domisation reaches 100%, both marketplaces charge 100% proﬁt fee. This is because two iden-
tical competing marketplaces have the same evolutionary process, and thus they cannot attract
traders from each other. When traders have probabilities of randomly choosing marketplace,
both marketplaces will ﬁnd that, even though they charge higher fees, they still keep traders.
Thus marketplaces will charge higher fees to make more proﬁts.
Two marketplaces initially having different charging strategies:
Now we consider the more general case, in which the marketplaces have different initial charg-
ing strategies. For example, we assume that initially marketplace 2 is slightly cheaper than mar-
ketplace 1, and thus marketplace 1 is slightly disadvantaged in terms of the traders’ probability
of choosing marketplaces. For this setting, the evolutionary charging strategies of marketplace
1 and 2 are shown by Figures 3.19(a) and 3.19(b), and the dynamic changes of the traders’
probabilities of choosing marketplace 1 are shown in Figure 3.19(c). From these, we can see
that in equilibrium, all traders converge to marketplace 1, which is initially disadvantaged. The
reason is that from Figures 3.19(a) and 3.19(b), we can see that marketplace 1 decreases its fees
to attract traders because of its disadvantageous position in the initial state, and marketplace
2 increases fees since it has an advantageous position in the initial state. Although there exist
small ﬂuctuations for traders’ probabilities of choosing marketplaces because of the fee changes
of marketplace 1 and 2, eventually all traders will converge to marketplace 1. This shows that it
is possible for an initial disadvantaged marketplace to beat an advantaged one by dynamically
adapting its fees. We also ﬁnd that once marketplace 1 attracts all traders, it will charge higherChapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 95
(a) Charging strategy of marketplace 1. (b) Charging strategy of marketplace 2.
(c) Traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1.
FIGURE 3.19: Evolutionary process of charging strategies of marketplace 1 and 2 and traders’
probability of choosing marketplace 1 when two competing marketplaces have different initial
charging strategies.
fees, around 70% proﬁt fee, but still keep traders. This is because the proﬁt fees of both com-
peting marketplaces are within the lock-in region, and therefore marketplace 1 can keep traders
even though it is more expensive. However, if we again introduce randomisation (see Figure
3.20), we see that the behaviour of the traders’ market selection changes signiﬁcantly. In detail,
we can see that marketplace 1 tries to charge a higher proﬁt fee, but because of random explo-
ration, traders will migrate to marketplace 2 (the cheaper marketplace). This causes marketplace
1 to reduce its fees and traders to migrate back to this marketplace. In fact, we observe that the
strategies of the traders and the marketplaces never converge to an equilibrium. However, by ob-
serving the overall evolutionary process, we still can see that, on average, marketplace 1 charges
slightly higher fees than marketplace 2 because of its higher initial market share.
Two different marketplaces having an adaptive charging strategy and a ﬁxed charging
strategy respectively:
In the above, we analysed the dynamic behaviour of both competing marketplaces evolving their96 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
FIGURE 3.20: Traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1 with 20% random exploration
when two competing marketplaces have different initial charging strategies .
(a) Charging strategy of marketplace 1. (b) Traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1.
FIGURE 3.21: Evolutionary process of charging strategy of marketplace 1 and traders’ proba-
bility of choosing marketplace 1 when marketplace 1 adopts an adaptive charging strategy and
marketplace 2 adopts a ﬁxed charging strategy.
charging strategies. In the real world, however, some marketplaces may adopt a ﬁxed charging
strategy, which means that they will not change fees during a speciﬁc time. To consider this
situation, we now analyse how a marketplace with an adaptive charging strategy competes with
a marketplace with a ﬁxed charging strategy. As an example, we assume that marketplace 2
ﬁxes its proﬁt fee at 30%, and marketplace 1 evolves its charging strategy and initially market-
place 1 is slightly more expensive than marketplace 2. The evolutionary process of the charging
strategy of marketplace 1 is shown in Figure 3.21(a), and the dynamic changes of the traders’
probability of choosing marketplace 1 for this setting are shown in Figure 3.21(b). From these
ﬁgures, we can see that initially, marketplace 1 decreases its fee, and when attracting all traders,
it will increase its fee, but still keep traders. In equilibrium, marketplace 1 will charge 70%
proﬁt fee. However, if in the beginning marketplace 1 is much more expensive than marketplaceChapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types 97
(a) Charging strategy of marketplace 1. (b) Charging strategy of marketplace 2.
(c) Traders’ probability of choosing marketplace 1.
FIGURE 3.22: Evolutionary process of charging strategies of marketplace 1 and 2 and traders’
probability of choosing marketplace 1 when marketplace 1 charges a proﬁt fee and marketplace
2 charges a registration fee.
2 (which means that marketplace 2 has a very large lock-in region), then even though market-
place 1 charges a very low fee, it still fails to attract traders. If both marketplaces have similar
initial charging strategies, then the marketplace using an adaptive charging strategy can beat the
marketplace using a ﬁxed charging strategy. However, when a marketplace initially has a large
market share, it is difﬁcult for a new marketplace to obtain market share, even when undercutting
its competitors.
Two different marketplaces charging different types of fees:
Finally we analyse how marketplaces evolve their charging strategies when different types of
fees are charged. Previously (in Section 3.2.3.2), when marketplaces charge different types of
fees, we showed that rich traders prefer marketplaces that charge registration fees, and poor
traders prefer marketplaces that charge proﬁt fees. From Figure 3.22(c), we ﬁnd that, initially,
rich traders still prefer marketplace 2 charging a registration fee, and poor traders prefer market-
place 1 charging a proﬁt fee, which is the same as the previous analysis. However, from Figures98 Chapter 3 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Discrete Trader Types
3.22(b) and 3.22(c), we can see that when rich traders choose marketplace 2, this marketplace
charges a higher registration fee. Then, in contrast to the previous analysis, where different types
of traders converge to different marketplaces in equilibrium, rich traders leave marketplace 2,
and all traders converge to marketplace 1. Once all traders choose marketplace 1, from Figure
3.22(a), we can see marketplace 1 charges 90% proﬁt fee, but still keeps the traders.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a game-theoretic framework for analysing competing double auc-
tion marketplaces that vie for traders and make proﬁts by charging fees. Firstly, we analysed
the equilibrium market selection strategies for traders for a given fee system. In more detail, we
used game theory to analyse the equilibrium market selection strategies and adopted evolution-
ary game theory to investigate how traders dynamically change their strategies, and thus, which
equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In so doing, we showed that when the same type of fees
are charged by two marketplaces, it is unlikely that competing marketplaces will continue to co-
exist when traders converge to their equilibrium market selection strategies. Eventually, all the
traders will congregate in one marketplace. However, when different types of fees are allowed
(registration fees and proﬁt fees), competing marketplaces are more likely to co-exist in equilib-
rium, where rich traders will converge to the marketplace charging a registration fee, and poor
traders will converge to the marketplace charging a proﬁt fee. Somewhat surprisingly, we found
that sometimes all the traders eventually migrate to the marketplace that charges higher fees.
Thus we further analysed this phenomenon, and speciﬁcally analysed how random exploration
by traders affects this migration.
Secondly, we analysed the equilibrium charging strategies of the marketplaces using two differ-
ent approaches. In the ﬁrst, we derived the equilibrium charging strategies by a static analysis.
However, this approach did not consider the interaction between traders’ strategies and market-
places’ strategies. We tackled this limitation by using a co-evolutionary approach to analyse this
game. Speciﬁcally, we considered the competition of the marketplaces as a two-stage game,
where the traders’ market selection strategies and marketplaces’ charging strategies affect each
other. In particular, we used a co-evolutionary approach to analyse how competing market-
places dynamically set fees while taking into account the dynamics of the traders’ market se-
lection strategies. In so doing, we found that two initially identical marketplaces undercut each
other, and they will eventually charge the minimal fee that guarantees positive market proﬁts for
them. Furthermore, we also extended the co-evolutionary analysis of the marketplaces’ charging
strategies to more general cases. We found that by dynamically evolving the charging strategy,
it is possible for the marketplace that is initially at a disadvantage to outperform its opponent,
which is also able to evolve its charging strategy. Furthermore, we showed that an initially dis-
advantaged marketplace with an adaptive charging strategy can beat the initially advantaged one
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Furthermore, we also want to point out that a certain conclusion drawn from this chapter is
consistent with the work done by Sohn et al. (2010); Niu et al. (2008a) in the context of the
CAT competition. In more detail, both of them presented that intra-marginal traders will select
the marketplace charging a registration fee with a high probability, and extra-marginal traders
will select the marketplace charging a proﬁt fee with a high probability. Their conclusion aligns
well with our conclusion that when two double auction marketplaces charge different types
of fees, it can happen that rich traders (corresponding to intra-marginal traders) converge to
the marketplace charging a registration fee, and poor traders (corresponding to extra-marginal
traders) converge to the marketplace charging a proﬁt fee.
The work in this chapter addresses our research challenges of analysing equilibrium market se-
lection strategies for traders and equilibrium charging strategies for marketplaces (i.e. research
challenges 1 and 4, see Section 1.2), which is the ﬁrst theoretical work in the context of compet-
ing double auction marketplaces. This analysis is insightful and can be used to guide the design
of a charging strategy. For example, the lock-in region gives us the insight that the competing
marketplace should initially charge lower and even no fees to attract traders, and once it has built
up a larger market share, the marketplace can charge fees to make proﬁts, but still can maintain
market share at a good level. However, in this work, we only considered discrete trader types,
and assumed that traders adopt a simple, truth-telling bidding strategy. In the next chapter, we
will address these shortcomings by considering continuous trader types and analysing both equi-
librium market selection and bidding strategies for traders. We will also extend this analysis to
the settings with multi-home trading and hybrid trading, and with different properties of goods.Chapter 4
Analysis of Competing Marketplaces
with Continuous Trader Types
In Chapter 3, we game theoretically analysed the equilibrium market selection strategies for
traders and equilibrium charging strategies for marketplaces. Now, while this analysis led to
a number of important insights, it was restricted to the setting with two discrete trader types.
Furthermore, we made the simplifying assumption that traders use a truth-telling bidding strat-
egy, which means that traders will submit their types as their shouts. However, in practice, trader
types are often drawn from a wider range, and they may bid strategically (such as shading shouts
in order to make more proﬁts). In addition, we assumed that marketplaces can only choose from
two types of fees (registration and proﬁt) to make proﬁt. However, as we will show in this
chapter, when traders can bid strategically, we ﬁnd that neither fees are effective in terms of
making proﬁts or keeping traders (see Section 4.4). Charging registration fees will cause traders
to leave the marketplace quickly, and charging proﬁt fees encourages traders to hide their ac-
tual proﬁts by shading their shouts, resulting in very low revenue for the marketplaces. In this
chapter, we will address all these limitations. Speciﬁcally, we consider a setting with contin-
uous trader types, where we use ﬁctitious play (a computational learning approach) to analyse
both the equilibrium market selection and bidding strategies for traders. Furthermore, because
of ineffectiveness of both registration and proﬁt fees in making proﬁts and keeping traders, we
consider two more types of fees: transaction and transaction price percentage fees. We introduce
the former one because it is used in the CAT competition (see Section 2.5.1), and we introduce
the latter one because it is commonly used in real-world auctions (e.g. both eBay and Ama-
zon charge a percentage fee on the ﬁnal sale prices to sellers). In so doing, we analyse what
types of fees are effective in making proﬁts and keeping traders, and analyse how competing
marketplaces set fees in equilibrium.
We furthermore extend the model in several directions. First, in addition to the single-home trad-
ing environment where traders can only enter one marketplace at a time (the analysis in Chapter
3 was restricted to this environment), we also consider other trading environments: multi-home
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environments where traders can enter multiple marketplaces at a time, and hybrid environments
where one side of traders (e.g. buyers) use multi-home trading and the other side of traders
(e.g. sellers) use single-home trading. These different trading environments affect the way in
which traders select marketplaces and submit shouts. For example, in the multi-home trading
environment, traders will enter multiple marketplaces if they can make positive proﬁts in these
marketplaces. Furthermore, if buyers can enter multiple marketplaces at a time, they can obtain
multiple goods. As discussed in Section 1.2, these goods can be either independent, substitutes,
or complementary. These different properties also affect traders’ strategies. For example, when
trading complementary goods, buyers will prefer to buy as many goods as they can, and thus
they will try to bid high in several marketplaces to make more transactions. Therefore, in this
chapter, in addition to considering different trading environments, we will also analyse goods
with these different properties.
Speciﬁcally, this chapter addresses research challenges 1 (analysing market selection strategies
for traders), 2 (analysing bidding strategies for traders) and 4 (analysing charging strategies for
marketplaces). The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.1, we formalise the above
setting, and derive expected utilities of traders and marketplaces in this new setting. In Section
4.2, we describe the ﬁctitious play (FP) algorithm used in our analysis. In Section 4.3, we use
FP to analyse traders’ equilibrium market selection and bidding strategies in different trading
environments with different good properties. In Section 4.4, we analyse the effects of different
types of fees on obtaining market proﬁts and how competing marketplaces should set fees in
equilibrium. Finally, we summarise in Section 4.5
4.1 Framework
In this section, we ﬁrst extend the setting from Chapter 3, and then derive equations to calculate
expected utilities of traders and marketplaces for this new setting.
4.1.1 Basic Settings
The basic setting for traders and marketplaces in this chapter is similar to that used in Chapter
3 (see Section 3.1.1). In this section we will discuss the changes with respect to Chapter 3 as a
result of the changes in the setting described above. First of all, since we consider continuous
trader types, in this setting we assume that types of buyers (sellers) are identically and indepen-
dently drawn from the cumulative distribution function Fb (Fs) with support [0,1] (in contrast to
that in Chapter 3 where we only consider discrete trader types). Furthermore, we consider two
more types of fees: transaction and transaction price percentage. Consequently, the fee structure
of a marketplace m is now deﬁned as pm = (rm,tm,qm,om), rm ≥ 0, tm ≥ 0, qm ∈ [0,1] and
om ∈ [0,1], where rm is a registration fee charged to traders when they enter the marketplace,
tm is a transaction fee charged to buyers and sellers when they make transactions, qm is a proﬁtChapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 103
fee charged on proﬁts made by buyers and sellers, and om is a transaction price percentage fee
charged on the transaction price of buyers and sellers. As before, the fee structures of all com-
peting marketplaces constitute a fee system ¯ P = hp1, p2,...pMi. Moreover, we further make an
assumption that traders will incur a small cost ε when they choose any marketplace (such as
time cost for trading online, travel and time costs for trading in shopping mall). We do this so
that they slightly prefer choosing no marketplace than choosing a marketplace and making no
transactions (even if rm = 0). This small cost will help us distinguish buyers’ behaviour between
bidding zero and not choosing the marketplace, and sellers’ behaviour between bidding one and
not choosing the marketplace.
The process of a trading round is the same as Chapter 3 (see Section 3.1) except that, in this set-
ting, traders can enter multiple marketplaces when multi-home trading is allowed. As before, we
assume that each trader can only trade a single unit of the good in each marketplace. However,
because now multi-home trading is allowed, traders may trade multiple goods when they enter
multiple marketplaces. We assume that goods traded in different marketplaces are identical. As
we said before, these goods can be either independent, substitutes, or complementary. We model
these different preferences as follows. For a buyer with type θb, the value that it derives when it
successfully purchases T units of goods is given by:
vb(θb,T) = αb
T ∗ θb (4.1)
where we refer to αb
T as the “buyer preference coefﬁcient”, determining whether the buyers
have independent, substitutable or complementary preferences. In more detail, if goods are
independent for the buyer, then the values for individual good are additive, i.e. αb
1 = 1 and
αb
T − αb
T−1 = 1, ∀T ≥ 2 (which is equivalent to αb
T = T). If, on the other hand, the goods
are substitutes, then the total value for getting T goods is subadditive, i.e. αb
1 = 1 and 0 ≤
αb
T − αb
T−1 < 1, ∀T ≥ 2. In particular, for perfectly substitutable goods for the buyer, we have
αb
T = 1 (T = 1,..., M). Finally, if goods are complementary for the buyer, the total value is
superadditive, i.e. αb
1 = 1 and αb
T −αb
T−1 > 1, ∀T ≥ 2. Speciﬁcally, for perfectly complementary
goods, we have αb
T = 0 (T = 1,..., M − 1) and αb
M = 1, i.e. the buyer obtains value θb when
it successfully purchases M goods, and the buyer obtains zero value when it purchases less
than M goods. The value function for a seller is deﬁned analogously, where αs
T is the seller
preference coefﬁcient. We assume that αb
T and αs
T are the same for all buyers and sellers, and
these parameters are common knowledge.
In addition to multi-home, we now allow traders to bid strategically. In what follows, we de-
scribe how this affects the framework from Chapter 3. Speciﬁcally, we make the assumption
that there is a ﬁnite number of bids and asks and that these are discrete. The reason for doing so
is two-fold. First of all, this assumption is more realistic than having continuous bids because, in
practice, the numeraire is discrete. Second, it allows us to compute the Bayes-Nash equilibrium
more easily using ﬁctitious play. Now the ranges of possible bids and asks constitute the bid
space and ask space respectively. For convenience, we further assume that buyers and sellers
have the same shout space, which is given by Φ = {0, 1
D, 2
D,..., D−1
D ,1} ∪ {
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space comprises D + 1 allowable bids(asks) from 0 to 1 with step size 1/D, and 
 means not
submitting a shout in the marketplace (i.e. not choosing the marketplace). Recall that, in our
new setting, traders can place shouts in multiple marketplaces. We refer to a combinational
shout across multiple marketplaces as an action. Formally, a buyer’s action is deﬁned as a tuple
δb = hdb
1,db
2,...,db
Mi, where the buyer bids db
m in marketplace m if db
m , 
, and does not choose
marketplace m if db
m = 
. Similarly, a seller’s action is given by δs = hds
1,ds
2,...,ds
Mi. The set of
all possible actions constitutes the action space, which is deﬁned as ∆ = ΦM. Note that in our
system, both buyers and sellers have the same action space.
Now, a trader’s action is determined by its strategy, which is a mapping from the set of types to
the action space. In addition, each trader does not know what the exact types of the other traders
are, and only know their type distribution functions. Therefore, given the trader’s strategy and
the type distribution function, we can derive the probability of a certain action being played by
this trader. Since the expected utility of a trader (and a marketplace) is directly dependent on
its beliefs about other traders’ action choices, instead of looking at traders’ strategies, in what
follows we directly consider traders’ action distributions. This will also be convenient when
we use ﬁctitious play to derive traders’ equilibrium strategies (see Section 4.2). Speciﬁcally,
we change our notation from before and now use ωb
i (ωs
i) to denote the probability of action δb
i
(δs
i) being chosen by a buyer (seller). Furthermore, we use Ωb =
 
ωb
1,ωb
2,...,ωb
|∆|

,
P|∆|
i=1 ωb
i = 1,
to represent the probability distribution of buyers’ actions, and Ωs = (ωs
1,ωs
2,...,ωs
|∆|) for the
sellers’ action distribution.
4.1.2 The Trader’s Expected Utility
Before analysing the strategies of the traders and the marketplaces, we ﬁrst need to derive equa-
tions to calculate expected utilities of traders and marketplaces. Although in Chapter 3 we have
given equations to calculate them, these equations are based on the assumption that traders sub-
mit their types as shouts, and thus are not appropriate in this setting. Therefore, in this section,
we derive the equations to calculate the expected utility of a trader based on the action distri-
bution of other traders. Then in the following section, we will describe how to calculate the
expected utilities of marketplaces.
In what follows, we derive the expected utility of a buyer, but the seller’s is calculated analo-
gously. We can see that a buyer’s expected utility depends on its type, its own action, and its
beliefs about action choices of other traders. In the following, we calculate the expected utility
of a buyer with type θb adopting the action δb = hdb
1,db
2,...,db
Mi given the other buyers’ action
distribution Ωb and the sellers’ action distribution Ωs, and the fee system ¯ P. The expected util-
ity consists of two parts: the expected value on the goods, and the expected payment. In the
following, we derive these two parts respectively.
To calculate the buyer’s expected value, since we consider the equilibrium matching policy
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positions in the available marketplaces (the buyer’s position is the rank of the buyer’s bid among
all descendingly sorted bids). Clearly, a buyer’s position is determined by its own action and
those of other buyers. However, since we do not know the actions of other traders, we can only
derive the probabilistic information about the buyer’s position in a marketplace. Furthermore,
since buyers can place multiple bids in multiple marketplaces at the same time, bids in different
marketplaces are correlated with each other, and thus the buyer’s positions in different mar-
ketplaces are also correlated with each other. Therefore, we cannot consider each marketplace
independently and need to consider the buyer’s joint positions in marketplaces. Furthermore,
since we consider discrete bids and multiple buyers may place the same bids, we need to use a
tie-breaking rule to determine a buyer’s position.
Therefore, to calculate the expected value, we need to take the following steps. First, we calcu-
late the expected joint positions of the buyer by considering all possible action choices of other
buyers and their action distributions. In addition to other buyers’ actions, a buyer’s expected
value also depends on the sellers’ actions. Therefore, we then consider the number of sellers
choosing different actions. Finally, given the buyer’s joint positions and the number of sellers
choosing different actions, we can derive the buyer’s expected value by considering all possible
numbers of units it can win. In the following, we discuss these steps in turn.
Firstly, we describe how to determine a buyer’s joint positions across the marketplaces. As we
said above, when we know the number of buyers choosing different actions, we can determine
the buyer’s joint positions. Speciﬁcally, we use a |∆|-tuple ¯ x = hx1,...x|∆|i ∈ X to represent the
number of buyers choosing different actions, where xi is the number of buyers choosing action
δb
i , X is the set of all such possible tuples and we have
P|∆|
i=1 xi = B − 1 (note that we need to
exclude the buyer for which we are calculating the expected utility). The probability of exactly
xi buyers choosing action δb
i is
 
ωb
i
xi, and then the probability of this tuple appearing is:
ρb(¯ x) =
 
B − 1
x1,..., x|∆|
!
∗
|∆| Y
i=1

ωb
i
xi
(4.2)
Now for a particular ¯ x, we determine the buyer’s position in each marketplace as follows. Firstly,
we obtain the number of other buyers whose bids are greater than the buyer’s bid in marketplace
m, db
m, which is given by:
X>
m(¯ x,db
m) =
X
δb
i ∈∆:db
im>db
m
xi (4.3)
where db
im is the bid placed in marketplace m through action δb
i . Similarly, we use X=
m(¯ x,db
m)
to represent the number of buyers whose bids are equal to the buyer’s bid in marketplace m
(excluding the buyer itself):
X=
m(¯ x,db
m) =
X
δb
i ∈∆:db
im=db
m
xi (4.4)
Due to having discrete bids and given X>
m(¯ x,db
m) buyers bidding higher than the buyer’s bid
db
m and X=
m(¯ x,db
m) buyers bidding equal to db
m, the buyer’s position in marketplace m could be106 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
anywhere from X>
m(¯ x,db
m)+1 to X>
m(¯ x,db
m)+X=
m(¯ x,db
m)+1, which constitutes the buyer’s position
range in this marketplace. Since X=
m(¯ x,db
m) + 1 buyers have the same bid, as we said previously,
a tie-breaking rule is needed to determine the buyer’s position. Here we adopt a standard rule
where each of these possible positions1 occurs with equal probability, i.e. 1/(X=
m(¯ x,db
m) + 1).
Now, given the buyer’s position ranges in different marketplaces, we can obtain the set of all
possible joint positions for the buyer. Speciﬁcally, we use a M-tuple ¯ v¯ x = hv1,...,vMi ∈ V¯ x to
represent one of the possible joint positions where vm is the buyer’s position in marketplace m,
and V¯ x is the set of all possible joint positions satisfying the condition X>
m(¯ x,db
m) + 1 ≤ vm ≤
X>
m(¯ x,db
m)+ X=
m(¯ x,db
m)+1 (m = 1,..., M). The probability of the buyer having the joint positions
¯ v¯ x given the tuple ¯ x is:
Φ(¯ v¯ x) =
M Y
m=1
1
X=
m(¯ x,db
m) + 1
(4.5)
Note that tie-breaking occurs independently for each marketplace.
In addition to depending on positions in different marketplaces, the buyer’s expected value also
depends on sellers’ action choices. Speciﬁcally, we use a |∆|-tuple ¯ y = hy1,...y|∆|i ∈ Y to
represent the number of sellers choosing different actions, where yi is the number of sellers
choosing action δs
i, and Y is the set of all such possible tuples and we have
P|∆|
i=1 yi = S. The
probability of this tuple appearing is:
ρs(¯ y) =
 
S
y1,...,y|∆|
!
∗
|∆| Y
i=1

ωs
i
yi
(4.6)
Now given the buyer’s joint positions ¯ v¯ x and the number of sellers choosing different actions ¯ y,
we are ready to calculate the buyer’s expected value on traded goods. Since the buyer can enter
multiple marketplaces and thus purchase multiple goods, we need to consider its expected value
on different units of goods. Remember that each trader can only trade one unit of good in each
marketplace, and thus when there are M marketplaces in total, the possible number of goods the
buyer can purchase is from 1 to M. Speciﬁcally, in Section 4.1.1, we have deﬁned the buyer’s
value vb(θb,T) on T units of goods by considering different good properties (see Equation 4.1).
Now by considering all possible marketplace subsets with cardinality T, where exactly T trans-
actions are made by this buyer, we obtain the buyer’s expected value when it purchases T units
of goods given its joint positions ¯ v¯ x and the number of sellers choosing different actions ¯ y:
˜ V(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs,T) =
X
MI⊂2M:|MI|=T
ϕb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,δb,MI) ∗ vb(θb,T)
=
X
MI⊂2M:|MI|=T
ϕb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,δb,MI) ∗ αb
T ∗ θb (4.7)
where ϕb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,δb,MI) indicates whether the buyer makes transactions in marketplaces MI and
does not make transactions in M − MI. Note that conditional on the buyer’s joint positions
1They are X>
m(¯ x,db
m) + 1, X>
m(¯ x,db
m) + 2,..., X>
m(¯ x,db
m) + X=
m(¯ x,db
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and the number of sellers choosing different actions, whether the buyer making a transaction
or not in each marketplace is independent of each other, and thus whether the buyer making
transactions in MI and not making transactions in M − MI is given by:
ϕb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,δb,MI) =
Y
m∈MI
ψb(vm, ¯ y,m,db
m) ∗
Y
m∈M−MI
χb(vm, ¯ y,m,db
m) (4.8)
where ψb(vm, ¯ y,m,db
m) indicates whether the buyer with bid db
m makes a transaction in mar-
ketplace m given its position vm and the number of sellers choosing different actions ¯ y, and
χb(vm, ¯ y,m,db
m) indicates whether the buyer with bid db
m does not make a transaction in market-
place m. Given the number of sellers choosing different actions, we will know what asks are
placed in marketplace m, from which we can calculate the number of asks which are not greater
than db
m:
Y≤
m(¯ y,db
m) =
X
δs
i∈∆:ds
im≤db
m
yi (4.9)
Now whether the buyer making a transaction in marketplace m is given by:
ψb(vm, ¯ y,m,db
m) =

  
  
1 if Y≤
m(¯ y,db
m) ≥ vm
0 if Y≤
m(¯ y,db
m) < vm
and whether the buyer not making a transaction in marketplace m is:
χb(vm, ¯ y,m,db
m) =

  
  
1 if Y≤
m(¯ y,db
m) < vm
0 if Y≤
m(¯ y,db
m) ≥ vm
Finally, by considering all possible numbers of units the buyer is purchasing, all possible num-
bers of sellers choosing different actions, all possible joint positions and all possible numbers of
buyers choosing different actions, the buyer’s expected value is given by:
˜ V(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs) =
X
¯ x∈X
ρb(¯ x) ∗
X
¯ v¯ x∈V¯ x
Φ(¯ v¯ x) ∗
X
¯ y∈Y
ρs(¯ y) ∗
M X
T=1
˜ V(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs,T) (4.10)
After deriving the expected value, in the following, we derive the expected payment of the
buyer given the action distributions of buyers and sellers, Ωb and Ωs, and the fee system ¯ P.
Firstly, we derive the buyer’s expected payment given its joint positions ¯ v¯ x and the number of
sellers choosing different actions ¯ y. This is equal to the sum of the expected payment in each
marketplace, which is:
˜ Pb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) =
M X
m=1
˜ Pb
m(vm, ¯ y,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm)
where ˜ Pb
m(vm, ¯ y,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm) is the expected payment of the buyer given its bid db
m and its
position vm in marketplace m. Speciﬁcally, when db
m = 
, i.e. not bidding in this marketplace,
the expected payment is 0; when db
m , 
, by sorting the asks ascendingly, we will know what108 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
exact ask will be (if it can be) matched with the bid db
m. We denote the ask matched with bid db
m
in marketplace m as ds
m. As a result, ˜ Pb
m(vm, ¯ y,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm) is given by:
˜ Pb
m(vm, ¯ y,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm) =

     
     
0 if db
m = 

˜ Pb
m(vm, ¯ y,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs,ds
m, pm) + rm + ε if db
m ≥ ds
m
rm + ε otherwise
where ˜ Pb
m(vm, ¯ y,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs,ds
m, pm) is the buyer’s expected payment in marketplace m ex-
cluding registration fee rm and constant cost ε when it is matched with ds
m, which is given by:
˜ Pb
m(vm, ¯ y,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs,ds
m, pm) = TP + tm + TP ∗ om + (db
m − TP) ∗ qm (4.11)
where TP = ds
m ∗ km + db
m ∗ (1 − km) is the transaction price, tm is the transaction fee, TP ∗ om is
the payment of transaction price percentage fee, and (db
m −TP)∗qm is the payment of proﬁt fee.
Now by considering all possible numbers of sellers choosing different actions, all possible joint
positions and all possible numbers of buyers choosing different actions, the buyer’s expected
payment is given by:
˜ Pb(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) =
X
¯ x∈X
ρb(¯ x) ∗
X
¯ v¯ x∈V¯ x
Φ(¯ v¯ x) ∗
X
¯ y∈Y
ρs(¯ y) ∗ ˜ Pb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) (4.12)
Finally, the expected utility of the buyer with type θb using action δb is:
˜ Ub(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) = ˜ Vb(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs) − ˜ Pb(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) (4.13)
Now we have derived equations to calculate expected utilities of traders. This way of calculating
traders’expectedutilitiesisintuitiveandthuscanbeeasilyexplained. However, thecomputation
is heavy since we need to consider all the possible numbers of traders choosing different actions.
In more detail, given shout space Φ and M competing marketplaces, there are |Φ|M actions for
traders. Then for B buyers, there are |X| = |Φ|M∗(B−1) possibilities for buyers’ action choices
(excluding the buyer itself), and |Y| = |Φ|M∗S for sellers. In Appendix B, in order to reduce
the computation, we introduce an alternative approach to calculate traders’ expected utilities
(which is somewhat less intuitive and thus is relatively harder to explain). Speciﬁcally, we
compare buyers’ actions in terms of comparing bids in these actions. By doing so, we obtain 3M
different events for buyers’ action comparison. By considering the number of buyers choosing
actions satisfying each event, we can calculate the buyer’s joint positions. Now we reduce the
possibilities of buyers’ action choices from |Φ|M∗(B−1) to 3M∗(B−1). For sellers, instead of directly
lookingatallpossiblenumbersofsellerschoosingdifferentactions, weconsiderthepossibilities
of the number of the sellers in different marketplaces. By doing so, we reduce the possibilities
from |Φ|M∗S to (S +1)M (note that the number of sellers in each marketplace is from 0 to S since
multi-home trading is allowed)2. For details of this approach, we refer to Appendix B. Note
2For example, in the following analysis, we consider 11 possible shouts plus 
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that in our implementation of the algorithm, in order to reduce the computation, we adopt the
approach in Appendix B to calculate a trader’s expected utility. However, both approaches are
mathematically equivalent.
4.1.3 The Marketplace’s Expected Utility
After deriving equations to calculate the expected utilities of traders, we now calculate expected
utilities of marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, in the following, we derive equations to calculate market-
place m’s expected utility given its fee structure pm and the action distributions of buyers and
sellers, Ωb and Ωs. Intuitively, we can see that the expected utility depends on the number of
traders choosing each action. Similarly, we use a |∆|-tuple ¯ x = hx1,..., x|∆|i ∈ X0,
P|∆|
i=1 xi = B, to
denote the number of buyers choosing different actions, where xi is the exact number of buyers
choosing action δb
i , and X0 is the set of all such possible tuples. We use ¯ y = hy1,...,y|∆|i ∈ Y,
P|∆|
i=1 yi = S, to denote the number of sellers choosing different actions. Given the number of
buyers and sellers choosing different actions, ¯ x and ¯ y, we will know the bids and asks placed
in marketplace m. Then marketplace m’s expected utility is calculated as follows. Since mar-
ketplace m uses equilibrium matching to match traders, we ﬁrst sort the bids descendingly and
asks ascendingly in marketplace m, and then match high bids with low asks. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that there are T transactions in total in marketplace m, and in transaction t, we use TPt,
Λb
t and Λs
t to represent the transaction price, the buyer’s share of the trading surplus3, and the
seller’s share of the trading surplus respectively. These can be easily calculated. For exam-
ple, for a transaction made by buyer with bid db
t and seller with ask ds
t, the transaction price is
TPt = ds
t ∗km+db
t ∗(1−km), the buyer’s share of trading surplus is Λb
t = db
t −TPt = (db
t −ds
t)∗km,
and the seller’s share of trading surplus is Λs
t = TPt−ds
t = (db
t −ds
t)∗(1−km). The marketplace’s
utility is:
Um(pm, ¯ x, ¯ y) =
X
δb
i ∈∆:db
im,	
xi∗rm+
X
δs
i∈∆:ds
im,	
yi∗rm+
T X
t=1
(tm∗2+Λb
t ∗qm+Λs
t∗qm+TPt∗om∗2) (4.14)
where db
im is the bid placed in marketplace m through the action δb
i . In this equation, the former
two parts are proﬁts from charging registration fees to buyers and sellers respectively, and the
last part is the proﬁt from charging transaction fees, proﬁt fees and transaction price percentage
fees.
Now we have obtained the marketplace’s expected utility given the number of buyers and sellers
choosing different actions, ¯ x and ¯ y. Furthermore, the probability of ¯ x appearing is:
%b
m(¯ x) =
 
B
x1,..., x|∆|
!
∗
|∆| Y
i=1

ωb
i
xi
(4.15)
buyers and 5 sellers. By using this alternative approach, we reduce the possibilities of buyers’ action choices from
128 = 429981696 to 38 = 6561, and reduce the possibilities for sellers from 1210 = 61917364224 to 62 = 36.
3The trading surplus of a transaction is the difference of the matched bid and ask in this transaction.110 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
and the probability of ¯ y appearing is:
%s
m(¯ y) =
 
S
y1,...,y|∆|
!
∗
|∆| Y
i=1

ωs
i
yi
(4.16)
At this moment, we can get the marketplace’s expected utility given action distributions Ωb and
Ωs:
˜ Um
 
pm,Ωb,Ωs
=
X
¯ x∈X0
%b
m(¯ x) ∗
X
¯ y∈Y
%s
m(¯ y) ∗ Um(pm, ¯ x, ¯ y) (4.17)
Furthermore, given action distributions Ωb and Ωs, we can obtain the expected number of traders
choosing marketplace m, which we will use when analysing the effects of different types of fees
on making proﬁts and keeping traders (see Section 4.4.1). Speciﬁcally, given the number of
buyers and sellers choosing different actions, ¯ x and ¯ y, the number of traders in marketplace m
is:
Qm
 
¯ x, ¯ y

=
X
δb
i ∈∆:db
im,

xi +
X
δs
i∈∆:ds
im,

yi (4.18)
Then by considering all possible numbers of buyers and sellers choosing different actions, we
obtain the expected number of traders in marketplace m:
˜ Qm
 
Ωb,Ωs
=
X
¯ x∈X0
%b
m(¯ x) ∗
X
¯ y∈Y
%s
m(¯ y) ∗ Qm
 
¯ x, ¯ y

(4.19)
Note that the above computation of the expected utility and the expected number of traders in
the marketplace is also very heavy since we need to consider all possible numbers of traders
choosing different actions. However, we usually calculate these when traders adopt equilibrium
strategies, where only a few actions are chosen by traders (as we will show in the equilibrium
analysis, see Section 4.3). Therefore, this way of calculating the marketplace’s expected utility
and the expected number of traders is still feasible.
4.2 The Fictitious Play Algorithm
In this section we describe how we can use ﬁctitious play (FP) to approximate the equilibrium
market selection and bidding strategies for traders in our setting. As we discussed in Section
2.1.2, the standard FP algorithm (von Neumann and Brown, 1950; Brown, 1951) is not suitable
for analysing Bayesian games in which the player’s type is not known to the other players. To
address this, Rabinovich et al. (2009) provided a generalised ﬁctitious play algorithm to analyse
games with continuous types, a ﬁnite action space and incomplete information. However, in
Rabinovich et al. (2009), researchers only showed how to use this algorithm to analyse traders’
strategies in single-sided auctions. Building on this, in the following, we apply this algorithmChapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 111
to approximate traders’ equilibrium strategies in the much more complex environment with
multiple competing double auction marketplaces.
We now describe how to use the generalised FP algorithm in our setting. We ﬁrst describe how
to compute the best response actions against current FP beliefs. Then we describe how to update
FP beliefs according to the best response action distributions. Furthermore, we introduce how to
measure the convergence in our setting. Finally, we show the structure of the entire algorithm.
We ﬁrst describe how to compute the best response actions against current FP beliefs. Previ-
ously, we used Ωb and Ωs to denote the probability distributions of buyers’ and sellers’ actions
respectively. In the FP algorithm, we use them to represent FP beliefs about the buyers’and
sellers’ actions respectively. Then, given their beliefs, we compute the buyers’ and the sellers’
best response functions. In the following, we describe how to compute the buyers’ best response
function σb∗, where σb∗(θb,Ωb,Ωs) = argmaxδb∈∆ ˜ U(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs) is the best response action
of the buyer with type θb against FP beliefs Ωb and Ωs. The optimal utility that a buyer with
type θb can achieve is ˜ U∗(θb,Ωb,Ωs) = maxδb∈∆ ˜ U(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs). Considering the equations to
calculate the buyer’s expected utility in Section 4.1.2, we note that the buyer’s expected utility
˜ U(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs) is linear in its type θb for a given action. Given this, and given a ﬁnite number
of actions, the best response function is the upper envelope of a ﬁnite set of linear functions,
and thus is piecewise linear. An example with 4 actions, δb
1, δb
2, δb
3 and 
, is given in Figure
4.1. Given each action, the buyer’s expected utility with respect to its type is shown by line1,
line2, line3 and line
 (i.e. x-axis) respectively. The optimal utility achieved by the buyer is
represented by the set of thick piecewise linear segments. Each line segment corresponds to a
type interval, where the best response action of each type in this interval is the same. In this
ﬁgure, the best response action δb
i corresponds to the interval Ψb
i (i = 1,2,3) and the best re-
sponse action 
 corresponds to Ψb

. More generally, we can create the set of distinct intervals
Ib, which constitute the continuous type space of buyers, i.e.
S
Ψb∈Ib Ψb = [0,1], which satisfy
the following conditions:
• For any interval Ψb, if θb
1,θb
2 ∈ Ψb, then σb∗(θb
1,Ωb,Ωs) = σb∗(θb
2,Ωb,Ωs), i.e. types in
the same interval have the same best response action.
• For any distinct Ψb
1,Ψb
2 ∈ Ib, if θb
1 ∈ Ψb
1, θb
2 ∈ Ψb
2, then σb∗(θb
1,Ωb,Ωs) , σb∗(θb
2,Ωb,Ωs)
Now we have computed the best response function and also provided the set of intervals of types
corresponding to the best response actions. Based on this, we can calculate the best response
action distribution of buyers, which is done as follows. We know that given the buyers’ type
distribution function Fb and probability density function fb, the probability that the buyer has
the type in the interval Ψb is
R
Ψb f(x)dx, denoted by Fb(Ψb). When the best response action
corresponding to the interval Ψb
i is δb∗
i , the probability that the action δb∗
i is used by buyers is
ωb
i = Fb(Ψb
i ). By calculating the probability of each action being used, we obtain the current
best response action distribution of buyers, denoted by Ωb
br, which is against current FP beliefs.112 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
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FIGURE 4.1: Piecewise linear expected utility functions.
We can then update the FP beliefs of buyers’ actions, which is given by:
Ωb
τ+1 =
τ
τ + 1
∗ Ωb
τ +
1
τ + 1
∗ Ωb
br
where Ωb
τ+1 is the updated FP beliefs of the buyers’ actions for the next iteration round τ + 1,
Ωb
τ is the FP beliefs on the current iteration round τ, and Ωb
br is the probability distribution of
best response actions against FP beliefs Ωb
τ. This equation actually gives the FP beliefs on the
current round as the average of FP beliefs of all previous rounds. The computation of the sellers’
best response function and belief updates is analogous. In our setting, we need to update both
buyers’ and sellers’ FP beliefs simultaneously.
We now describe how to check the convergence of Nash equilibrium. Recall that in Section
2.1.2, weintroducedthatitisunrealistictoruntheﬁctitiousplayalgorithmforaninﬁnitenumber
ofiterationroundsfortheconvergence, andtherefore, itisoftentorunthealgorithmforalimited
number of rounds to derive the -Nash equilibrium. Recall that in the -Nash equilibrium, it is
not possible for any player to gain more than  in expected utility by unilaterally deviating from
its strategy (see Section 2.1). Therefore, in our setting, if the difference between the expected
utility of a buyer(seller) in current best response action distributions and its expected utility of
adopting best response action against current best response action distributions is not greater
than , the FP algorithm stops the iteration process, and the current best response actions with
corresponding type intervals constitute an -Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Speciﬁcally, in our work
we set  as  = 0.00001. Formally, the measure of convergence is given by:
| ˜ Ub(Ωb
br,Ωs
br) − ˜ Ub
br(Ωb
br,Ωs
br)| ≤  and | ˜ Us(Ωb
br,Ωs
br) − ˜ Us
br(Ωb
br,Ωs
br)| ≤ 
˜ Ub(Ωb
br,Ωs
br) is the expected utility of a buyer in the best response action distributions Ωb
br and
Ωs
br:
˜ Ub(Ωb
br,Ωs
br) =
Z 1
0
fb(x) ∗ ˜ Ub(x,δb,Ωb
br,Ωs
br)dx (4.20)
where δb is the action chosen by the buyer with type x (actually, it is the best response action of
this buyer against FP beliefs Ωb
τ and Ωs
τ, i.e. σb∗(x,Ωb
τ,Ωs
τ)). ˜ Ub
br(Ωb
br,Ωs
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of a buyer adopting the best response action against the current best response action distributions
Ωb
br and Ωs
br:
˜ Ub
br(Ωb
br,Ωs
br) =
Z 1
0
fb(x) ∗ ˜ Ub(x,δb∗,Ωb
br,Ωs
br)dx (4.21)
where δb∗ = σb∗(x,Ωb
br,Ωs
br) is the best response action of the buyer with type x against action
distributions Ωb
br and Ωs
br. The equations for sellers are analogous.
Finally, given the calculation of best response actions, the update of FP beliefs and the measure
of convergence, Figure 4.2 shows the structure of the entire FP algorithm.
Initial:
set iteration count τ = 0
set the initial beliefs Ωb
0 and Ωs
0
1. loop
Compute best response functions σb∗(θb,Ωb
τ,Ωs
τ) and σs∗(θs,Ωb
τ,Ωs
τ) against
the action distribution Ωb
τ and Ωs
τ;
Generate the interval Ψb
i corresponding to the best response action δb∗
i ;
Generate the interval Ψs
i corresponding to the best response action δs∗
i ;
3. Compute current best response action distribution of buyers and sellers:
Ωb
br = (ωb
1,...,ωb
|∆|), where ωb
i = Fb(Ψb
i ), i = 1,...,|∆|
Ωs
br = (ωs
1,...,ωs
|∆|), where ωs
i = Fs(Ψs
i), i = 1,...,|∆|
4. Update beliefs:
Ωb
τ+1 = τ
τ+1 ∗ Ωb
τ + 1
τ+1 ∗ Ωb
br
Ωs
τ+1 = τ
τ+1 ∗ Ωs
τ + 1
τ+1 ∗ Ωs
br
5. Measure the convergence, if (so), then
6. return the best response actions δb∗
i and δs∗
i with corresponding type intervals Ψb
i and Ψs
i
7. end if
8. Set τ = τ + 1
9. end loop
FIGURE 4.2: The ﬁctitious play algorithm.
4.3 EquilibriumAnalysisofMarketSelectionandBiddingStrategy
In this section, we will use the FP algorithm to analyse the traders’ equilibrium strategies. We
ﬁrst analyse traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies in a single marketplace. This will help us to
understand the analysis in the more complex setting with multiple competing marketplaces. In
thefollowing, forillustrativepurposes, weshowourresultsinaspeciﬁcsettingwith5buyersand
5 sellers, and 11 allowable bids(asks) unless mentioned otherwise4. Furthermore, we assume
that the small cost for traders to enter a marketplace is set to ε = 0.0001. For the transaction
price, we assume that km = 0.5, i.e. the transaction price is set in the middle of the matched
bid and ask, which means that the marketplaces have no bias in favour of buyers or sellers when
4We also tried other settings. However, we still obtained the similar results.114 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
allocating surpluses. Finally, we assume that both buyers and sellers’ types are independently
drawn from a uniform distribution.
4.3.1 A Single Marketplace
As we introduced in Section 2.3.2.1, many heuristic bidding strategies for double auctions have
been proposed in the literature (GD, ZIP, ZI-C and so on). However, they all fail to answer what
exactly traders should bid in equilibrium. This is important since how traders bid in a given
marketplace will affect their expected utilities and this, in turn, their selection of marketplaces.
Furthermore, market fees may also affect traders’ bidding strategies. Therefore, in this section,
we ﬁrst analyse the equilibrium bidding strategies of traders in a single marketplace without
fees, and then analyse the strategies when the marketplace charges different types of fees.
We ﬁrst consider the case where the marketplace charges no fees to traders. We use the FP
algorithm to analyse the traders’ equilibrium strategies, and ﬁnd that starting from different
initial beliefs of traders’ actions, all traders who choose the marketplace eventually converge to
the same pure Nash equilibrium bidding strategy, which is shown in Figure 4.3. The gray line
represents buyers’ bids in equilibrium and the black line represents sellers’ asks in equilibrium.
From this ﬁgure, we can see what traders will bid corresponding to their types in equilibrium.
We ﬁnd that buyers shade their bids by decreasing their bids, and sellers shade their asks by
increasing their asks, in order to keep proﬁts. We also ﬁnd that when buyers’ types are lower
than a certain point and sellers’ types are higher than a certain point, they will not enter the
marketplace because of the small cost ε.
Now we consider how different types of fees (registration, transaction, proﬁt and transaction
price percentage fees) can affect the traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies. First we consider
that the marketplace charges a registration fee. For example, when we assume that it charges
0.1 registration fee, then the traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies are shown in Figure 4.4. We
can see that, compared to the case where no fees are charged (see Figure 4.3), there exists a
bigger range of types of traders not choosing this marketplace. This is because the registration
fee causes negative proﬁts for them. In addition, we further ﬁnd that when registration fees are
charged, both buyers and sellers will shade less (compared to Figure 4.3) in order to increase
the probability of being matched.
After analysing the traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies in the marketplace charging a reg-
istration fee, we now consider the case that the marketplace charges a transaction fee. As an
example, we assume that the marketplace charges 0.1 transaction fee. The results are shown in
Figure 4.5. We ﬁnd that compared to the case that no fees are charged (see Figure 4.3), there
exists a bigger range of types of traders not choosing the marketplace. However, compared to
the case that a registration fee is charged (see Figure 4.4), more traders are willing to submit
shouts since the payment only happens after they make transactions.
Then we consider the case that the marketplace charges a proﬁt fee. As an example, we assumeChapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 115
FIGURE 4.3: Equilibrium strategies with the same number of buyers and
sellers.
FIGURE 4.4: Equilibrium strategies of traders with registration fees.
that the marketplace charges 50% proﬁt fee. The results are shown in Figure 4.6. We still ﬁnd
that compared to the case that no fees are charged (see Figure 4.3), there exists a bigger range of
types of traders not choosing the marketplace. However, compared to the case that a transaction
fee is charged (see Figure 4.4), more traders are willing to submit shouts. This is because the
proﬁt fee is a percentage fee charged on the observed trading surplus (which is the difference
of the matched bid and ask), and when traders shade their shouts, a proﬁt fee will not cause
negative proﬁts for them. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that charging proﬁt fees causes traders to shade
their shouts more. This is because when a proﬁt fee is charged, the marketplace extracts proﬁts
from traders according to their trading surpluses, which are the differences of matched bids
and asks. Then in order to keep more proﬁts, the traders try to reduce the trading surpluses by
lowering bids or increasing asks.
Now we consider the case that the marketplace charges a transaction price percentage fee. As
an example, we assume that the marketplace charges 20% transaction price percentage fee. The
results are shown in Figure 4.7. We ﬁnd that compared to the case where no fees are charged
(see Figure 4.3), there exists a bigger range of types of traders not choosing the marketplace.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that in this case, in contrast to the above cases, the behaviour of buyers and
sellers are not symmetric. Sellers shade their asks less than buyers. For example, when types
of sellers are within [0.1, 0.19], sellers submit asks 0.3 (i.e. the shading is from 0.11 to 0.2),
compared to that when types of buyers are within [0.81 0.9], buyers submit bids 0.6 (i.e. the
shading is from 0.21 to 0.3). The reason is as follows. The transaction price is at the middle of
the shouts of the matched buyer and seller. When a transaction price percentage fee is charged,
in order to reduce the payment, buyers will shade to decrease their bids in order to reduce the
transaction prices. However, for sellers, on one hand, they want to shade more by increasing116 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
FIGURE 4.5: Equilibrium strategies of traders with transaction fees.
FIGURE 4.6: Equilibrium strategies of traders with proﬁt fees.
their asks; on the other hand, they want to shade less to decrease transaction prices to reduce the
payment. They have to make a trade-off. That’s why in this case, buyers shade their bids more
in contrast to that sellers shade their asks less.
Note that in the above analysis, we choose a speciﬁc value for each type of fees. We also try
other values of fees. We ﬁnd that higher fees will cause more traders not to participate in the
marketplace. However, for the bidding behaviour of traders still participating in the market-
place, the conclusions obtained in the above analysis are still applied. For example, when a
higher registration fee is charged, traders have to shade their shouts less in order to increase the
probability of being matched; when a higher transaction price percentage fee is charged, sellers
will shade much less than buyers; and when a higher proﬁt fee is charged, traders will shade
their shouts more in order to keep more proﬁts.
In the above, we considered the case with the same number of buyers and sellers. In often hap-
pens that there are different numbers of buyers and sellers in the marketplace. In this situation,
buyers and sellers have different market power, which will affect their bidding strategies. We
now analyse this issue in our setting. For example, we consider the case that there are 8 buyers
and 5 sellers and no fees are charged to traders. Then the traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies
are shown in Figure 4.8. Compared to Figure 4.3, as can be expected, we see that because there
are more buyers than sellers, the competition between buyers is more severe, and thus they have
to raise their bids. For sellers, since they have a higher probability of being matched, they raise
their asks. At this moment, sellers have more market power, and can therefore extract more
proﬁt from their transactions.Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 117
FIGURE 4.7: Equilibrium strategies of traders with transaction price per-
centage fees.
FIGURE 4.8: Equilibrium strategies with 8 buyers and 5 sellers.
4.3.2 Competing Marketplaces
In the above, we analysed how traders submit shouts in a single marketplace in equilibrium. This
analysis will provide foundations for analysing how traders submit shouts in the environment
with competing marketplaces. As we will show, in the competing marketplace context, when
traders converge to one marketplace, their bidding strategies are exactly the same as that in a
single marketplace environment. Based on this, we now analyse traders’ equilibrium market
selection and bidding strategies in the competing marketplace environment with two compet-
ing marketplaces5. As mentioned in Section 1.2, there are three types of trading environments:
single-home, multi-home and hybrid trading environments. Furthermore, when multiple goods
are traded by the same trader across multiple marketplaces, goods can be either independent,
substitutable or complementary. In the single-home trading environment, since we assume that
only one unit of the good is traded by each trader, we do not need to consider the good prop-
erties. However, in the multi-home and hybrid trading environments where multiple goods can
be traded by each trader, we need to consider these different good properties. In the following,
we ﬁrst analyse traders’ equilibrium strategies in the single-home trading environment. Then
we extend the analysis to the multi-home and hybrid trading environments with different good
properties.
5We also considered the case with more than two competing marketplaces. However, the results are similar to the
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FIGURE 4.9: Equilibrium strategies of traders with different types of fees.
4.3.2.1 Single-Home Trading
We now consider traders’ equilibrium strategies in the single-home trading environment, where
traders can only enter one marketplace at a time. In this environment, traders can only trade
one unit of good, and thus its value on the good is its type, i.e. αb
1 = αs
1 = 1. In order to
understand the effects of fees on the traders’ strategies, we ﬁrst consider the basic setting where
the marketplaces charge no fees to traders, before we consider fees. By using FP, we ﬁnd that,
except for some traders (buyers with low types and sellers with high types) choosing no mar-
ketplace, all other traders eventually converge to one marketplace in equilibrium. Since the two
marketplaces are identical at this moment, the traders will eventually converge to marketplace
1 or 2 with the same probability. In addition, we ﬁnd that the traders’ bidding strategies in the
converged marketplace are the same as the case with a single marketplace (i.e. Figure 4.3).
We now consider what happens to the traders’ behaviour when they are charged fees. First we
consider the cases where both marketplaces charge the same type of fees (registration, trans-
action, proﬁt or transaction price percentage). We run simulations with many possible initial
beliefs, and ﬁnd that traders eventually converge to one marketplace, which depends on initial
FP beliefs and market fees. Since traders converge to one marketplace, the equilibrium bidding
strategies are the same as the case with a single marketplace (i.e. Section 4.3.1).
Now we consider the cases where marketplaces charge different types of fees. Firstly, we con-
sider that marketplace 1 charges a proﬁt fee and marketplace 2 charges a registration fee. For
example, we consider that marketplace 1 charges a relatively high proﬁt fee of 90%, and mar-
ketplace 2 charges a registration fee of 0.1. If initial beliefs are uniform (i.e. all actions are
equally probable), we ﬁnd that all traders eventually converge to marketplace 1, and the equi-
librium bidding strategies are shown in Figure 4.9. The reason for the traders converging to
marketplace 1, which seems more expensive, is as follows. When a high proﬁt fee is charged,
the traders shade their shouts more to keep proﬁts (as can be seen in Figure 4.9). However,
shading has no effect in the case of registration fees. Therefore, traders prefer the marketplace
charging proﬁt fees compared to registration fees. Furthermore, we ran simulations with many
other fee combinations and different initial beliefs, and always ﬁnd that all traders converge to
one marketplace. This is different from the analysis in Section 3.2.3.2, where when different
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traders converge to the marketplace charging a registration fee, and poor traders converge to
the marketplace charging a proﬁt fee). The reason is that traders can hide their actual trading
surpluses by shading their shouts, and thus even when a high proﬁt fee is charged, traders still
can keep proﬁts. As per the analysis in Chapter 3, the positive size effect has a larger impact
than the negative size effect, and all traders will converge to one marketplace.
Furthermore, we consider the cases of other combinations of different types of fees, such as
marketplace 1 charging a proﬁt fee, and marketplace 2 charging a transaction price percentage
fee, or marketplace 1 charging a registration fee, and marketplace 2 charging a transaction price
percentage fee, and so on. However, we still ﬁnd that traders eventually converge to one mar-
ketplace, and the equilibrium bidding strategies for traders is the same as the case of a single
marketplace.
4.3.2.2 Multi-Home Trading
So far we have analysed equilibrium strategies for traders in the single-home trading environ-
ment. Now we extend the analysis to the multi-home trading environment where both buyers
and sellers can enter multiple marketplaces at a time. In such an environment, multiple goods
may be traded by each trader. Therefore we now need to consider the properties of goods since
these will affect traders’ strategies. Speciﬁcally, here we assume that for sellers, all goods are
independent (i.e. when obtaining one unit of good, αs
1 = 1, and when obtaining two units of
goods, αs
2 = 2) since a seller’s value on sold goods is usually equal to the sum of its value on
each individual sold good (i.e. additive). Thus in the multi-home trading environment, sellers
are willing to enter any marketplace which can provide positive proﬁts for them. For buyers,
goods can be either independent, substitutable or complementary. In the following, we will
analyse traders’ equilibrium strategies by considering different good properties for buyers. Fur-
thermore, since we focus on the effects of different trading environments and good properties
on the traders’ equilibrium strategies, we assume that both competing marketplaces charge no
fees (the analysis of the cases with fees is similar).
Independent Goods:
In the multi-home trading environment with independent goods, buyers’ values on goods are
additive, i.e. the good property coefﬁcient αb
1 = 1, αb
2 = 2. In such an environment, buyers
and sellers will enter both marketplaces when their expected utilities (equal to expected values
minus the expected payments) in both marketplaces are positive. The analysis of their bidding
strategies is then identical to the single marketplace setting (i.e. Section 4.3.1).
Substitutable Goods:
Now we analyse the equilibrium strategies for traders in the multi-home trading environment
with substitutable goods for buyers (i.e. αb
1 = 1, and 1 ≤ αb
2 < 2). Here we consider perfectly
substitutable goods, i.e. αb
1 = 1 and αb
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wins one good, it obtains value θb and pays for the good; and when this buyer wins two goods,
it only obtains value θb, but pays for two goods. When both 5 buyers and 5 sellers are multi-
home trading, totally, there are 2 ∗ 122 = 288 different actions that traders can take, in contrast
to 2 ∗ 12 ∗ 2 = 48 different actions in the single-home environment. Since sellers are multi-
home trading with independent goods and both competing marketplaces are identical, in order
to reduce the action space, we simplify the analysis by assuming that 5 sellers only submit asks
in marketplace 1, and another 5 sellers only submit asks in marketplace 2. Now the total number
of actions for traders is reduced from 288 to 122 + 24 = 168. The results is shown in Figure
4.10(a) and 4.10(b). We can ﬁnd that, in this setting, the same buyer (or buyers with the same
type) will bid differently in two marketplaces. The reason is as follows. Because of perfectly
substitutable goods, buyers would like to purchase and pay for only one good. Therefore, buyers
with high types will choose to only bid in one marketplace, and will bid slightly higher than the
buyers with lower types. By so doing, they can win one good successfully and only pay for
this good. For example, when the types are within [0.928, 1.0], they bid 0.6 in marketplace
1. However, for buyers with lower types, in order to make transactions, they have to bid in
both marketplaces in order to increase the probability of being matched. In this situation, they
may make transactions in both marketplaces, which means that they have to pay for two goods.
Then in order to make transactions and decrease the payment, they may choose to bid slightly
higher in one marketplace, and lower in another one. That’s why buyers bid differently in two
marketplaces. Furthermore, we note that some of these buyers with lower types will bid higher
in one marketplace, and the other will bid higher in another one. This is because all buyers
bidding higher in one marketplace results in ﬁerce competition between them, and thus some
of them will choose to bid higher in another one in order to increase the probability of being
matched.
Complementary Goods:
Now we analyse the setting with complementary goods for buyers. We ﬁrst consider the case
with perfectly complementary goods, i.e. αb
1 = 0 and αb
2 = 1. This means that when the buyer
with type θb wins one good, it obtains zero value, but needs to pay for the good; and when
this buyer wins two goods, it obtains value θb, and pays for two goods. Furthermore, in or-
der to reduce the action space, we still assume that 5 sellers only submit asks in marketplace
1, and another 5 sellers only submit asks in marketplace 2. The results are shown in Figures
4.11(a) and 4.11(b). We can see that with perfectly complementary goods, only buyers with
high types will bid in marketplaces, and they will bid in both marketplaces (if they only bid in
one marketplace and make a transaction, they need to pay for the good, but obtain zero value
because of the perfectly complementary goods). Buyers with relatively low types will not enter
marketplaces since even though they bid in both marketplaces, because of their low types and
perfectly complementary goods, they are more likely to obtain negative proﬁts. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that buyers shade their bids more. For example, when buyers’ types are within [0.825,
1.0], buyers will bid 0.5 in both marketplaces. The reason is as follows. With perfectly comple-
mentary goods, the buyer with type θb purchasing two goods, only obtains value θb, but has toChapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 121
(a) Buyers
(b) Sellers
FIGURE 4.10: Equilibrium strategies of traders in the multi-home trading environment with
perfectly substitutable goods for buyers.
pay for two goods. In order to keep proﬁts, buyers should shade their bids more. Furthermore,
we extend this analysis to another case that αb
1 = 1 and αb
2 = 4, i.e. when the buyer with type θb
wins one good, it obtains value θb and pays for the good; and when this buyer wins two goods, it
obtains value 4 ∗ θb (four times of its type), but only pays for two goods. The results are shown
in Figures 4.12(a) and 4.12(b). Compared to the perfectly complementary goods, we ﬁnd that
buyers still bid in two marketplaces. However, they will not shade their bids. Instead, buyers
increase their bids in order to increase the probability of being matched. Particularly, when
buyers’ types are within [0.408,1.0], buyers bid 1.0 in each marketplace. This is because when
purchasing two complementary goods, buyers’ values for goods are very high (i.e. 4 ∗ θb). In
this situation, in terms of obtaining more utility, it is better for the buyers to increase the bids to
increase the probability of making transactions than to shade bids. Furthermore, this will cause
a bigger range of sellers to ask since when buyers increase their bids, sellers with high types still
can make transactions.
4.3.2.3 Hybrid Trading
Now we analyse the equilibrium strategies for traders in the hybrid trading environment where
one side can only participate in one marketplace, and the other side can participate in multiple
marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, we consider the case that buyers can participate in multiple market-
places and sellers can only participate in one marketplace at the same time. Note that the results
of the opposite case where sellers can choose multiple marketplaces and buyers can only choose
one are similar.122 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
(a) Buyers
(b) Sellers
FIGURE 4.11: Equilibrium strategies of traders in the multi-home trading environment with
perfectly complementary goods for buyers.
(a) Buyers
(b) Sellers
FIGURE 4.12: Equilibrium strategies of traders in the multi-home trading environment with
complementary goods for buyers.Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 123
(a) Buyers
(b) Sellers
FIGURE 4.13: Equilibrium strategies of traders in the hybrid trading environment with inde-
pendent goods for buyers.
Independent Goods:
We now analyse the case with independent goods for buyers (i.e. αb
1 = 1, αb
2 = 2). The
results are shown in Figures 4.13(a) and 4.13(b). From these ﬁgures, we can see that sellers
eventually split and place asks in different marketplaces in equilibrium. In this situation, two
competing marketplaces co-exist. This co-existence is caused by the negative size effect. In
more detail, the sellers have to compete with each other in order to be matched with buyers
and make transactions, and thus they prefer those marketplaces with fewer sellers. Because
identical buyers stay in both competing marketplaces in this case, then the attractiveness from
the buyers to the sellers (i.e. the positive size effect) in both marketplaces is the same. At this
moment, the internal competition between the sellers (i.e. the negative size effect) takes effect,
which drives the sellers to stay in different marketplaces. Another interesting phenomenon is
that compared to the traders’ equilibrium strategies in Figure 4.3, we ﬁnd that buyers raise their
bids and sellers also raise their asks in this case. The reason is as follows. As the sellers are split
in two marketplaces, then in each marketplace the number of sellers is less than the number of
buyers. Thus as per our previous analysis (see Figure 4.8), sellers have more market power than
buyers, and so buyers raise their bids in order to be matched and sellers raise their asks to extract
more proﬁts from transactions.
Substitutable Goods:
Now we analyse the cases when goods are substitutable for buyers. We ﬁrst analyse the case
with perfectly substitutable goods (i.e. αb
1 = 1, αb
2 = 1). In this case, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium
traderswillonlychooseonemarketplace, andthebiddingstrategiesarethesameasthecasewith124 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
(a) Buyers
(b) Sellers
FIGURE 4.14: Equilibrium strategies of traders in the hybrid trading environment with substi-
tutable goods for buyers.
a single marketplace charging no fees (see Figure 4.3). The reason is as follows. When goods
are perfectly substitutable for buyers, buying more than one good does not mean obtaining more
value for buyers, but does mean paying more. Thus buyers will prefer to bid in one marketplace.
This will cause sellers to converge to that marketplace. Furthermore, since in the above analysis
when buyers’ expected values on goods are additive, we ﬁnd that buyers will bid in multiple
marketplaces. Thus we hypothesise that as buyers’ values on multiple goods increase, they will
begintoprefertobidinmultiplemarketplaces, andsellersmaysplitintwomarketplacesbecause
of the negative size effect. This is conﬁrmed by running experiments with different values of
αb
2. We ﬁnd that when αb
2 ≥ 1.8, buyers will begin to bid in two marketplaces. Speciﬁcally,
when αb
2 = 1.8, the traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies are shown in Figures 4.14(a) and
4.14(b), from which we can see that buyers bid in two marketplaces and sellers distribute in two
marketplaces.
Complementary Goods:
Finally, we analyse the case with complementary goods for buyers in the hybrid trading environ-
ment. Firstly, we consider perfectly complementary goods for buyers (i.e. αb
1 = 0 and αb
2 = 1).
When there are 5 buyers and 5 sellers, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium, no traders will choose any
marketplace. The reason is as follows. With perfectly complementary goods, buyers have to
bid in both marketplaces and need to shade their bids more in order to make positive proﬁts.
However, since sellers are single-home trading, sellers have more market power when they split
in two marketplaces, and buyers have to increase their bids in order to increase the probability
of being matched. Now buyers cannot shade at a high degree. When they purchase two goods,Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 125
(a) Buyers
(b) Sellers
FIGURE 4.15: Equilibrium strategies of traders in the hybrid trading environment with per-
fectly complementary goods for buyers.
their values of the two goods are equal to their types, but have to pay for two goods. In this
situation, buyers may have negative proﬁts. Now buyers will not choose any marketplaces, and
then sellers will also not choose any marketplaces. If we increase the number of sellers (to de-
crease their market power) and decrease the number of buyers (to increase their market power),
for example, we consider 2 buyers and 10 sellers, the results are shown in Figures 4.15(a) and
4.15(b). We can see that buyers will bid in two marketplaces, and shade more to keep proﬁts.
Because of the negative size effects, sellers will distribute in two marketplaces. Furthermore, in
the case with 5 buyers and 5 sellers, we change the property coefﬁcient as αb
1 = 1 and αb
2 = 4
(i.e. when purchasing two goods, the buyer with type θb can obtain value 4∗θb). The results are
shown in Figures 4.16(a) and 4.16(b). We can see that buyers will bid in two marketplaces, and
instead of shading, they increase their bids to increase the probabilities of making transactions,
since when making transactions in both marketplaces, they will obtain very high values (i.e. four
times their types). For sellers, since buyers’ bids in both marketplaces are identical, each type
of seller has equal probability to ask in each marketplace. For example, when sellers’ types are
within [0, 0.257], sellers can ask 0.6 in marketplace 1 or ask 0.6 in marketplace 2. Furthermore,
since buyers increase their bids, sellers increase their asks to make more proﬁts.
4.4 Equilibrium Analysis of Charging Strategies
In Section 4.3.1, we analysed the traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies in a single marketplace
with different types of fees charged. From the analysis, we ﬁnd that when registration fees or126 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
(a) Buyers
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FIGURE 4.16: Equilibrium strategies of traders in the hybrid trading environment with com-
plementary goods for buyers.
transaction fees are charged, traders may choose to leave the marketplace; when proﬁt fees are
charged, traders will shade their shouts more, and high proﬁt fees cannot guarantee high market
proﬁts; and when transaction price percentage fees are charged, compared to buyers, sellers
shade less in order to reduce transaction prices, and thus reduce the payments. From all of this,
we can see that it is not obvious which type of fees is the most effective in terms of maximising
market proﬁts and keeping traders. Given this, in the following, we ﬁrst analyse this problem in
a single marketplace, which will help us ﬁnd the most effective type of fees that we can use in
the competition. Then we will analyse how competing marketplaces set fees in equilibrium.
4.4.1 A Single Marketplace
As before, we analyse a single marketplace with 5 buyers and 5 sellers, but now consider the
proﬁt made by the marketplace when different types of fees are charged. We start by analysing
registration fees. Speciﬁcally, we discretize registration fees from 0 to 1 with step size 0.01.
For each registration fee, we use FP to analyse the equilibrium strategies for traders. Then
according to the traders’ action distributions in equilibrium, we use Equations 4.17 and 4.19 to
calculate the expected proﬁt for the marketplace and the expected number of traders entering the
marketplace respectively. By so doing, we know for each level of registration fee, how much
proﬁt the marketplace can extract from traders and how many traders will enter the marketplace.
These are shown in Figure 4.4.1, where Figure 4.17(a) shows the expected market proﬁt and
Figure 4.17(b) shows the expected number of traders for different registration fees. From these
results, we can see that, as the marketplace increases its registration fee, the market proﬁt ﬁrstChapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 127
(a) Market proﬁt (b) Number of traders
FIGURE 4.17: Market proﬁt and number of traders in a single marketplace charging a registra-
tion fee.
(a) Market proﬁt (b) Number of traders
FIGURE 4.18: Market proﬁt and number of traders in a single marketplace charging a transac-
tion fee.
increases, and when the marketplace charges a 0.14 registration fee, it obtains the maximum
marketproﬁt. FromFigure 4.17(b), we canseehow thisrelates tothe numberof traders. Initially
when the marketplace charges no fees to traders, it contains around 7 traders (the small cost ε
causes the other 3 traders not to choose the marketplace). When the marketplace increases the
registration fee, we can see that traders leave the marketplace quickly. When the registration
fee increases to around 0.19, no traders will stay in this marketplace. As traders leave the
marketplace, from Figure 4.17(a), we can see that the market proﬁt also decreases, and going to
0 when the registration fee increases to around 0.19.
Now we analyse how the marketplace sets its transaction fee to make a proﬁt. The results are
shown in Figures 4.18(a) and 4.18(b). From this, we can see that the marketplace obtains the
maximum proﬁt when it charges a transaction fee of around 0.22. When the transaction fee
reaches 0.6, no traders stay in the marketplace.
Furthermore, we analyse how the marketplace sets its proﬁt fee to make a proﬁt. The results
are shown in Figures 4.19(a) and 4.19(b). We can see that as the proﬁt fee increases, the mar-
ket proﬁt ﬁrst increases to the maximum point, and then decreases. Furthermore, from Figure128 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
(a) Market proﬁt (b) Number of traders
FIGURE 4.19: Market proﬁt and number of traders in a single marketplace charging a proﬁt
fee.
(a) Market proﬁt (b) Number of traders
FIGURE 4.20: Market proﬁt and number of traders in a single marketplace charging a transac-
tion price percentage fee.
4.19(b), we can see that the marketplace can keep traders at a good level (around 6 traders
staying in the marketplace even when it charges 100% proﬁt fee), since traders can shade their
shouts to hide actual trading surpluses, and thus reduce payments.
Finally, we analyse what happens when the marketplace charges a transaction price percentage
fee. From Figure 4.20(a) we ﬁnd that when the marketplace charges a 43% transaction price
percentage fee, the maximum market proﬁt is reached. Furthermore, from Figure 4.20(b), we
can see that traders still choose the marketplace even though a high transaction price percentage
fee is charged.
Now we compare the effects of different types of fees on obtaining market proﬁts and keeping
traders. From Figures 4.19(a) and 4.19(b), we can see that when a proﬁt fee is charged to
traders, the marketplace is more likely to keep traders. However, even though a very high proﬁt
fee is charged, the extracted proﬁt is still low. From Figures 4.17(a), 4.18(a) and 4.20(a), we
can see that the effects of the registration, transaction and transaction price percentage fees
on obtaining market proﬁt are similar, In more detail, when this marketplace charges a 0.14
registration fee, or a 0.22 transaction fee, or a 43% transaction price percentage fee, it will obtainChapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 129
the maximum proﬁt which is around 0.44. However, at this point, only around 3.1 traders stay
in the marketplace when a registration fee is charged, around 3.6 traders stay when a transaction
fee is charged, and around 4.6 traders stay when a transaction price percentage fee is charged.
Given this, we can conclude that the marketplace charging a transaction price percentage fee
is the best on obtaining market proﬁts and keeping traders. Furthermore, we can see that a
transaction fee is better than a registration fee. Thus in the design of a charging strategy for the
CAT competition (in Section 5.4), we will let the marketplace charge a transaction fee, instead
of charging a registration fee. Note that although the transaction price percentage fee is the most
effective, it is not allowed in the CAT competition.
4.4.2 Competing Marketplaces
In the above, we analysed how a single marketplace sets its fee to maximise proﬁt while keeping
traders. However, this analysis did not consider the competition between multiple marketplaces.
Given this, in this section, we will analyse how marketplaces set fees in equilibrium when com-
peting with each other. We analyse this in the single-home trading setting since such a trading
mechanism results in a highly competitive environment (where marketplaces have to compete
ﬁercely with each other to attract traders), and we are interested in analysing how both market-
places set fees in such an environment6. In the following analysis, we discretize fees from 0 to
1 with step size 0.1. Then we obtain different fee systems. For each fee system, we calculate
the marketplaces’ expected utilities. In more detail, for a given fee system, we repeat the exper-
iments by trying different initial ﬁctitious play beliefs7. For each set of initial FP beliefs, we run
the ﬁctitious play algorithm and obtain the traders’ equilibrium strategies. Given the equilibrium
strategies of the traders, by using Equation 4.17, we then calculate the marketplaces’ expected
utilities for the given fee system when starting from the particular FP beliefs. When repeating
the experiments from different initial FP beliefs, we obtain the average utilities of marketplaces
for this given fee system. We repeat this process for different fee systems, and obtain a payoff
table, from which we can analyse the equilibrium fee system for marketplaces. In the following,
we analyse how marketplaces set fees in three different cases: both marketplaces only charge
registration fees; only charge proﬁt fees; and one marketplace charges a registration fee, and
the other charges a proﬁt fee (which is the same as what we did in Chapter 3). The analysis of
marketplaces charging other types of fees is similar.
In the ﬁrst case where both marketplaces only charge registration fees, there are 121 different
fee systems. The payoff table are shown in Table 4.1, from which, by using Gambit, we can see
that both marketplaces charging 0.1 registration fee constitutes a NEQ fee system.
In the second case, we assume that both marketplaces only charge proﬁt fees. The payoff table
is shown in Table 4.2. Compared to the analysis using EGT in Section 3.3.1, we ﬁnd that
6This analysis can also be easily extended to multi-home trading and hybrid trading environments.
7Similar to the analysis in Section 3.2.3, we also ﬁnd the existence of a lock-in region, i.e. when traders start from
some FP beliefs, where they initially prefer some marketplace, then even though this marketplace charges a higher
fee, traders may eventually converge to this marketplace in equilibrium.130 Chapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types
in equilibrium, both marketplaces charge higher proﬁt fees. This is because traders can now
shade their shouts, whereas before we assumed that traders had a truth-telling bidding strategy.
Speciﬁcally, both marketplaces charging a 60% proﬁt fee with probability 0.067, a 70% proﬁt
fee with probability 0.593 and a 80% proﬁt fee with probability 0.340 constitutes a mixed Nash
equilibrium.
Now we consider the case that different types of fees are charged to traders. We consider that
marketplace 1 charges a registration fee and marketplace 2 charges a proﬁt fee. The payoff table
is shown in Table 4.3. From this, we ﬁnd that marketplace 1 charging a 0.1 registration fee, and
marketplace 2 charging a 90% proﬁt fee constitutes a NEQ fee system.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we used a FP algorithm to analyse how traders select marketplaces and submit
shouts, and how competing marketplaces set fees in equilibrium in a setting with continuous
trader types. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst analysed traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies in a single
marketplace, where we found that traders shade their shouts in equilibrium. We further analysed
the effect of different types of market fees on the traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies and
observed that registration fees cause a bigger range of traders to not choose the marketplace;
proﬁt fees cause traders to shade their shouts more; and transaction price percentage fees cause
sellers to shade relatively less than buyers’ shading. Then we analysed the traders’ equilibrium
market selection strategies and bidding strategies in the single-home trading environment with
multiple marketplaces. We found that all traders eventually converge to bid in one marketplace.
Competing marketplaces cannot co-exist even though they charge different types of fees. This
is contrary to the conclusion in Chapter 3 that competing marketplaces may co-exist when one
marketplace charges a registration fee and another charges a proﬁt fee. This difference occurs
because in this setting, traders can reduce the payment incurred by proﬁt fees by shading their
shouts to hide their actual trading surpluses, and then traders will prefer the marketplace charg-
ing a proﬁt fee. Furthermore, we extended the analysis by considering multi-home and hybrid
trading environments and different good properties. We then analysed the effects of different
types of fees on obtaining market proﬁts and keeping traders in a single marketplace environ-
ment, and showed that the transaction price percentage fee is the most effective in terms of
making proﬁts and at the same time keeping traders for the marketplace. Finally, we analysed
how competing marketplaces set fees in equilibrium, and found that since traders can shade their
shouts, the marketplace will charge a high proﬁt fee.
This work addresses our research challenges of analysing equilibrium market selection and bid-
ding strategies for traders and equilibrium charging strategies for marketplaces (i.e. research
challenges 1, 2 and 4, see Section 1.2). Speciﬁcally, this is the ﬁrst work that derives the equi-
librium bidding strategies for traders in double auctions and analyses the effect of market fees
on these strategies. This analysis is insightful and can be used to guide the design of a chargingChapter 4 Analysis of Competing Marketplaces with Continuous Trader Types 131
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strategy. For example, we found that when charging a proﬁt fee, the marketplace may not be
able to obtain a good level of proﬁt even though a very high proﬁt fee is charged, since traders
will shade their shouts more. However, the marketplace can keep the number of traders at a
good level. Another example is that charging a transaction fee is better than a registration fee to
make proﬁts and keep traders. In the following chapter of designing a competing marketplace,
we will use these insights to design an effective charging policy.Chapter 5
Designing a Competing Double
Auction Marketplace
So far, we have analysed the equilibrium charging strategies for marketplaces and obtained
a number of insights into individual and systemwide behaviour in a competing marketplace
situation (see Chapters 3 and 4). However, as noted in Section 1.1, in addition to the design
of a charging policy, we also need to design effective market policies that cover issues such as
timing, matching, pricing and shout accepting policies. Now as we discussed in Section 2.5.1,
there exist many such policies for competing marketplaces. However, we do not know which
of them will perform well when marketplaces using different policies compete with each other.
Therefore, we need to analyse how the different polices affect the performance of competing
marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, inthischapter, wewillconductanexperimentalanalysisonthisissue
in the context of the CAT competition since this provides an international benchmark for this
problem. However, before we can do this, we ﬁrst need to know how traders select marketplaces
and submit shouts in this context since the traders’ strategies will affect the effectiveness of the
different market policies. Then, based on the analysis of traders’ strategies, we can undertake
an experimental analysis of market policies in different environments where different bidding
strategies are adopted. By doing so, we obtain further insights about which policy is effective
in guaranteeing traders’ proﬁts and thus attracting traders and how traders’ bidding strategies
affect the effectiveness of market policies. We then use these insights to design market policies
for the CAT competition. This is in addition to the insights from Chapters 3 and 4 to designing
a charging policy for the CAT competition.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.1, we describe how traders select mar-
ketplaces and submit shouts in the CAT competition. Then, in Section 5.2, we analyse how
different market polices affect the performance of competing marketplaces when different bid-
ding strategies are adopted. Through this analysis, we obtain several insights. In Section 5.3,
we use the obtained insights to design market policies for the CAT competition. In Section 5.4,
we design a charging policy and evaluate it in the CAT competition context. In Section 5.5, we
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describe the competition result of 2010 when our competing marketplace adopted the market
policies and charging policy designed in this chapter. Finally, we summarise in Section 5.6.
5.1 Traders’ Strategies in the CAT Competition
In this section, we describe how traders behave in the CAT competition (these are provided by
the operators of the competition, not the competition entrants, see Cai et al. 2009; Niu et al.
2009). Firstly, we describe how traders select marketplaces. Then we analyse how traders
submit shouts when using different bidding strategies.
5.1.1 Selecting Marketplaces
Firstly, we describe how traders select marketplaces in the CAT competition. In particular, the
-greedy exploration strategy is adopted by all traders. This uses the parameter  to adjust the
balance between exploration of searching for the most proﬁtable marketplace and exploitation of
selecting what they believe is the most proﬁtable marketplace (see Section 2.5.1). The parameter
 is from 0 to 1, and in the CAT competition, it is usually set as 0.1. In more detail, in the
beginning of the competition, traders select each marketplace with equal probability. Then
in the following days, according to their historical knowledge, they select the most proﬁtable
marketplace with probability 1 − , and explore other marketplaces with probability . Niu
et al. (2007) experimentally analysed the traders’ choices of marketplaces when they adopt this
strategy in the speciﬁc context of the CAT competition. They showed that through exploration,
traders will eventually locate the marketplace which is the most proﬁtable. Therefore, since
tradersareabletosearchforthehighlyefﬁcientmarketplacewhenadoptingthismarketselection
strategy, competing marketplaces should provide effective market policies to maximise traders’
proﬁts to attract them. Note that this strategy is similar to our equilibrium analysis of traders’
marketselectionstrategiesinChapter3, wherewefoundthatwhenweintroducedrandomisation
for traders’ market selection (i.e. traders randomly select marketplaces with some probability to
explore other marketplaces), traders can explore to locate the cheapest marketplace (see Section
3.2.3.3).
5.1.2 Submitting Shouts
In the CAT competition, four heuristic bidding strategies are adopted: ZI-C, RE, GD and ZIP
(see Section 2.3.2.1). In this section, we analyse how traders submit shouts when using these
different bidding strategies. We ﬁrst need to set up the marketplace where traders submit shouts.
Speciﬁcally, we adopt the same market policies as those that were used in Chapters 3 and 4
(as we will show in Section 5.2, these market policies are highly efﬁcient). In more detail, we
adopt the round clearing policy (see Section 2.3.2.2), equilibrium matching policy (see SectionChapter 5 Designing a Competing Double Auction Marketplace 137
(a) ZI-C Strategy (b) RE Strategy
(c) ZIP Strategy (d) GD Strategy
FIGURE 5.1: Bids, asks and transaction prices in the marketplace with traders using different
bidding strategies.
2.3.2.2) and a k-pricing policy with k = 0.5 (see Section 2.3.2.2). For the shout accepting policy,
we use the quote-beating accepting policy since this policy is widely used in real exchanges (like
the NYSE, see also Section 2.3.2.2 for a detailed description of this policy). After setting up
the marketplace, we now consider the composition of traders in the experiments. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that there are 60 buyers and 60 sellers in this marketplace. Their private values
are independently drawn from a uniform distribution between 50 and 150, and each trader is
allowed to buy or sell up to 3 identical goods each day. Each experiment lasts for 100 days
with 10 round per day and 1 second per round1. In the trading round, traders will submit shouts
(and may improve their shouts in order to get matched). We run four experiments with all
traders adopting ZI-C, RE, ZIP and GD strategies respectively based on the JCAT platform2,
and randomly choose one trading day for which we plot the bids, asks and transaction prices of
all successful transactions in that day (the results are similar in other days).
1These setups are similar to those in the CAT competition.
2Here we use version 0.11 of JCAT platform. All the following experiments are also based on this version.138 Chapter 5 Designing a Competing Double Auction Marketplace
The experimental results are given in Figure 5.1 where we show the bids, asks and transaction
prices of traders. From Figures 5.1(a) and 5.1(b), we can see that, although ZI-C and RE traders’
transaction prices are close to the equilibrium price, which is 100, their shouts are typically far
away from the equilibrium price (i.e. they shade their shouts very little). On the other hand,
from Figures 5.1(c) and 5.1(d), we can see that the shouts from the ZIP and GD traders are
concentrated in the area close to the equilibrium price (i.e. they shade their shouts a lot), and
their transaction prices do indeed converge to the equilibrium price. The reason is as follows.
Intra-marginal ZIP traders try to ﬁnd shouts that provide high proﬁts and also try to remain
competitive in the marketplace. Through learning, ZIP traders ﬁnd that, when their bids (asks)
are a little higher (lower) than the equilibrium price, their proﬁts are high and they are still
sufﬁciently competitive to make transactions. Thus ZIP traders’ shouts are concentrated in the
area close to the equilibrium price. For traders using GD strategy, recall that in Section 2.3.2.1,
we introduced the fact that the submitted shout depends on the belief of the shout accepted by
the marketplace and the hidden proﬁt (which is the difference between the private value and the
shout). When their shouts are close to the equilibrium price, the hidden proﬁts are high, and
as shouts close to the equilibrium price are accepted by the marketplace, traders’ beliefs about
shoutacceptancewithintheareaclosetotheequilibriumpriceincrease. Eventually, moretraders
will submit shouts close to the equilibrium price because of the high probability of acceptance
and high hidden proﬁts. We also note that in the last rounds, no transactions take place in
the marketplace with trader adopting GD or ZIP strategy. This is because the more intelligent
GD and ZIP traders can sell or buy items more quickly than ZI-C and RE traders. Moreover,
we also run experiments by considering fees charged to traders. However, we ﬁnd that fees
cannot affect traders’ shouts signiﬁcantly when they use these heuristic bidding strategies, and
the experimental results are similar to those in Figure 5.1. Furthermore, given this analysis, we
further classify the four bidding strategies into two categories: the ﬁrst is made of the ZI-C and
RE strategies, where shouts generated by them are distributed over a wide range; the second
consists of the ZIP and GD strategies, where their shouts are concentrated in the area close
to the equilibrium price. This classiﬁcation is useful because it enables us to group the four
bidding strategies and can help us analyse the experiments of how each market policy affects
the performance of competing marketplaces in the following section.
5.2 Experimental Analysis of Market Policies
In this section, we experimentally analyse how different market policies affect the performance
of competing marketplaces in the context of the CAT competition. Speciﬁcally, we use alloca-
tive efﬁciency, market share, transaction success rate (TSR) and the number of transactions as
metrics to measure marketplaces’ performance. The reasons of adopting these metrics are as
follows. Allocative efﬁciency is commonly used in literature to measure the performance of
marketplaces; both market share and TSR are used as metrics in the CAT competition; and the
number of transactions is important for us to determine whether to charge fees or not. ThisChapter 5 Designing a Competing Double Auction Marketplace 139
analysis will provide us insights for designing effective market polices in the CAT competition.
Furthermore, recall that in Chapters 3 and 4, we conducted our equilibrium analysis by assuming
that marketplaces adopt the speciﬁc market policies (i.e. round clearing, equilibrium matching
and k-pricing policy with k = 0.5). Through the experimental analysis in this section, we will
know whether these speciﬁc market policies perform well, and if so, then our assumption is
reasonable. Note that since the effectiveness of market policies are affected by the traders’ bid-
ding strategies, we need to conduct the analysis in different environments with different bidding
strategies. In the following, we ﬁrst describe the different market policies that we will analyse.
Then we run experiments in different environments to analyse how different market policies
affect the marketplaces’ performance.
5.2.1 Market Policies
In this section, we introduce the market policies that we want to analyse. For the timing policy,
we consider continuous clearing (CC) and round clearing (RC) (see Section 2.3.2.2). For the
matching policy, we consider the equilibrium matching policy (ME) which matches buyers with
high bids with sellers with low asks, i.e. match intra-marginal buyers with intra-marginal sellers,
and the maximising volume matching policy (MV)3 which matches buyers with high bids with
sellers with high asks if they can be matched, i.e. match intra-marginal buyers with extra-
marginal sellers (see Section 2.3.2.2). For the pricing policy, existing research has shown that
the k-pricing policy with k=0.5 is efﬁcient both in terms of the allocative efﬁciency and the
traders’ efﬁciency (see Section 2.3.2.2), and thus we use this pricing policy in our analysis.
In terms of the shout accepting policy, we mainly consider the two alternatives that have been
most widely used in the CAT Competition: the quote-beating accepting policy (AQ) and the
estimated equilibrium accepting policy (AE) (see Section 2.3.2.2). Note that in addition to these
market policies, other policies do exist. However, from the CAT competition, we ﬁnd that lots
of policies designed by entrants are built from these speciﬁc policies. Thus here we focus on
these market policies.
In addition to the above matching policies, we also design a speciﬁc one. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3.2.2, there are some disadvantages with both ME and MV. The former aims to maximise
traders’ proﬁts. Thus, intra-marginal traders are happy with this matching policy since they can
usually earn high expected proﬁts. However, it is difﬁcult for marginal traders, who submit
shouts close to the equilibrium price, to make transactions. The latter aims to maximise the
number of transactions, and thus beneﬁts TSR. In this case, marginal traders are easily matched,
and thus they favour this policy. However, using this policy, intra-marginal traders cannot be
guaranteed to trade with other intra-marginal traders to obtain high expected proﬁt. Thus their
proﬁt is lost and it causes a decrease in allocative efﬁciency. Thus in order to strike a balance
between maximising proﬁts and maximising the number of transactions, we developed the fol-
lowing matching policy which combines the advantages of both ME and MV. At the end of each
3We had to implement the MV matching policy since it was not actually implemented in the JCAT platform.140 Chapter 5 Designing a Competing Double Auction Marketplace
Marketplace Policies Timing Policy Matching Policy Shout Accepting Policy
CC-ME-AQ continuous clearing equilibrium matching quote-beating accepting
CC-MV-AQ continuous clearing maximising volume quote-beating accepting
RC-ME-AQ round clearing equilibrium matching quote-beating accepting
RC-MV-AQ round clearing maximising volume quote-beating accepting
RC-MEV-AQ round clearing combined matching of ME and MV quote-beating accepting
CC-ME-AE continuous clearing equilibrium matching estimated equilibrium accepting
CC-MV-AE continuous clearing maximising volume estimated equilibrium accepting
RC-ME-AE round clearing equilibrium matching estimated equilibrium accepting
RC-MV-AE round clearing maximising volume estimated equilibrium accepting
RC-MEV-AE round clearing combined matching of ME and MV estimated equilibrium accepting
TABLE 5.1: The different marketplace policies in the experimental setup.
round, the marketplace is ﬁrstly cleared using ME, which guarantees that intra-marginal traders
obtain high expected proﬁts. Then, when the bid-ask spread4 is less than a certain threshold, i.e.
most remaining traders are marginal traders with low expected proﬁts, the marketplace is cleared
using MV. By so doing, it generates high proﬁts for most traders, similar to ME, and increases
the number of transaction, similar to MV. In the following, this matching policy is referred to
as MEV. Note that we only adopt the MEV matching policy when the marketplace is cleared at
the end of each round, i.e. in combination with the RC policy. When the marketplace is cleared
continuously, both ME and MV cannot guarantee high proﬁts of intra-marginal traders. Thus
MEV cannot offer any advantage in this case, and we will not combine CC with MEV in our
experiments.
From the above we therefore consider two types of timing policies, three types of matching
policies, two types of shout accepting policies and one type of pricing policy. Given this,
we consider 10 different marketplaces with different combinations of policies, namely: CC-
ME-AQ, CC-ME-AE, CC-MV-AQ, CC-MV-AE, RC-ME-AQ, RC-ME-AE, RC-MEV-AQ, RC-
MEV-AE, RC-MV-AQ, RC-MV-AE. See Table 5.1 for an overview of these policies. In what
follows, we analyse the above policies in the competing marketplace context with different bid-
dingstrategies. We also wanttoknowwhether themarketplaceadoptingRC-ME(i.e. the market
policiesweusedinChapters3and4)canperformwellwhencompetingwithmarketplacesusing
other combinations.
5.2.2 Experiments with Homogeneous Bidding Strategy
We ﬁrst run experiments in the environments where all traders use the same bidding strategy
(i.e. homogeneous bidding strategy). From this, we will know how each bidding strategy affects
the effectiveness of market policies, and this will provide the foundation for understanding the
further analysis where different traders may use different bidding strategies (i.e. heterogeneous
bidding strategies). The experimental setup is as follows. Each experiment runs for 100 days
with 10 rounds per day and 1 second per round. There are 200 buyers and 200 sellers. The
private values of all traders are independently drawn from a uniform distribution between 50 and
4This is the difference between the outstanding bid and the outstanding ask in the marketplace, see Section 2.3.2.1
for the deﬁnition of outstanding bid/ask.Chapter 5 Designing a Competing Double Auction Marketplace 141
150, and each trader is allowed to buy or sell up to 3 goods per day. All traders use either ZI-C,
RE, GD or ZIP strategy. Furthermore, in the experiments, there are 10 competing marketplaces
and each one of them adopts one of the policy combinations speciﬁed in Table 5.1. In total, we
run 4 experiments with all traders adopting ZI-C, RE, GD and ZIP strategies respectively, and
each experiment is repeated 40 times.
The results with all traders only adopting ZI-C strategy are shown in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.2.
For clarity, we do not add error bars in the ﬁgures, and instead we calculate 95% conﬁdence
intervals of the average values of each metric in tables. The average values are taken over 100
days and 40 runs. The conﬁdence intervals show the error of the average daily result over the
40 runs. For example, in Table 5.2, 91.171±1.211 means the 95% conﬁdence interval range
of allocative efﬁciency of the marketplace adopting CC-ME-AE, where 91.171 − 1.211 is the
lower 95% conﬁdence limit, 91.171 + 1.211 is the upper 95% conﬁdence limit and 91.171 is
the mean of scores of 100 days and 40 runs. Here we can see that the marketplaces using RC-
ME-AQ and RC-MEV-AQ, signiﬁcantly outperform other marketplaces in terms of allocative
efﬁciency (see Figure 5.2(a) and Table 5.2), and also in terms of market share (see Figure 5.2(b)
and Table 5.2) and the number of transactions completed (see Figure 5.2(d) and Table 5.2). The
reason for this is that ZI-C traders submit shouts from a uniform distribution, and, as a result,
their shouts are not close to the equilibrium price (as shown in Figure 5.1(a)). Consequently,
when the marketplace maximises the number of transactions, as the marketplaces using CC-ME,
CC-MV and RC-MV do, the intra-marginal buyers cannot be guaranteed to trade with the intra-
marginal sellers, and thus lose potential proﬁts. These intra-marginal traders will then choose
other more proﬁtable marketplaces. Furthermore, AE provides a tighter restriction on accepting
shouts, and thus, the TSR of marketplaces adopting AE is signiﬁcantly better than a marketplace
using AQ (see Figure 5.2(c) and Table 5.2). However, because of the imprecise estimation
of the equilibrium price, this accepting policy drives some traders to leave the marketplace,
which decreases slightly the number of transactions. From this experiment, we ﬁnd that the
marketplacewithRC-ME-AQperformswellinallthesemetrics. Inaddition, fromFigure5.2(b),
we note that in the ﬁrst few trading days, the market shares of marketplaces using CC-ME-AQ,
CC-MV-AQ and RC-MV-AQ are high. This is because some extra-marginal traders may be able
to “steal” transactions, and thus prefer these marketplaces. However, because intra-marginal
traders’ proﬁts are harmed, they leave these marketplaces and this leads to a decreased market
share.
The second experiment uses RE traders. These experimental results are shown in Figure 5.3
and Table 5.3. Now, recall from Section 5.1.2 that shouts of RE traders are also far away from
the equilibrium price, and therefore, as we expect, the experimental results are similar to those
experiments with ZI-C traders and the explanation is the same as above.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 and Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the experimental results with ZIP and GD
traders respectively. As before, since shouts of both ZIP and GD traders are close to the equi-
librium price, these two sets of experiments show the same pattern. From this, we can see
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5.5(a), and Tables 5.4 and 5.5), and the number of transactions is very low (see Figures 5.4(d)
and 5.5(d) and Tables 5.4 and 5.5). The reasons for this are as follows. As discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1.2, ZIP and GD traders’ shouts are close to the equilibrium price, and so transaction
prices converge to the equilibrium price. However, the estimated equilibrium price is not al-
ways precise enough. A small error of estimated equilibrium price may cause the rejection of
many shouts, and then traders will choose to leave the marketplace5. Therefore, a marketplace
using AE performs worse than a marketplace using AQ. From the experimental results, we can
also determine that the market share in the marketplaces adopting CC-ME-AQ or RC-MV-AQ
is slightly higher than the marketplaces using RC-ME-AQ (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5, the result is
statistically signiﬁcant). This is different from the experiments with the ZI-C and RE traders.
The reason for this discrepancy is that ZIP traders’ shouts are close to the equilibrium prices, and
thus the marketplace cannot distinguish between intra-marginal and marginal traders. Therefore,
the advantage of RC-ME in maximising traders’ proﬁts is weakened. As a result, in this case,
the performance of RC-ME is similar to RC-MV and CC-ME in terms of the traders’ proﬁts.
However, in marketplaces using RC-MV and CC-ME, marginal traders can easily be matched,
and some extra-marginal traders may also trade. Therefore, marginal traders and some extra-
marginal traders prefer marketplaces using RC-MV and CC-ME. However, because the number
of marginal traders and extra-marginal traders that steal transactions is small, and they are dis-
tributed in marketplaces using RC-MV and CC-ME respectively, CC-ME-AQ and RC-MV-AQ
just slightly outperform RC-ME-AQ in terms of market share.
Now we have run experiments where all traders use the same bidding strategy. In summary,
because of the similarity of traders using ZI-C and RE strategies, the experimental results us-
ing these traders are similar. Similarly, we ﬁnd that experimental results with ZIP traders are
similar to those with GD traders. When traders’ shouts are far away from the equilibrium price,
the timing and matching policies mainly determine the marketplace’s performance. Conversely,
when traders’ shouts are close to the equilibrium price, the shout accepting policy mainly deter-
mines the marketplace’s performance. Speciﬁcally, from our experimental results, we can see
that the performance of marketplaces using AE in the environments with GD and ZIP strategies,
and marketplaces using CC-ME, CC-MV, RC-MV in the environments with ZI-C and the RE
strategies is very poor. We also ﬁnd that the marketplace using RC-ME-AQ performs well in all
cases, even though they might be outperformed slightly by other marketplaces in some particular
environments.
5.2.3 Experiments with Heterogenous Bidding Strategies
In the above, we analysed how different market policies affect the competing marketplaces’
performance in the environments where all traders use the homogeneous bidding strategy. How-
5In the above experiments with ZI-C or RE traders, because traders’ shouts are generally far away from the
equilibrium price, the error of the estimated equilibrium price has little impact on the number of rejected shouts in
a marketplace using AE. This is why the AE has small impact in such a marketplace, in contrast to the experiments
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(a) Allocative efﬁciency (b) Market share
(c) TSR (d) Number of transactions
FIGURE 5.2: Scores of marketplaces with ZI-C strategy.
Marketplace Alloc. Eff. % Market Share TSR Num. of Transactions
CC-ME-AE 91.171±1.211 0.087±0.003 0.949±0.014 21.638±1.923
CC-ME-AQ 87.900±0.753 0.110±0.004 0.806±0.016 20.018±1.578
CC-MV-AE 90.140±2.002 0.085±0.004 0.939±0.020 20.382±1.956
CC-MV-AQ 87.193±0.856 0.109±0.005 0.803±0.015 20.342±2.122
RC-ME-AE 95.951±0.360 0.096±0.005 0.965±0.003 30.228±2.886
RC-ME-AQ 96.970±0.335 0.113±0.006 0.911±0.012 34.089±3.005
RC-MEV-AE 95.521±0.665 0.093±0.005 0.959±0.007 27.685±2.818
RC-MEV-AQ 97.118±0.175 0.110±0.005 0.913±0.007 33.312±2.422
RC-MV-AE 91.324±1.650 0.088±0.003 0.950±0.017 22.579±1.837
RC-MV-AQ 89.623±0.730 0.109±0.004 0.852±0.013 23.007±1.950
TABLE 5.2: Average daily results and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals of marketplaces
with ZI-C strategy. The average values are taken over 100 days and 40 runs. The conﬁdence
intervals show the error of the average daily result over the 40 runs. Bold face indicates that
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(a) Allocative efﬁciency (b) Market share
(c) TSR (d) Number of transactions
FIGURE 5.3: Scores of marketplaces with RE strategy.
Marketplace Alloc. Eff. % Market Share TSR Num. of Transactions
CC-ME-AE 80.024±1.532 0.080±0.003 0.928±0.012 16.632±1.608
CC-ME-AQ 80.456±0.663 0.106±0.004 0.788±0.010 18.126±1.178
CC-MV-AE 85.573±0.616 0.092±0.004 0.956±0.003 22.994±1.805
CC-MV-AQ 80.008±0.859 0.112±0.003 0.786±0.011 18.832±1.021
RC-ME-AE 88.88±0.332 0.084±0.004 0.950±0.004 22.714±1.956
RC-ME-AQ 90.770±0.237 0.117±0.004 0.910±0.007 34.228±2.429
RC-MEV-AE 88.858±0.670 0.092±0.003 0.950±0.009 26.124±2.372
RC-MEV-AQ 90.910±0.296 0.117±0.004 0.907±0.008 34.122±2.838
RC-MV-AE 83.743±1.595 0.086±0.004 0.933±0.015 20.92±2.264
RC-MV-AQ 84.804±0.565 0.115±0.002 0.858±0.004 24.098±0.827
TABLE 5.3: Average daily results and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals of marketplaces
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(a) Allocative efﬁciency (b) Market share
(c) TSR (d) Number of transactions
FIGURE 5.4: Scores of marketplaces with ZIP strategy.
Marketplace Alloc. Eff. % Market Share TSR Num. of Transactions
CC-ME-AE 67.538±5.030 0.066±0.003 0.715±0.050 11.286±1.830
CC-ME-AQ 96.952±0.108 0.149±0.003 0.917±0.001 50.758±1.275
CC-MV-AE 70.935±4.663 0.061±0.003 0.738±0.047 10.8±1.621
CC-MV-AQ 96.627±0.196 0.126±0.005 0.894±0.006 38.666±2.802
RC-ME-AE 75.14±2.597 0.067±0.002 0.761±0.025 11.192±0.683
RC-ME-AQ 97.873±0.058 0.130±0.004 0.928±0.003 44.352±2.033
RC-MEV-AE 72.224±2.814 0.066±0.002 0.741±0.028 12.616±1.146
RC-MEV-AQ 97.897±0.105 0.136±0.003 0.936±0.002 48.57±1.86
RC-MV-AE 61.998±5.574 0.058±0.004 0.639±0.052 7.806±1.733
RC-MV-AQ 97.882±0.123 0.142±0.004 0.931±0.003 47.992±1.633
TABLE 5.4: Average daily results and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals of marketplaces
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(a) Allocative efﬁciency (b) Market share
(c) TSR (d) Number of transactions
FIGURE 5.5: Scores of marketplaces with GD strategy.
Marketplace Alloc. Eff. % Market Share TSR Num. of Transactions
CC-ME-AE 63.248±0.860 0.064±0.001 0.717±0.016 7.03±0.407
CC-ME-AQ 95.686±0.315 0.142±0.004 0.876±0.007 39.966±2.146
CC-MV-AE 53.789±4.835 0.064±0.002 0.633±0.058 5.676±0.834
CC-MV-AQ 95.834±0.170 0.153±0.004 0.886±0.003 44.518±1.531
RC-ME-AE 59.056±9.185 0.066±0.003 0.642±0.099 6.772±1.168
RC-ME-AQ 96.830±0.096 0.125±0.002 0.923±0.001 42.64±0.482
RC-MEV-AE 63.216±4.352 0.064±0.002 0.692±0.040 6.94±0.797
RC-MEV-AQ 96.808±0.156 0.135±0.003 0.923±0.004 48.662±2.327
RC-MV-AE 72.220±2.261 0.065±0.001 0.778±0.024 8.07±0.686
RC-MV-AQ 97.272±0.112 0.123±0.003 0.921±0.003 42.452±1.953
TABLE 5.5: Average daily results and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals of marketplaces
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ever, it often happens that traders use heterogeneous bidding strategies in the CAT competition.
Therefore, in this section, we analyse how different market policies affect the performance of
marketplaces in the environments where traders use heterogeneous bidding strategies. Speciﬁ-
cally, we will analyse different environments where a big proportion of traders adopts a certain
bidding strategy. We also want to analyse the environment where the same number of traders
adopts each bidding strategy. In more detail, we consider ﬁve different environments where
traders adopting heterogenous bidding strategies: (i) 300 ZI-C, 40 RE, 40 GD and 40 ZIP
traders; (ii) 40 ZI-C, 300 RE, 40 GD and 40 ZIP traders; (iii) 40 ZI-C, 40 RE, 300 GD and
40 ZIP traders; (iv) 40 ZI-C, 40 RE, 40 GD and 300 ZIP traders; (v) 100 ZI-C, 100 RE, 100
GD and 100 ZIP traders. In all of these environments, the number of buyers using a particular
bidding strategy is equal to the number of sellers6.
The result when using environment (i) are shown in Figure 5.6 and Table 5.6. From these
experiments, we can see that the marketplace adopting RC-ME-AQ still performs well (see
allocative efﬁciency in Figure 5.6(a) and Table 5.6 and the number of transactions in Figure
5.6(d) and Table 5.6). We also note that the performance of marketplaces adopting RC-ME-AE
improves compared with the experimental results with traders adopting the ZI-C strategy (see
Figure 5.2 and Table 5.2). The reason is as follows. Shouts from ZIP and GD traders in this
environment generate transaction prices closer to the equilibrium price than those with traders
adopting ZI-C strategy. This means that the marketplace using AE can estimate the equilibrium
price more precisely. Because shouts of ZI-C traders are far away from the equilibrium price,
as previously discussed, the estimation error of the equilibrium price has little impact on the
number of rejected shouts. Thus the marketplace adopting RC-ME-AE improves within this
environment. Then we run experiments with environment (ii) where most traders use the RE
strategy, we can see the experimental results shown in Figure 5.7 and Table 5.7 are similar to
those with environment (i). The marketplace adopting RC-ME-AQ still performs well.
Our third set of experiments uses environment (iii) and the results are shown in Figure 5.8 and
Table 5.8. We can see that the marketplace adopting RC-ME-AQ still performs well. Further-
more, similar to previous experiments with all traders adopting the GD strategy, we can see that
the marketplaces using AE performs badly because of the rejection of many shouts. We also ﬁnd
that compared with the experimental results with trader only adopting GD strategy (see Figure
5.5 and Table 5.5), the marketplaces adopting AE improve their performance slightly in this
environment with heterogenous strategies. The main reason for this is that in this environment,
the beliefs of GD traders on shouts which are a bit further away from the equilibrium price in-
crease because of the wide range of ZI-C and RE traders’ shouts (see the calculation of belief
function in equation 2.8 and 2.9 of Section 2.3.2.1), and thus the shouts of the GD traders in
this environment become a little wider than those of all traders adopting the GD strategy only.
This means that the number of rejected shouts when adopting AE decreases, and thus the perfor-
mance of the marketplaces using AE improves slightly. It also explains why in this environment
the marketplaces adopting CC-ME, CC-MV and RC-MV perform slightly worse than they do
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with all traders adopting the GD strategy, since now, intra-marginal traders are more likely to
be matched with marginal traders, and thus choose to leave these marketplaces. Furthermore,
the experimental results with environment (iv) where most traders use ZIP strategy are shown in
Figure 5.9 and Table 5.9. We ﬁnd that they are similar to those with the environment (iii) where
most traders use GD strategy.
Finally, the experimental results with environment (v) are shown in Figure 5.10 and Table 5.10.
In this environment, the numbers of traders using each of the ZI-C, RE, ZIP and GD strate-
gies are equal. Again we can see that the marketplace using RC-ME-AQ performs well in the
allocative efﬁciency (see Figure 5.10(a)) and in the number of transactions (see Figure 5.10(d)).
Now we have analysed how different market policies affect the allocative efﬁciency, market
share, TSR and the number of transactions in different environments. This analysis provides us
insights of designing market policies for the CAT competition. In the following section, we will
describe our design of market policies in detail.
5.3 Market Policy Design
In this section, we use insights from the above analysis to design market policies for the CAT
competition. In the experimental analysis, we found that the marketplace adopting RC-ME-AQ
always performs well in different environments. Therefore, our design of market policies will
be built from RC-ME-AQ. In the following, we discuss how to design each market policy in
detail.
For the timing policy, in Section 5.2, we found that when traders use the GD or the ZIP strategy,
the continuous clearing policy also performs well. Actually, from Section 2.3.2.1, we can see
that GD traders need to use information about transactions to improve their beliefs of shout
acceptance. Therefore, in our timing policy, in the ﬁrst round of each trading day, when a
new shout is accepted by the marketplace, and this shout is close to the equilibrium price, the
marketplace will immediately clear the shout (if it can be matched). However, if this shout is far
away from the equilibrium price, it will be cleared at the end of the round. By so doing, on one
hand, we can guarantee proﬁts for buyers with high limit prices and sellers with low cost prices
(since these traders are more likely to be matched at the end of round); on the other hand, the
immediately matched bids and asks will provide useful information for traders to improve their
shouts. After the ﬁrst round, traders will have information to improve their shouts. Then in the
remaining rounds, our marketplace will use round clearing policy in order to guarantee traders’
proﬁts.
For the matching policy, as we discussed in Section 5.2, the ME matching policy can maximise
traders’ proﬁts, and thus it can attract traders to improve the market share. However, it is difﬁcult
for marginal traders to make transactions. The MV matching can maximise the number of tran-Chapter 5 Designing a Competing Double Auction Marketplace 149
(a) Allocative efﬁciency (b) Market share
(c) TSR (d) Number of transactions
FIGURE 5.6: Scores of marketplaces in the environment where most traders use ZI-C strategy.
Marketplace Alloc. Eff. % Market Share TSR Num. of Transactions
CC-ME-AE 84.582±3.179 0.076±0.003 0.902±0.031 16.742±1.849
CC-ME-AQ 90.069±0.725 0.120±0.003 0.8280±0.008 23.938±0.620
CC-MV-AE 86.438±0.521 0.077±0.002 0.932±0.005 15.78±1.030
CC-MV-AQ 87.489±1.212 0.103±0.005 0.798±0.018 20.268±1.977
RC-ME-AE 94.730±0.355 0.112±0.002 0.972±0.002 37.504±1.231
RC-ME-AQ 96.067±0.101 0.118±0.003 0.918±0.006 37.842±2.689
RC-MEV-AE 92.423±1.097 0.092±0.005 0.951±0.009 26.962±2.883
RC-MEV-AQ 95.886±0.317 0.115±0.004 0.921±0.005 37.572±2.398
RC-MV-AE 89.655±0.514 0.082±0.002 0.950±0.003 20.054±0.599
RC-MV-AQ 91.945±0.469 0.106±0.002 0.861±0.010 25.018±1.543
TABLE 5.6: Average daily results and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals of marketplaces
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(a) Allocative efﬁciency (b) Market share
(c) TSR (d) Number of transactions
FIGURE 5.7: Scores of marketplaces in the environment where most traders use RE strategy.
Marketplace Alloc. Eff. % Market Share TSR Num. of Transactions
CC-ME-AE 83.809±1.227 0.086±0.003 0.940±0.010 20.69±1.649
CC-ME-AQ 85.304±1.344 0.115±0.003 0.824±0.013 25.972±1.853
CC-MV-AE 84.906±1.144 0.084±0.002 0.939±0.008 20.136±1.695
CC-MV-AQ 85.695±1.784 0.115±0.004 0.807±0.018 25.218±2.199
RC-ME-AE 89.560±0.259 0.097±0.003 0.961±0.003 20.584±2.228
RC-ME-AQ 91.334±0.247 0.112±0.003 0.911±0.004 31.104±1.461
RC-MEV-AE 90.007±0.562 0.101±0.002 0.965±0.001 30.976±1.607
RC-MEV-AQ 91.071±0.421 0.103±0.004 0.901±0.005 31.316±1.496
RC-MV-AE 84.845±2.084 0.087±0.005 0.928±0.016 21.264±3.382
RC-MV-AQ 86.962±0.881 0.102±0.002 0.844±0.006 19.018±0.922
TABLE 5.7: Average daily results and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals of marketplaces
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(a) Allocative efﬁciency (b) Market share
(c) TSR (d) Number of transactions
FIGURE 5.8: Scores of marketplaces in the environment where most traders use GD strategy.
Marketplace Alloc. Eff. % Market Share TSR Num. of Transactions
CC-ME-AE 89.279±1.498 0.095±0.007 0.924±0.011 25.488±4.013
CC-ME-AQ 94.504±0.472 0.120±0.005 0.854±0.008 32.176±2.538
CC-MV-AE 87.649±1.192 0.089±0.004 0.914±0.008 20.472±1.786
CC-MV-AQ 95.002±0.542 0.127±0.007 0.857±0.014 35.552±4.048
RC-ME-AE 72.519±4.413 0.070±0.005 0.758±0.042 11.204±2.344
RC-ME-AQ 95.261±0.291 0.124±0.004 0.912±0.007 41.518±2.669
RC-MEV-AE 88.064±0.887 0.076±0.002 0.910±0.008 17.126±1.125
RC-MEV-AQ 94.589±0.266 0.114±0.004 0.900±0.005 35.866±2.386
RC-MV-AE 81.88±3.610 0.079±0.005 0.853±0.035 16.606±2.700
RC-MV-AQ 94.863±0.456 0.107±0.004 0.877±0.006 29.396±2.045
TABLE 5.8: Average daily results and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals of marketplaces
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(a) Allocative efﬁciency (b) Market share
(c) TSR (d) Number of transactions
FIGURE 5.9: Scores of marketplaces in the environment where most traders use ZIP strategy.
Marketplace Alloc. Eff. % Market Share TSR Num. of Transactions
CC-ME-AE 77.695±5.344 0.072±0.006 0.810±0.053 18.216±3.582
CC-ME-AQ 95.776±0.183 0.123±0.004 0.885±0.008 35.894±2.35
CC-MV-AE 78.430±4.720 0.083±0.006 0.828±0.041 20.836±3.522
CC-MV-AQ 94.902±0.616 0.122±0.005 0.879±0.009 35.696±3.415
RC-ME-AE 75.682±6.141 0.073±0.005 0.779±0.061 17.802±3.600
RC-ME-AQ 95.761±0.064 0.124±0.005 0.929±0.004 43.818±2.839
RC-MEV-AE 90.904±0.830 0.086±0.004 0.929±0.006 24.898±2.409
RC-MEV-AQ 95.512±0.409 0.119±0.003 0.927±0.002 41.156±1.147
RC-MV-AE 79.402±4.219 0.083±0.004 0.834±0.045 20.08±2.618
RC-MV-AQ 96.537±0.239 0.116±0.003 0.908±0.009 37.088±2.639
TABLE 5.9: Average daily results and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals of marketplaces
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(a) Allocative efﬁciency (b) Market share
(c) TSR (d) Number of transactions
FIGURE 5.10: Scores of marketplaces in the environment where the numbers of traders using
different bidding strategies are equal.
Marketplace Alloc. Eff. % Market Share TSR Num. of Transactions
CC-ME-AE 83.840±4.131 0.081±0.004 0.881±0.040 20.462±2.773
CC-ME-AQ 93.498±0.420 0.119±0.006 0.869±0.005 30.294±1.796
CC-MV-AE 87.651±3.332 0.101±0.008 0.914±0.032 29.728±4.086
CC-MV-AQ 91.645±0.551 0.117±0.004 0.835±0.014 26.16±2.730
RC-ME-AE 85.079±3.079 0.079±0.004 0.897±0.028 18.206±2.296
RC-ME-AQ 93.649±0.232 0.117±0.002 0.916±0.005 31.29±1.250
RC-MEV-AE 91.311±0.298 0.095±0.003 0.959±0.003 34.130±1.409
RC-MEV-AQ 93.331±0.288 0.098±0.004 0.888±0.007 35.62±1.178
RC-MV-AE 85.143±2.352 0.075±0.001 0.896±0.027 16.996±1.175
RC-MV-AQ 93.047±0.164 0.118±0.002 0.881±0.005 29.248±1.070
TABLE 5.10: Average daily results and corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals of market-
places in the environment where the numbers of traders using different bidding strategies are
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sactions, and thus can improve TSR. However, since it fails to guarantee traders’ proﬁts, some
traders may leave the marketplace using the MV matching policy. Therefore, in our competing
marketplace, we adopt the MEV matching policy, which is a trade-off between the ME and the
MV matching policy. In more detail, in the MEV matching policy, when shouts are far away
from the equilibrium price, we use the ME matching policy to maximise traders’ proﬁts, and
when traders’ shouts are within an area close to the equilibrium price, we use the MV matching
policy to maximise the number of transactions. By so doing, this policy can guarantee traders’
proﬁts and increase the number of transactions, and from Section 5.2 we actually have seen that
this policy performs well.
Now we consider the shout accepting policy. This determines the shouts accepted by the market-
place, and thus signiﬁcantly affects the TSR. If we provide tight restrictions on accepting shouts,
our TSR will be improved. However, some intra-marginal traders’ shouts will not be accepted
by the marketplace, and they will leave the marketplace. Therefore we need to make a trade-off
between these. In Section 5.2, we have shown that the quote-beating accepting policy provides
a loose restriction on accepting shouts, and the equilibrium accepting policy provides a tight
restriction on accepting shouts. Therefore, in our marketplace, when the number of transactions
decreases, we will switch to the quote-beating accepting policy. If the number of transactions is
at a good level, we will use the equilibrium accepting policy to improve TSR.
Finally, for the pricing policy,, market theory has indicted that when the transactions happen at
the equilibrium price, the optimal allocative efﬁciency is reached (see Section 2.2). Therefore,
we use the equilibrium price as the transaction price in the CAT competition. In more detail,
if the equilibrium price is higher than the matched ask and is lower than the matched bid, we
set the equilibrium price as the transaction price; otherwise we set the transaction price to the
bid or ask which is closest to the equilibrium price. Note that in this thesis, we adopt k-pricing
policy in the analysis, which is different from what we actually used in the CAT competition.
The reason is that k-pricing policy can be easily represented in a mathematic way and it also
has been shown to be highly efﬁcient in the literature (Phelps et al., 2003). Furthermore, in a
marketplace with symmetric demand and supply curve, we can expect that the transaction price
set by k-pricing policy with k = 0.5 is approximately equal to the equilibrium price.
Now we have introduced our design of the market policies for the CAT competition. In Section
5.5, we will describe how these policies performed in 2010 CAT competition. First, however,
we will detail the design of the charging policy.
5.4 Charging Policy Design
After detailing the market policies for the CAT competition, in this section we discuss the design
of our charging policy, which is used to determine fees charged to traders. As we discussed be-
fore (see Section 1.2), there exists a conﬂict between making proﬁts and attracting (or keeping)
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short term, but will lose traders in the long term, and so will receive less proﬁts. Thus, a good
charging policy should be able to make high market proﬁts, while still maintaining the number
of traders at a good level. In particular, in this section, we will design an adaptive charging
policy that charges market fees based on market conditions.
In so doing, we would like to use the insights from our analysis in Chapters 3 and 4. However,
we cannot directly use these results because the setting is different in a number of respects7.
Firstly, for traders’ bidding behaviour, as we discussed in Section 5.1.2, traders using the equi-
librium bidding strategies shade their shouts less than when using GD or ZIP strategy, and more
than when using ZI-C or RE strategy. Furthermore, in Chapters 3 and 4, although both EGT and
FP are repeated learning approaches, the game we analysed is a one-shot game (i.e. restricted
in one trading round). In the CAT competition, there are several trading days which includes
several trading rounds, and thus it is a repeated game. Finally, in the CAT competition, different
marketplaces have different charging policies, and we cannot guarantee that other marketplaces
also use the equilibrium charging strategies. Given this situation, we cannot directly use the
equilibrium charging strategies we have derived. However, as we will show, a number of the
general insights from the equilibrium analysis are still useable. In the following, we ﬁrst deter-
mine what types of fees are effective at making proﬁts and keeping traders. Then we decide at
what point in the game to charge fees and how much to charge.
In the CAT competition, competing marketplaces can charge ﬁve different types of fees: regis-
tration, information, shout, transaction and proﬁt fees (see Section 2.5.1). We now discuss each
of these in turn, and determine what types of fees are the most effective. A registration fee is
charged to all traders that register with a marketplace. When such a fee is charged, because
extra-marginal traders usually cannot trade in the marketplace, their proﬁts will be negative.
Thus these traders will leave the marketplace. As extra-marginal traders leave the marketplace,
the market share will decrease. Moreover, when a high registration fee is charged, some intra-
marginal traders whose limit/cost prices are close to the equilibrium price may also leave the
marketplace because of negative proﬁts. This is consistent with our analysis in Section 4.4,
where we found that charging registration fees cause traders to leave the marketplace quickly.
The information fee is charged only to GD and ZIP traders since only these traders need in-
formation provided by the marketplaces to generate shouts. Therefore, this is equivalent to a
registration fee, but one that only applies to GD and ZIP traders. A shout fee will be charged
when traders successfully place shouts. Like the registration fee, this may drive extra-marginal
traders to leave the marketplace when shouts placed by extra-marginal traders are accepted by
the marketplace, and thus decreases the market share. We can see that the above three types
of fees are charged to traders no matter whether they have made any proﬁts (i.e. ex ante fees,
see Section 1.1). This causes some traders to have negative proﬁts and leave the marketplace.
Therefore, all these three types of fees are less effective in either making proﬁts or keeping
traders. In contrast, transaction and proﬁt fees are charged only when traders make transactions,
and thus make proﬁts (i.e. ex post fees, see Section 1.1). Therefore, in such cases, traders’
7We have to operate the theoretical analysis on the restricted setting to provide basic insights. In the future, we
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proﬁts are usually positive. Furthermore, charging these two types of fees will not drive extra-
marginal traders to leave the marketplace, which will beneﬁt the market share. This is consistent
with our analysis in Section 4.4, where we found that the marketplace charging transaction fees
can maintain traders longer than the marketplace charging registration fees, and the marketplace
charging proﬁt fees can keep traders even though it charges very high proﬁt fees. Furthermore,
from Section 4.4, we found that charging transaction fees is effective in making proﬁts and
charging proﬁt fees cannot guarantee high market proﬁt when traders can shade their shouts a
lot. However, we should note that when traders cannot signiﬁcantly shade their shouts (e.g. ZI-
C or RE traders), i.e. they cannot effectively hide their actual proﬁts, charging proﬁt fees will
guarantee high market proﬁts. Now, given this analysis, in terms of making proﬁts and keeping
traders, we decide to charge two types of fees: transaction and proﬁt fees. Note that in Section
4.4, we found that the transaction price percentage fee is the most effective in making proﬁts
and keeping traders. However, this type of fees is not allowed in the CAT competition.
After determining what types of fees to charge to traders, we now describe when and how much
to charge. From Section 3.2.3.3, we obtained the insight that, initially, the marketplace should
charge low (or even zero) fees to attract traders, and when it obtains a larger market share, it can
charge higher fees, but still keep traders. In our charging policy, we adopt this insight. However,
we should note that in Section 3.2.3.3, we also found that, when there is a large number of
traders, or traders are able to explore other marketplaces to search for cheaper alternatives, it is
difﬁcult for the marketplace to keep traders even though it already has a larger market share. In
the context of CAT competition, there are a large number of traders (400 traders in recent years’
competition), and traders with an -greedy exploration strategy are able to search for the cheaper
marketplace. Thus it is difﬁcult for the marketplace to keep traders when it charges higher fees
in the CAT competition. We address this problem by reducing the fees whenever the transaction
share falls below a certain threshold, thereby repeating the above problem. Here the transaction
share is the number of transactions made in this marketplace as a percentage of the total number
of transactions made in all marketplaces. The reason that instead of directly looking at market
share, we look at the transaction share is as follows. As we discussed above, our marketplace
charges fees after traders make transactions. However, a large number of traders does not always
mean a large number of transactions since it may happen that most traders are extra-marginal
traders. Thus it is better for determining whether charging fees or not based on transaction share,
instead of market share.
Now we discuss how to calculate the marketplace’s transaction share in the CAT competition. In
order to do this, we need to know the number of transactions in other marketplaces. In the JCAT
platform, the marketplace can subscribe to other marketplaces to obtain this information, but
an information fee needs to be paid to subscribed marketplaces. This payment (incurred by an
information fee) will result in a “lost proﬁt share” for the marketplace, which is the proportion
of total information fees to the total proﬁts of all marketplaces. Thus, in the beginning of each
competition day, we need to decide which marketplace we need to subscribe to. In more detail,
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since low transaction share indicates that these marketplaces perform badly. Furthermore, when
the “lost proﬁt share” is less than a predetermined threshold, then the marketplace purchases
information from all marketplaces. However, if the “lost proﬁt share” is higher than this thresh-
old, then the specialist does not purchase information from marketplaces with high information
fees and low historical transaction shares, so as to keep the “lost proﬁt share” below the thresh-
old. However, these marketplaces may perform better later, and therefore it is necessary to relax
the threshold regularly in order to obtain information from these marketplaces. After obtain-
ing information about transactions from other marketplaces, we can calculate the marketplace’s
transaction share directly.
Then our charging policy proceeds as follows. In the ﬁrst few days, our marketplace charges no
fees in order to attract traders, and thus build up its transaction share. When the marketplace
obtains a large transaction share (i.e. reaches a predetermined threshold), it then starts to charge
transaction and proﬁt fees to extract proﬁts from traders. With increasing fees, the marketplace
becomes less attractive to potential traders (since traders are able to search for the cheaper mar-
ketplace), and then gradually, the effect of increased fees decreases the number of traders, and
thus the transaction share. At this point, the marketplace decrease its fees and goes back to
building up its transaction share back to a predetermined threshold. Once it reaches this target,
it has a sufﬁcient number of transactions, and can charge high fees to make proﬁts again. By
following this process, the marketplace will adapt fees according to its transaction share, and
can make high proﬁts while maintain the transaction share at a reasonably good level.
So far we have established when to charge fees. Now, in order to set the level of fees, we use
the concept of target proﬁt. This is the proﬁt that our marketplace attempts to extract from
traders on the current day. Intuitively, we can see that the target proﬁt depends on the number
of transactions made in the marketplace. If more transactions are made, the marketplace can
extract more proﬁts from traders. In more detail, we consider that the target proﬁt share is
approximately equal to the transaction share of the marketplace, and then the target proﬁt will
be equal to the product of the marketplace’s transaction share and the estimated historical total
proﬁts extracted from traders by all marketplaces. After calculating the target proﬁt, we now
describe how to set transaction and proﬁt fees to obtain such a proﬁt.
Since we charge two different types of fees, we need to split the target proﬁt to two parts, each
of which is extracted from charging transaction fee and proﬁt fee respectively. We now discuss
how to split the target proﬁt. To this end, the shaded area in Figure 5.11 shows the observed
proﬁts of traders. Here, the observed proﬁts are the sum of the differences between the matched
bids and asks. Note that the observed proﬁts are not equal to the actual proﬁts of traders unless
traders adopt a truth-telling strategy. If traders use the ZI-C or RE strategies, the observed proﬁts
are relatively close to the actual proﬁts, compared to that of traders using ZIP or GD strategies.
Given the target proﬁt, when only a proﬁt fee is charged, the target proﬁt is equal to the size of
the dark triangular area. When only a transaction fee is charged, the target proﬁt is equal to the
size of the rectangular area surrounded by the red line. From the ﬁgure, we can see that, traders
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FIGURE 5.11: Trade-off between charging a proﬁt fee and a transaction fee. Red, blue and
yellow lines represent different types of fees charged to traders respectively: transaction fee,
proﬁt fee, and a combination of transaction and proﬁt fee.
than when a transaction fee is charged; and traders whose shouts are close to the equilibrium
price pay more when a transaction fee is charged than that when a proﬁt fee is charged. Thus in
the design of a charging policy, we need to make a trade-off between these two fees, as showed
by the yellow line in Figure 5.11, which we call the combined fee. In more detail, initially, we
assume that more than half of the target proﬁt is obtained from charging a transaction fee since
charging a transaction fee can guarantee market proﬁt in any cases (even though traders shade
shouts a lot), and the rest from a proﬁt fee. As the game proceeds, we adjust the balance as
follows. If most shouts are close to the equilibrium price, i.e. most traders shade their shouts a
lot, charging a proﬁt fee cannot guarantee a target proﬁt, and thus we extract more from charging
transaction fees. On the other hand, when less shouts are close to the equilibrium price, charging
a proﬁt fee can guarantee the target proﬁt. We then extract relatively more from charging proﬁt
fees. However, in this case, traders with shouts far away from the equilibrium price will pay
more when proﬁt fees are charged, and thus may leave the marketplace. To avoid this, we
assume that at least half target proﬁt is extracted from charging transaction fees.
5.4.1 Evaluation of the Charging Policy
Now that we have presented our adaptive charging policy, in this section, we evaluate it against a
numberofthechargingpoliciesusedinrecentyears’CATcompetition. Notethatallcompetition
entrants only published their binary codes of marketplace implementation, and thus we do not
know exactly what charging policies other marketplaces used in the competition. We can only
observe the fees charged to traders from the competition log ﬁles. However, by investigating the
log ﬁles from recent years, we found that the marketplaces that perform well only charge proﬁt
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charge ﬁxed 5%, 10% and 15% proﬁt fees respectively (which is similar to what most of the
marketplaces did in the competition). Although very few marketplaces charge transaction fees
in the CAT competition, according to our analysis in Section 4.4, this type of fees is effective
in making proﬁts and keeping traders. Therefore, we consider three marketplaces charging
ﬁxed 0.5, 1 and 1.5 transaction fees respectively, which correspond more or less to the above
proﬁt fees in terms of the absolute payments incurred by them8. Furthermore, we consider a
marketplace charging a ﬁxed 0.1 registration fee as a representative marketplace charging other
types of fees. For all these marketplaces, we assume that they begin to charge fees on day 21
(i.e. in the ﬁrst 20 days, they charge no fees to build up their market share). In terms of the
market policies, we consider that all marketplaces adopting the default market policies provided
by JCAT platform, which are RC-ME-AQ and k-pricing policy with k = 0.5 (in Section 5.2, we
have shown that these market policies perform well).
We now run simulations to evaluate our charging policy against the above ﬁxed policies. The
experimental setup is as follows. Each experiment runs for 200 days with 10 rounds per day and
1 second per round. There are 200 buyers and 200 sellers. The private values of all traders are
independently drawn from a uniform distribution between 50 and 150, and each trader is allowed
to buy or sell up to 3 goods per day. We will run our simulations in different environments with
different bidding strategies since the effectiveness of a charging policy is affected by traders’
strategies. For each environment, the experiment is repeated 40 times. Firstly, we consider
the environment where all traders use ZI-C bidding strategy. We evaluate the performance in
terms of market share, proﬁt share, the sum of weighted market share and proﬁt share with
0.5 weight on each and the number of transactions. The results are shown in Figure 5.12 and
Table 5.11, from which, we can see that our charging policy can signiﬁcantly outperform other
marketplaces. From Figures 5.12(a) and 5.12(b), we can see that once competing marketplaces
begin to charge fees, our marketplace will attract traders and make proﬁts at a good level. In the
whole competition, we can see that our market share is maintained at a good level, and our proﬁt
share is quite high. This is because our charging policy determines the target proﬁt according
to the changes of the transaction share, and thus will not set unreasonable fees to extract proﬁts.
Moreover, by extracting the target proﬁt from charging both transaction and proﬁt fees, our
marketplace is better on keeping traders than those marketplaces only charging a proﬁt fee or a
transaction fee. Thus our marketplace can obtain a good proﬁt share while maintaining traders
at a good level. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd that the market share of the marketplace charging a
registration fee is very low since no extra-marginal traders stay in this marketplace. We then
run experiment in the environment of all traders using RE strategy, and the results are shown in
Figure 5.13 and Table 5.12. We also ﬁnd that the marketplace using our charging policy obtains
the highest market share and proﬁt share, and it outperforms other marketplaces signiﬁcantly.
We further run experiments in the environments where all traders use GD and ZIP strategies
8When traders’ private values are drawn from a uniform distribution between 50 and 150, we roughly consider
that the average of the buyers’ bids is around 110 and the average of the sellers’ asks is around 90. Given that the
transaction prices are set as 100, the absolute payments incurred by 5%, 10% and 15% proﬁt fees are 0.5, 1 and 1.5
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respectively. The results are shown in Figure 5.14, Table 5.13 and Figure 5.15, Table 5.14 re-
spectively. We can see that our marketplace outperforms other marketplaces. Furthermore, since
traders shade their shouts a lot (see Figure 5.1(d) and 5.1(c)), we ﬁnd that the marketplaces
charging proﬁt fees can maintain traders at a higher level compared to marketplaces charging
transaction fees (see Figures 5.14(a), 5.15(a) and Tables 5.13 and 5.14), and the marketplaces
charging transaction fees can obtain proﬁt share at a high level compared to marketplaces charg-
ing proﬁt fees (see Figures 5.14(b), 5.15(b) and Tables 5.13 and 5.14).
Finally, we evaluate our charging policy in an environment where traders use different bidding
strategies. Speciﬁcally, we assume that there are 100 ZI-C traders, 100 RE traders, 100 GD
traders and 100 ZIP traders. Experimental results are shown in Figure 5.16 and Table 5.15.
Again, we can see that the marketplace adopting our charing policy has the highest market share
and proﬁt share. This shows that our charging policy is also effective in making proﬁts and
keeping traders when traders adopt heterogeneous bidding strategies.
5.5 The 2010 CAT Competition
Now we have introduced our design of market policies and the charging policy. In 2010 CAT
competition, on the ﬁrst day, we entered our marketplace using policies not based on the results
of this thesis (as the software was not available). On the second and third days of the competi-
tion, which took place a while later, we did use market policies and the charging policy designed
in this thesis. The competition results showed that our marketplace performed well in the last
two days’ competition, obtaining the ﬁrst position on the second day and the second position on
the third day among nine entrants. In the following, we describe how our marketplace performed
on the second and third day.
The competition results of the second day and the third day are shown in Figure 5.17 and Table
5.16 and Figure 5.18 and Table 5.17 respectively. On the second day, we obtained the ﬁrst
position, and on the third day, we obtained the second position. In more detail, we can see that
our competing marketplace obtained good scores on the sum of daily market share, the sum
of daily proﬁt share and the sum of daily TSR. The high market share shows that the timing,
matching and pricing policies used by our competing marketplace are highly effective in terms
of guaranteeing traders’ proﬁts, and thus can attract and keep traders. The high TSR shows that
our shout accepting policy is highly effective to reject shouts which are unlikely to be matched,
and the high market share also shows that the shout accepting policy does not reject shouts that
can make transactions. Furthermore, from the high scores of proﬁt share and market share, we
can see that our marketplace using the adaptive charging policy designed in this chapter makes a
high market proﬁt while maintaining the number of traders at a good level. This shows that our
design of the charging policy, which adapts the fees according to the transaction share and makes
a trade-off between only charging a proﬁt fee and only charging a transaction fee, is highly
effective. However, although our competing marketplace performed well in the competition, itChapter 5 Designing a Competing Double Auction Marketplace 161
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FIGURE 5.12: Evaluation of charging policy with ZI-C strategy.
Marketplace Market Share Proﬁt Share Sum of Weighted Market and Proﬁt Share Num. of Transactions
IAM 0.181±0.002 0.223±0.002 0.202±0.002 54.44±1.248
PF 5% 0.158±0.003 0.13±0.004 0.144±0.003 48.966±2.382
PF 10% 0.128±0.002 0.143±0.002 0.136±0.001 32.644±1.243
PF 15% 0.11±0.002 0.107±0.003 0.108±0.002 21.419±1.682
RF 0.1 0.067±0.002 0.004±0.001 0.036±0.002 25.017±1.535
TF 0.5 0.124±0.001 0.042±0.002 0.083±0.002 29.895±1.212
TF 1 0.117±0.002 0.104±0.003 0.111±0.002 27.989±1.741
TF 1.5 0.115±0.002 0.141±0.002 0.128±0.002 24.015±1.257
TABLE 5.11: Evaluation of charging policy with ZI-C strategy. PF: Proﬁt Fee. RF: Registra-
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FIGURE 5.13: Evaluation of charging policy with RE strategy.
Marketplace Market Share Proﬁt Share Sum of Weighted Market and Proﬁt Share Num. of Transactions
IAM 0.193±0.002 0.211±0.002 0.202±0.002 46.586±1.559
PF 5% 0.125±0.002 0.077±0.002 0.101±0.002 32.847±1.672
PF 10% 0.121±0.002 0.185±0.004 0.153±0.004 26.155±1.91
PF 15% 0.116±0.003 0.106±0.004 0.111±0.003 22.817±2.223
RF 0.1 0.069±0.002 0.005±0.002 0.037±0.002 25.93±1.551
TF 0.5 0.133±0.003 0.064±0.002 0.098±0.003 33.761±2.56
TF 1 0.124±0.002 0.083±0.002 0.104±0.002 30.373±1.49
TF 1.5 0.114±0.002 0.164±0.004 0.139±0.004 23.761±1.653
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FIGURE 5.14: Evaluation of charging policy with GD strategy.
Marketplace Market Share Proﬁt Share Sum of Weighted Market and Proﬁt Share Num. of Transactions
IAM 0.198±0.002 0.215±0.002 0.206±0.002 55.693±1.965
PF 5% 0.159±0.004 0.04±0.003 0.099±0.003 48.231±2.178
PF 10% 0.152±0.004 0.074±0.002 0.113±0.004 44.345±2.249
PF 15% 0.144±0.004 0.085±0.002 0.114±0.004 39.962±1.992
RF 0.1 0.056±0.002 0.008±0.001 0.032±0.002 21.477±1.482
TF 0.5 0.109±0.002 0.113±0.002 0.111±0.002 27.375±1.619
TF 1 0.093±0.002 0.181±0.002 0.137±0.002 22.017±1.51
TF 1.5 0.082±0.002 0.178±0.002 0.13±0.002 16.851±1.337
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FIGURE 5.15: Evaluation of charging policy with ZIP strategy.
Marketplace Market Share Proﬁt Share Sum of Weighted Market and Proﬁt Share Num. of Transactions
IAM 0.196±0.002 0.201±0.002 0.198±0.002 54.234±1.949
PF 5% 0.149±0.004 0.078±0.002 0.113±0.004 48.084±2.233
PF 10% 0.137±0.004 0.123±0.004 0.130±0.004 41.454±2.033
PF 15% 0.113±0.002 0.107±0.004 0.11±0.002 26.876±1.594
RF 0.1 0.059±0.002 0.005±0.001 0.032±0.002 22.295±1.472
TF 0.5 0.125±0.004 0.087±0.002 0.106±0.003 34.72±1.864
TF 1 0.113±0.002 0.134±0.004 0.123±0.004 29.294±1.702
TF 1.5 0.107±0.002 0.16±0.004 0.134±0.004 26.258±1.596
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FIGURE 5.16: Evaluation of charging policy with heterogeneous strategies.
Marketplace Market Share Proﬁt Share Sum of Weighted Market and Proﬁt Share Num. of Transactions
IAM 0.203±0.002 0.222±0.002 0.212±0.002 53.079±1.702
PF 5% 0.126±0.004 0.052±0.002 0.089±0.002 37.523±1.666
PF 10% 0.122±0.004 0.124±0.004 0.123±0.004 31.707±1.776
PF 15% 0.119±0.004 0.178±0.006 0.148±0.004 25.091±2.251
RF 0.1 0.071±0.002 0.005±0.002 0.038±0.002 27.49±1.637
TF 0.5 0.127±0.004 0.066±0.002 0.096±0.002 33.341±2.117
TF 1 0.122±0.002 0.108±0.004 0.115±0.004 29.382±1.668
TF 1.5 0.109±0.002 0.138±0.004 0.124±0.004 23.707±1.588
TABLE 5.15: Evaluation of charging policy with heterogeneous strategies.166 Chapter 5 Designing a Competing Double Auction Marketplace
(a) Daily score (b) Market share
(c) Proﬁt share (d) TSR
FIGURE 5.17: Competition on the second day.
Rank Specialist Total Score Total Market Share Total Proﬁt Share Total TSR
1 IAMwildCAT 198.228 69.923 110.582 414.199
2 jackaroo 193.008 56.508 83.266 439.035
3 Mertacor 191.679 82.001 106.06 386.393
4 PoleCAT 174.621 56.073 72.319 395.481
5 PSUCAT 153.013 48.203 18.368 392.597
6 TWBB 148.324 44.928 14.953 384.151
7 MyFuzzy 139.166 36.469 29.93 350.114
8 AstonCAT 115.685 35.906 8.229 303.241
9 PersianCat 73.765 27.026 13.31 182.512
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(a) Daily score (b) Market share
(c) Proﬁt share (d) TSR
FIGURE 5.18: Competition on the third day.
Rank Specialist Total Score Total Market Share Total Proﬁt Share Total TSR
1 Mertacor 208.576 83.289 135.125 406.367
2 IAMwildCAT 198.421 69.988 109.403 415.548
3 jackaroo 172.217 46.303 39.357 431.686
4 PoleCAT 170.951 55.662 75.222 381.917
5 AstonCAT 164.445 61.543 38.651 393.029
6 TWBB 157.257 45.567 13.204 431.686
7 MyFuzzy 148.131 35.082 31.325 377
8 PSUCAT 141.819 41.291 9.319 375.029
9 PersianCat 79.7 26.26 13.368 200.297
TABLE 5.17: Competition result on the third day in 2010 CAT competition168 Chapter 5 Designing a Competing Double Auction Marketplace
failed to beat Mertacor (which is the winner of this year’s competition) on the third day. This
means that our design of market policies and the charging policy can be improved.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we ﬁrst described how traders select marketplaces and submit shouts in the
CAT competition. We then ran experiments to analyse how different market policies affect
marketplaces’ performance in different environments with different bidding strategies. This
analysis addresses our research challenge 3 of analysing market policies (see Section 1.2). From
this analysis, we obtained several insights, and we further used these insights to design market
policies for the CAT competition. For example, in the ﬁrst round of each trading day, we adopt
the continuous clearing in order to provide information for traders to improve their shouts, and
we switch between quote-beating accepting and equilibrium accepting policies in order to keep
traders and improve TSR. After designing market policies, we then used insights from Chapters
3and4todesignanovelchargingpolicy, whichwillchargetransactionandproﬁtfees, andadapt
fees according to transaction share. We further evaluated it in the context of CAT competition.
Finally, we showed that our design of market policies and charging policy performs well in the
actual CAT competition (ranked the ﬁrst on the second day and the second on the third day).
This work then addresses our research challenge 5 of designing an effective competing double
auction marketplace (see Section 1.2).Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
The double auction, a highly efﬁcient market mechanism, has been widely used by both tra-
ditional and online exchanges. In today’s economy, these marketplaces increasingly need to
compete with each other to attract traders and make proﬁts by appropriately charging fees to
participating traders. Therefore, it is necessary to design effective market policies and charging
strategies that can operate effectively in this situation. To this end, in this thesis, we analysed
how double auction marketplaces can be designed to compete with each other in an effective
way and then use the insights from this analysis to design an effective competing marketplace
agent. In so doing, we have made several contributions (summarised below in Section 6.1) to
the state of the art. Thereafter, we outline the directions for future work in this area in Section
6.2.
6.1 Research Summary
The design of a competing double auction marketplace primarily consists of setting the market
policies and a charging strategy. In this thesis, we mainly focused on how competing market-
places should set their fees (i.e. the charging strategy), since this is a signiﬁcant determinant
that affects traders’ market selection and the marketplaces’ proﬁts. Now, because such charg-
ing strategies are affected by both the traders’ market selection and bidding strategies, we ﬁrst
analysed the traders’ strategies and then the marketplaces’ charging strategies. Since the opti-
mal behaviour of a trader in terms of selecting marketplaces and submitting shouts depends on
the behaviour of other traders and marketplaces, and the optimal behaviour of a marketplace
in terms of setting fees depends on the behaviour of traders and other marketplaces, we used
game theory to analyse the equilibrium strategies for traders and marketplaces. In addition to
analysing the charging strategies, we further analysed how different market policies affect the
performance of competing marketplaces in the CAT competition. Finally, based on the insights
from analysing the charging strategies and market policies, we designed an effective compet-
ing double auction marketplace, and entered it into 2010 CAT competition, where it was very
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successful.
In more detail, ﬁrstly, in Chapter 3, we used game theory to analyse equilibrium market se-
lection strategies for traders and equilibrium charging strategies for marketplaces in the setting
with discrete trader types. We also assumed that traders use a truth-telling bidding strategy and
traders can only enter one marketplace at a time (i.e. single-home trading). This work addressed
research challenges 1 (analysing market selection strategies) and 4 (analysing charging strate-
gies), and it is the ﬁrst theoretical work on analysing equilibrium strategies for marketplaces
and traders in the context of multiple competing double auction marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁrst analysed the equilibrium market selection strategies for traders for a given fee system. We
used game theory to derive the equilibrium market selection strategies analytically and used
evolutionary game theory to investigate the dynamics of traders’ strategies. In so doing, we
showed which equilibrium traders are more likely to converge to. Furthermore, we found that,
when the same type of fees are charged by two marketplaces, all the traders will congregate
in one marketplace. However, when different types of fees are allowed (registration fees and
proﬁt fees), competing marketplaces are more likely to co-exist in equilibrium. Furthermore,
we found an interesting phenomenon that sometimes all the traders eventually migrate to the
marketplace that charges higher fees, when this marketplace initially has a larger proportion
of the traders. We further analysed this phenomenon in detail. This analysis provided us the
insight into the charging strategy, which is that, ﬁrstly, a marketplace should lower its fees to
attract or maintain traders, and after obtaining an advantageous position, the marketplace can
then increase its fees while still keeping traders. Based on the analysis of traders’ equilibrium
market selection strategies, we analysed the equilibrium charging strategies of the marketplaces
using two different approaches. In the ﬁrst, we derived the equilibrium charging strategies by
a static analysis. However, this approach did not consider the interaction between the traders’
and the marketplaces’ strategies. We then tackled this limitation by using a co-evolutionary ap-
proach to analyse how competing marketplaces dynamically set fees, while taking into account
the dynamics of the traders’ market selection strategies. In so doing, we found that two initially
identical marketplaces undercut each other, and they will eventually charge the minimal fee that
guarantees positive market proﬁts for them. Furthermore, we also extended the co-evolutionary
analysis of the marketplaces’ charging strategies to more general cases. Speciﬁcally, we anal-
ysed how an initially disadvantaged marketplace with an adaptive charging strategy can beat an
initially advantaged one with a ﬁxed charging strategy, and how competing marketplaces evolve
their charging strategies when different types of fees are allowed.
The work in Chapter 3 was restricted to the setting with discrete trader types and assumed that
tradersadoptasimple, truth-tellingbiddingstrategy. InChapter4, weaddressedtheseshortcom-
ings by considering continuous trader types and analysing both the equilibrium market selection
and bidding strategies for traders. Moreover, we considered two more types of fees: transaction
and transaction price percentage fees. Furthermore, we extended this analysis to settings with
different trading environments and with different good properties. By considering these addi-
tional factors, we used a ﬁctitious play algorithm to analyse how traders select marketplaces andChapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work 171
submit shouts, and how competing marketplaces set fees in equilibrium. This work addressed
research challenges 1 (analysing market selection strategies), 2 (analysing bidding strategies)
and 4 (analysing charging strategies). In more detail, we ﬁrst analysed traders’ equilibrium
bidding strategies in a single marketplace and analysed the effect of different types of market
fees on the traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies. We observed that registration fees cause a
bigger range of traders not to choose the marketplace; proﬁt fees cause traders to shade their
shouts more; and transaction price percentage fees cause sellers to shade relatively less than
buyers’ shading. This is the ﬁrst work that derives the equilibrium bidding strategies for traders
in double auctions and analyses the effect of market fees on these strategies. Then we analysed
the traders’ equilibrium market selection and bidding strategies in the single-home trading en-
vironment with multiple marketplaces. Furthermore, we extended the analysis by considering
multi-home and hybrid trading environments and different good properties, which is also the
ﬁrst work to consider these factors in the analysis of competing double auction marketplaces.
We then analysed the effects of different types of fees on obtaining market proﬁts and keeping
traders in a single marketplace environment, and showed that the transaction price percentage
fee is the most effective in terms of making proﬁts and keeping traders. Finally, we analysed
how competing marketplaces set fees in equilibrium. From this analysis, we found that com-
peting marketplaces need to charge high proﬁt fees in equilibrium since traders hide their actual
proﬁts by shading.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we analysed the traders’ behaviour of selecting marketplaces and submit-
ting shouts in the speciﬁc context of the CAT competition. Based on this, we analysed how
different market policies affect the performance of competing marketplaces in different environ-
ments where different bidding strategies are adopted. This work addressed research challenge 3
of analysing market policies. Finally, we used insights from analysing the market policies and
the equilibrium charging strategies to design a competing marketplace. As we have shown, this
marketplace performed well in 2010 CAT competition. In particular, it ranked ﬁrst in the sec-
ond day’s competition and second in the third day’s competition. This work addressed research
challenge 5 of designing an effective competing marketplace.
When taken together, this research work has successfully addressed the research challenges
outlined in the beginning of the thesis and has made a number of important contributions to the
design of effective competing double auction marketplaces.
6.2 Future Work
Despite these accomplishments, there still exist limitations of our work. For example, our anal-
ysis of market policies is still experimental, and we modelled our game as a one-shot game.
Therefore, there are still a number of issues to be addressed in order to further improve the
design of competing double auction marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, these are as follows:
• In this thesis, we experimentally analysed how different market policies affect the perfor-172 Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work
mance of competing marketplaces. However, this analysis was restricted to the speciﬁc
context of the CAT competition. In the future, we would like to analyse how marketplaces
compete with each other in terms of setting their mechanisms (i.e. market policies) from
a theoretical perspective. Speciﬁcally, we would like to analyse when and how to execute
possible transactions (i.e. timing and matching policies) and how to set the transaction
prices (i.e. pricing policy). For the timing policy, the market can be cleared when a new
shout is admitted (i.e. continuous clearing, in which traders can buy or sell goods quickly,
but cannot guarantee traders’ proﬁts), or when all traders have submitted their shouts (i.e.
round clearing, in which traders’ proﬁts can be guaranteed, but they take longer to buy or
sell goods). In the real world, in addition to caring about proﬁts made in each marketplace,
traders may also look at the time costs of sale or purchase in each marketplace. Different
traders may weight differently the obtained proﬁts and time costs, and thus prefer different
marketplaces. Therefore, we would like to analyse how to set an effective timing policy
to attract traders that have different requirements. For the matching policy, we want to
ﬁnd a matching policy that can guarantee traders’ proﬁts (as the equilibrium matching
does) and can maximise the number of transactions (as the maximising volume matching
does). Furthermore, for the pricing policy, many potential policies could be adopted. This
policy determines the trading surplus allocation between buyers and sellers. An improper
surplus allocation may cause asymmetric demand and supply, and thus drives traders with
excess demand or supply to leave the marketplace. Furthermore, in the competition, other
factors may also cause asymmetric demand and supply in the marketplace. For example,
the marketplace’s opponents may attract more buyers by allocating more proﬁts to them.
Faced with this, sellers with excess supply may leave the marketplace since they cannot
make transactions. In this situation, the marketplace needs to use the pricing policy to
adjust the surplus allocation to re-balance the demand and supply. In the future, we would
like to analyse this policy as well. Finally, in addition to theoretically analysing each type
of market policy separately, we would like to consider the combination of market policies
as a whole, and analyse which one is the most effective. This analysis is likely to provide
further and general insights about designing market policies, and can be applied in the
more general scenario of competing marketplaces.
• Furthermore, our current theoretical analysis is restricted to one trading round, i.e. a one-
shot game. However, the practical competition between marketplaces usually involves
multiple trading rounds, and thus is a repeated game. For example, as we mentioned
earlier, the CAT competition involves multiple days, each of which includes multiple
trading rounds, and thus it is a repeated game. Given this, instead of determining its
action in an isolated round, in the repeated game, a trader should take into account the
impact of its current action (in terms of selecting marketplaces and submitting shouts) on
the future actions of other traders and marketplaces in the future trading rounds, and the
same for a competing marketplace. In this vein, we would therefore like to extend our
theoretical analysis to a repeated game involving multiple trading rounds. In more detail,
in this repeated game, we want to analyse how traders select marketplaces and submitChapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work 173
shouts, and how competing marketplaces set market policies and fees. This analysis will
provide further insights about designing market policies and charging strategies.
• Finally, although our design of market and charging policies performed well in the 2010
CAT competition, it failed to obtain the ﬁrst position. This may mean that our design can
be further improved. Therefore, we would like to use insights from the above theoretical
analysis of market policies and the repeated game to improve the market policy design.
Furthermore, wewouldliketouseinsightsfromtheaboveanalysisoftherepeatedgameto
improve the charging policy. Moreover, as we introduced in Section 5.4, in addition to the
gap between the one-shot game and the repeated game, we also made other assumptions,
which meant that we could not directly use the equilibrium charging strategies in the CAT
competition. We would like to close these gaps in the future. For example, although
we cannot guarantee that other marketplaces also use equilibrium charging strategies,
according to these marketplaces’ fees and the traders’ actions, and taking into account the
impact of our marketplace’s fees on future actions of traders and other marketplaces, we
can derive the best response fees to maximise the market proﬁts while maintaining the
number of traders at a good level.Appendix A
Expansion of Equations when Deriving
Nash Equilibrium Analytically in
Section 3.2.2
Now we expand equations in Section 3.2.2 to derive Nash equilibrium. In Section 3.2.2, we
consider 2 buyers, 2 sellers and 2 competing marketplaces only charging proﬁt fees. For trader
types, we consider two discrete trader types, rich and poor. Furthermore, we use Λ1 = tb
2 − ts
1 to
represent the surplus of a transaction between rich buyer and rich seller, Λ2 = tb
2−ts
2 to represent
the surplus of a transaction between rich buyer and poor seller, Λ3 = tb
1 − ts
1 to represent the
surplus of a transaction between poor buyer and rich seller and Λ4 = tb
1 − ts
2 to represent the
surplus of a transaction between poor buyer and poor seller. According to Equation 3.14, we
obtain the expected utility of rich buyer in marketplace 1:
˜ Ub
1( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),tb
2)
=
"
1 −
ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P) + ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P)
2

∗

ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P) + ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P) −

ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P) + ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P)
2
4

∗
Λ1 + Λ2
2
+
1
2
∗
 
ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P) ∗

ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P) + ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P) −

ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P) + ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P)
2
4

∗
Λ1 + Λ2
2
+ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P) ∗

ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P) + ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P)
2
4
∗

ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P)
2
∗ Λ1 +

ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P)
2
∗ Λ2

ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P)
2
+

ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P)
2
!#
∗k1 ∗ (1 − q1) (A.1)
and we obtain its expected utility in marketplace 2:
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The poor buyer’s expected utility in marketplace 1 is:
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and the poor buyer’s expected utility in marketplace 2 is:
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The rich seller’s expected utility in marketplace 1 is:
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and rich seller’s expected utility in marketplace 2 is:
˜ Us
2( ¯ P, ¯ K, ¯ ωb( ¯ P), ¯ ωs( ¯ P),ts
1)
=
"ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P) + ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P)
2
∗

2 − ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P) − ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P) −
2 −

ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P) − ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P)
2
4

∗
Λ1 + Λ3
2
+
1
2
∗
 
1 − ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P)

∗

2 − ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P) − ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P) −

2 − ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P) − ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P)
2
4

∗
Λ1 + Λ3
2
+

1 − ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P)

∗
2 −

ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P) − ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P)
2
4
∗

1 − ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P)
2
∗ Λ1 +

1 − ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P)
2
∗ Λ3

1 − ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P)
2
+

1 − ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P)
2
!
∗(1 − k2) ∗ (1 − q2)(A.6)Appendix A Expansion of Equations when Deriving Nash Equilibrium Analytically in Section
3.2.2 177
The poor seller’s expected utility in marketplace 1 is:
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and the poor seller’s expected utility in marketplace 2 is:
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Recall that in the mixed Nash equilibrium, we have:
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Now we replace the left-hand and right-hand sides of Equations A.9, A.10, A.11 and A.12 by
Equations A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, A.7 and A.8 respectively. Then when ωb(tb
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equation:

2 ∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) −

ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P)
2
− ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) + ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗

ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P)
2
∗k1 ∗ (1 − q1)
=

1 − ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) + ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗ ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P) − ω
b(t
b
1,1, ¯ P) ∗

ω
s(t
s
1,1, ¯ P)
2
∗k2 ∗ (1 − q2) (A.13)
and Equations A.11 and A.12 can be rewritten as the same equation:
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This means that ωb(tb
1,1, ¯ P) = ωb(tb
2,1, ¯ P) and ωs(ts
1,1, ¯ P) = ωs(ts
2,1, ¯ P) will be one of the
solutions for Equations A.9, A.10, A.11 and A.12, and by solving Equations A.13 and A.14, we
can obtain the solutions.Appendix B
An Alternative Approach to Calculate
Expected Utilities of Traders in Section
4.1.2
In Section 4.1.2, when we calculate the expected utilities of traders, we need to consider all
possible numbers of buyers and sellers choosing different actions. As we discussed previously,
this calculation is demanding. Given this fact, we introduce an alternative approach to calculate
a trader’s expected utility. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the expected utility of a buyer with type θb
adopting the action δb = hdb
1,db
2,...,db
Mi given the other buyers’ action distribution Ωb and the
sellers’ action distribution Ωs, and the fee system ¯ P. The calculation for the seller is analogous.
The expected utility consists of two parts: the expected value on the goods and the expected
payment. In the following, we derive these two parts respectively.
We ﬁrst derive the buyer’s expected value on traded goods. In order to do this, we need to know
the buyer’s joint positions. In contrast to that in Section 4.1.2, we derived the buyer’s joint
positions from the number of buyers choosing different actions, we derive this by comparing
buyers’ actions in terms of comparing bids in these actions. In more detail, when comparing the
buyer’s bid db
m with another bid d0b
m in marketplace m, there are three possible mutually exclu-
sive events, i.e. db
m > d0b
m (i.e. the buyer’s bid in marketplace m is higher than another buyer’s
bid in this marketplace)1, db
m = d0b
m (i.e. both buyers have the same bid in marketplace m) or
db
m < d0b
m (i.e. the buyer’s bid in marketplace m is less than another buyer’s bid in this market-
place). Thus when comparing the buyer’s action, hdb
1,db
2,...,db
Mi, with another buyer’s action,
hd0b
1 ,d0b
2 ,...,d0b
Mi, in terms of comparing bids in each marketplace, there are 3M possible mutually
exclusive events, each of which is a joint event of comparing bids across M marketplaces. We
use R = {R1,R2,...,R3M} to represent the set of all these possible joint events. For example,
when there are two marketplaces, we have R = {R1 = (<,<),R2 = (<,=),R3 = (<,>),R4 =
(=,<),R5 = (=,=),R6 = (=,>),R7 = (>,<),R8 = (>,=),R9 = (>,>)}. As an example, event
1For not choosing the marketplace, i.e. d0b
m = 
, we regard that db
m > d0b
m = 
.
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R1 = (<,<) means that the buyer’s bids in both marketplaces are less than the bids placed by
another buyer. The probability that a joint event Ri occurs is:
φb
i =
X
δb
j∈∆:δb ? δb
j=Ri
ωb
j (B.1)
where as we introduced previously, ωb
j is the probability of a buyer choosing the action δb
j, and
δb ? δb
j = Ri means that event Ri occurs when we compare action δb with δb
j.
To calculate the position, we furthermore need to know the number of buyers satisfying each
event. Speciﬁcally, we use a 3M-tuple ¯ x = hx1,..., x3Mi ∈ X to represent the number of buyers
satisfying each event, where there are exactly xi buyers satisfying event Ri when they compare
their actions with the buyer’s action, and X is the set of all such possible tuples satisfying the
conditions xi ≥ 0 and
P3M
i=1 xi = B − 1 (note that we need to exclude the buyer for which we
are calculating the expected utility) and |X| = 3M∗(B−1). The probability of exactly xi buyers
satisfying event Ri is
 
φb
i
xi, and then the probability of this tuple appearing is:
ρb(¯ x) =
 
B − 1
x1,..., x3M
!
∗
3M Y
i=1
(φb
i )xi (B.2)
Now given tuple ¯ x, we determine the buyer’s joint positions as follows. Firstly, we obtain the
number of buyers whose bids are greater than the buyer’s bid in marketplace m, which is given
by:
X>
m(¯ x) =
X
Ri∈R:Rim=‘<’
xi (B.3)
where Rim is the event of comparing bids in marketplace m from the joint event Ri. Similarly,
we use X=
m(¯ x) to represent the number of buyers whose bids are equal to the buyer’s bid in
marketplace m (excluding the buyer itself):
X=
m(¯ x) =
X
Ri∈R:Rim=‘=’
xi (B.4)
Due to having discrete bids and given X>
m(¯ x) buyers bidding higher than the buyer’s bid db
m and
X=
m(¯ x) buyers bidding equal to db
m, the buyer’s position in marketplace m could be anywhere from
X>
m(¯ x)+1 to X>
m(¯ x)+X=
m(¯ x)+1, which constitutes the buyer’s position range in this marketplace.
Since X=
m(¯ x)+1 buyers have the same bid, a tie-breaking rule is needed to determine the buyer’s
position. As we did in Section 4.1.2, we adopt a standard tie-breaking rule where each of these
possible positions2 occurs with equal probability, i.e. 1/(X=
m(¯ x) + 1). For example, when there
are two marketplaces and joint event Ri occurs for xi buyers, i = 1,...,9, in marketplace 1, we
have X>
1(¯ x) = x1 + x2 + x3 and X=
1(¯ x) = x4 + x5 + x6, and the buyer’s position will be anywhere
from X>
1(¯ x) + 1 to X>
1(¯ x) + X=
1(¯ x) + 1 with equal probability 1/(X=
1(¯ x) + 1); and in marketplace
2, we have X>
2(¯ x) = x1 + x4 + x7 and X=
2(¯ x) = x2 + x5 + x8, and the buyer’s position will be
anywhere from X>
2(¯ x)+1 to X>
2(¯ x)+X=
2(¯ x)+1 with equal probability 1/(X=
2(¯ x)+1). Now, given
2They are X>
m(¯ x) + 1, X>
m(¯ x) + 2,..., X>
m(¯ x) + X=
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the buyer’s position ranges in different marketplaces, we can obtain the set of all possible joint
positions for the buyer. Speciﬁcally, we use a M-tuple ¯ v¯ x = hv1,...,vMi ∈ V¯ x to represent one
of the possible joint positions where vm is the buyer’s position in marketplace m, and V¯ x is the
set of all possible joint positions satisfying the condition X>
m(¯ x) + 1 ≤ vm ≤ X>
m(¯ x) + X=
m(¯ x) + 1
(m = 1,..., M). The probability of the buyer having the joint positions ¯ v¯ x given the tuple ¯ x is:
Φ(¯ v¯ x) =
M Y
m=1
1
X=
m(¯ x) + 1
(B.5)
Note that tie-breaking occurs independently for each marketplace.
In addition to depending on positions in different marketplaces, the buyer’s expected value also
dependsonthenumbersofsellerschoosingdifferentactions. DifferentfromSection4.1.2where
we consider all possible numbers of sellers choosing different actions, we consider the number
of sellers submitting asks in each marketplace. Given this and the sellers’ action distributions,
we can know whether the buyer will be matched in each marketplace. Since a seller can place
multiple asks in multiple marketplaces at the same time, the numbers of sellers submitting asks
in different marketplaces are also correlated with each other. Thus we need to consider the
joint numbers of sellers submitting asks in different marketplaces. Speciﬁcally, we use a M-
tuple ¯ y = hy1,...,yMi ∈ Y to denote the joint numbers of sellers submitting asks in different
marketplaces, where ym is the number of sellers submitting asks in marketplace m, and Y is
the set of all such possible tuples satisfying the condition that 0 ≤ ym ≤ S (m = 1,..., M), and
|Y| = (S + 1)M. In the following, we derive the probability of a speciﬁc tuple ¯ y appearing. We
use the powerset 2M = {M1,...,M2M} to denote the set of all possible marketplace subsets. For
marketplace subset MI, I = 1,...,2M, we use ∆I ⊂ ∆ to denote the subset of seller’s actions
which only submit asks in MI, and submit 
 in the complement M − MI (i.e. sellers do not
choose marketplaces in M− MI). From the seller’s action distribution Ωs, we can calculate the
probability of sellers choosing actions from ∆I (i.e. only submitting asks in marketplace subset
MI):
µs
I =
X
δs
j∈∆I
ωs
j (B.6)
Now we use a 2M-tuple ¯ z = hz1,...,z2Mi ∈ Z,
P2M
I=1 zI = S, to denote the numbers of sellers
submitting asks in each of these possible marketplace subsets, where zI is the number of sellers
choosing actions from action subset ∆I (i.e. only submitting asks in subset MI), and Z is the
set of all such possible tuples. The probability of this tuple appearing is:
ρs(¯ z) =
 
S
z1,...,z2M
!
∗
2M Y
I=1
(µs
I)zI (B.7)
Given tuple ¯ z, we can know the joint numbers of sellers submitting asks in different market-
places. Speciﬁcally, we introduce a function g(¯ z) = hy0
1,...,y0
Mi, which converts the numbers
of sellers submitting asks in different marketplace subsets to the numbers of sellers submitting182
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asks in different single marketplaces, where
y0
m =
X
MI∈2M:m∈MI
zI (B.8)
Now we calculate the probability of the tuple ¯ y appearing:
ρs(¯ y) =
X
¯ z∈Z:¯ y=g(¯ z)
ρs(¯ z) (B.9)
Now given the buyer’s joint positions ¯ v¯ x, the joint numbers of sellers submitting asks in different
marketplaces ¯ y, we are ready to calculate its expected value on traded goods. Since the buyer can
enter multiple marketplaces and thus purchase multiple goods, we need to consider its expected
value on different units of goods. Remember that each trader can only trade one unit of good
in each marketplace, and thus when there are M marketplaces in total, the possible number of
goods the buyer can purchase is from 1 to M. Speciﬁcally, in Section 4.1.1, we have deﬁned
the buyer’s value vb(θb,T) on T units of goods by considering different good properties (see
Equation 4.1). Now by considering all possible marketplace subsets with cardinality T, where
exactly T transactions are made by this buyer, we obtain the buyer’s expected value when it
purchases T units of goods given its joint positions ¯ v¯ x and the numbers of sellers submitting
asks in different marketplaces ¯ y:
˜ V(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs,T) =
X
MI⊂2M:|MI|=T
ϕb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,δb,MI) ∗ vb(θb,T)
=
X
MI⊂2M:|MI|=T
ϕb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,δb,MI) ∗ αb
T ∗ θb (B.10)
where ϕb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,δb,MI) is the probability of the buyer making transactions in marketplaces MI
and not making transactions in M − MI. Note that given the buyer’s position and the number
of sellers submitting asks in each marketplace, the probability of the buyer making a transaction
(or not making a transaction) in each marketplace is independent of each other, and thus the
probability of the buyer making transactions in MI and not making transactions in M − MI is
given by:
ϕb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,δb,MI) =
X
m∈MI
ψb(vm,m,db
m,ym) ∗
X
m∈M−MI
χb(vm,m,db
m,ym) (B.11)
where ψb(vm,m,db
m,ym) is the probability of the buyer with bid db
m making a transaction in
marketplace m given its position vm and ym sellers submitting asks in this marketplace, and
χb(vm,m,db
m,ym) is the probability of the buyer with bid db
m not making a transaction in market-
place m. In the following, we derive them respectively.
First, we introduce three support functions3: e<
s(d) denotes the probability that the sellers’ asks
3These are calculated by taking the sum of the probabilities of actions whose corresponding shouts in marketplace
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are strictly less than d in marketplace m, e=
s(d) denotes the probability that the sellers’ asks are
equal to d in marketplace m, and e>
s(d) denotes the probability that the sellers’ asks are strictly
higher than d in marketplace m but are not 
. Given the buyer’s position vm, its bid db
m, and the
number of sellers ym submitting asks in marketplace m, the probability of the buyer making a
transaction in marketplace m is given by:
ψb(vm,m,db
m,ym) =
ym X
c=vm
 
ym
c
!
∗
 
e<
s(db
m) + e=
s(db
m)
E
!c
∗
 
e>
s(db
m)
E
!ym−c
(B.12)
where E = e<
s(db
m) + e=
s(db
m) + e>
s(db
m). Note that this calculation is given the condition that ym
sellers have submitted asks in marketplace m, and thus the probability of an ask less than or
equal to db
m in marketplace m should be normalised, i.e.
 
e<
s(db
m) + e=
s(db
m)

/E, and the same
reason for e>
s(db
m)/E. The probability of the buyer not making a transaction in marketplace m is
given by:
χb(vm,m,db
m,ym) =
vm−1 X
c=0
 
ym
c
!
∗
 
e<
s(db
m) + e=
s(db
m)
E
!c
∗
 
e>
s(db
m)
E
!ym−c
(B.13)
Finally, by considering all possible numbers of units the buyer purchase, all possible joint num-
bers of sellers submitting asks in different marketplaces, all possible joint positions and all
possible numbers of buyers satisfying different joint events, the buyer’s expected value is given
by:
˜ V(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs) =
X
¯ x∈X
ρb(¯ x) ∗
X
¯ v¯ x∈V¯ x
υ(¯ v¯ x) ∗
X
¯ y∈Y
ρs(¯ y) ∗
M X
T=1
˜ V(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs,T) (B.14)
After deriving the expected value, in the following, we derive the expected payment of the buyer
given the action distributions of buyers and sellers, Ωb and Ωs, and the fee system ¯ P. Firstly,
we derive the buyer’s expected payment given its joint positions ¯ v¯ x and joint numbers of sellers
submitting asks in different marketplaces ¯ y. The buyer’s expected payment is the sum of its
expected payment in each marketplace, which is:
˜ Pb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) =
M X
m=1
˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm)
where ˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm) is the buyer’s expected payment in marketplace m when it
bids db
m given its position vm and ym sellers submitting asks in this marketplace, and it is given
by:
˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm) =

   
   
0 if db
m = 

P
ds∈Φ−{
}
˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs,ds, pm) + rm + ε if db
m , 
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where
P
ds∈Φ−{
}
˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs,ds, pm) is the buyer’s expected payment excluding reg-
istration fee rm and constant cost ε, and ˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs,ds, pm) is the buyer’s expected
payment when it attempts to be matched with the ask ds, which is given by:
˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs,ds, pm) =

     
     
0 if db
m ≤ ds
vm−1 P
ys
1=0
ym−ys
1 P
ys
2=vm−ys
1
ρs(ym,ys
1,ys
2,ds) ∗ ˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm|ds) if db
m > ds
where
ρs(ym,ys
1,ys
2,ds) =
 
ym
ys
1,ys
2,ym − ys
1 − ys
2
!
∗
3 Y
i=1
es
i(ds)
E
ys
i
is the probability that there are exactly ys
1 asks strictly less than ds, exactly ys
2 asks equal to
ds (including the ask itself), and exactly ym − ys
1 − ys
2 asks greater than ds. The same as be-
fore, since the calculation is given the condition that ym sellers have submitted asks in mar-
ketplace m, and thus the probability of an ask less than (equal to, or greater than) ds in mar-
ketplace m should be normalised, i.e. es
i(ds)/E and E = e<
s(ds) + e=
s(ds) + e>
s(ds). Note that
vm−1 P
ys
1=0
ym−ys
1 P
ys
2=vm−ys
1
ρs(ym,ys
1,ys
2,ds) actually gives the overall probability that this match happens. Fi-
nally, ˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm|ds) is the buyer’s expected payment when it is matched with
the ask ds. This is given by:
˜ Pb
m(vm,ym,θb,db
m,Ωb,Ωs, pm|ds) = TP + tm + TP ∗ om + (db
m − TP) ∗ qm (B.15)
where TP = ds ∗ km + db
m ∗ (1 − km) is the transaction price, tm is the transaction fee, TP ∗ om is
the payment of transaction price percentage fee, and (db
m −TP)∗qm is the payment of proﬁt fee.
Now by considering all possible joint numbers of sellers submitting asks in different market-
places, all possible joint positions and all possible numbers of buyers satisfying different joint
events, the buyer’s expected payment is given by:
˜ Pb(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) =
X
¯ x∈X
ρb(¯ x) ∗
X
¯ v¯ x∈V¯ x
υ(¯ v¯ x) ∗
X
¯ y∈Y
ρs(¯ y) ∗ ˜ Pb(¯ v¯ x, ¯ y,θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) (B.16)
Finally, the expected utility of the buyer with type θb using action δb is:
˜ Ub(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) = ˜ Vb(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs) − ˜ Pb(θb,δb,Ωb,Ωs, ¯ P) (B.17)
In this way of calculating a buyer’s expected utility, for buyers, by comparing actions in terms
of comparing bids in the actions, we reduce the possibilities of buyers’ action choices from
|Φ|M∗(B−1) to3M∗(B−1), andforsellers, byconsideringthepossibilitiesofthenumberofthesellers
submitting asks in different marketplaces, we reduce the possibilities from |Φ|M∗S to (S +1)M. In
our analysis where we consider 11 possible shouts plus 
, 2 competing marketplaces, 5 buyersAppendix B An Alternative Approach to Calculate Expected Utilities of Traders in Section
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and 5 sellers, we signiﬁcantly reduce the possibilities of buyers’ action choices from 128 =
429981696 to 38 = 6561, and reduce the possibilities for sellers from 1210 = 61917364224 to
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